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INTRODUCTION
Colonel Dan Bryan and 
the evolution of Irish Military Intelligence, 1919 -1945.
In the context o f contemporary Irish History Colonel Dan Bryan has played a 
significant, but controversial role in a period which has been well documented but where 
he has largely gone unnoticed. The aim of this thesis is twofold; to examine the life and 
career of Colonel Dan Bryan and in the process to give the reader an accurate depiction 
of the Irish Military Intelligence organisation from it’s foundation up to 1945. The aims 
are compatible and lend themselves to each other. An in depth analysis of Dan Bryan’s 
character and the role he played within the intelligence organisation serves to illuminate 
much about the organisation itself.
Dan Bryan was bom on 9th May 1900 in Dunbell a small rural townland 
near Gowran in County Kilkenny. He lived there with his widowed Grandmother Bridget 
and his parents John and Margaret. Dan Bryan was the first bom of a large family. He had 
fourteen younger brothers and sisters. These included Walter, Richard, James, John, 
Mary, Maggie, Thomas, Patrick, Ellen, Michael, Bridget, Paddy, Steven and Nelly. His 
father John inherited the large five hundred acre family farm which Dan worked on 
occasionally with his brothers and sisters. At the turn of the century the Bryan family 
were financially secure. Dan Bryan’s grandfather, after whom he was named, died aged 
forty eight in 1879. This left the running of the farm to his wife Bridget which she did 
with great resolve.1 By 1901 the Bryan’s could afford to keep three farm hands and one
1 According to Dan Bryan’s nephew Bartley Bryan, Bridget Bryan ran the farm with an Iron hand. Interview 
with author
20-09-98, Dunbell Co. Kilkenny.
domestic servant. This changed significantly as Bridget left the running of the farm to her 
son John. From 1901 to 1911 the number of children in the family had increased from 
just Dan to seven more brothers and sisters. John was a strong believer in education and 
insisted that all his children should receive schooling. This created a large financial 
burden on the family income and meant that by 1911 the Bryans could only afford one 
farm hand but were putting four children through school.2
Many of the Bryan children were very bright. Dan although the oldest son, 
because of his intellect and the financial situation at home, was encouraged by his father 
to pursue a career in medicine. At the age of sixteen Dan Bryan matriculated from the 
local Christian Brother school in Kilkenny through the National University of Ireland. He 
entered U.C.D. in October 1916 to study medicine, although he wanted to study law.3 He 
moved from the family home in Kilkenny to a series of rented rooms on the South 
Circular Road and eventually settled on the Rathmines Road in Dublin. While studying 
he was meticulous with his money and kept a daily cashbook of all his expenditure which 
included his return train fare to Kilkenny once a month.4
Bryan was a student in a Dublin with a changing atmosphere. Dublin was 
experiencing the aftermath of the Easter Rising and change of heart of the Dublin public 
following the executions of the rebel leaders.5 Coupled with this, Universities were 
proving to be a hotbed for the seeds of new underground societies. New cultural 
revolution societies and some older militant societies such as the Gaelic League, the Irish
2 See 1901 and 1911 Census for County Kilkenny, Barony of Gowran, Dunbell. National Archives Dublin; 
henceforth referenced as N.A. Dublin.
3 Dan wanted to study law rather than medicine according to his nephew Bartley Bryan. Interview with 
author 20-09-98.
4 Student cashbook (UCD Archives, Bryan papers, P71/1, P71/2).
5 According to the Old Kilkenny Review which published an obituary o f Dan Bryan who had been one of 
their contributors, he was present in College in Dublin during Easter week which would suggest he studied 
and sat the matrick exams in Dublin before he entered UCD in October 1916.
Ellen Prendergast, “Obituary Colonel Daniel Bryan” in Old Kilkenny Review , v3, no. 2 (second series 1985) 
p. 227.
Republican Brotherhood (I.R.B.) and now the newly reorganised Irish Volunteers were 
enjoying new leases of life in student surroundings. Despite Bryan’s middle class land 
owning and catholic background it was not surprising that during his student years in 
Dublin he was involved in the political and militant struggle for Irish independence. As a 
seventeen year old in 1917 he joined the Irish Volunteers. Although Dan Bryan did not 
come from a military family, like most of the leading intelligence staff he fought in the 
War of Independence (1919-21). It was during this period, whilst serving in the Dublin 
Brigade, that he was introduced to the world of espionage and intelligence gathering. His 
unit at one stage worked in collaboration with Michael Collins infamous “Squad”. This 
thesis examines the birth of Irish Military Intelligence during the War of Independence, 
together with Bryan’s own promotion through the ranks and his early involvement with 
the intelligence department.
After the signing of the treaty, Bryan enlisted as an officer in the new Free State 
Army. He played a significant role in the civil war years, leading to his promotion at the 
age of only twenty three, in February 1924, to the rank of Captain. As the civil war 
ensued he found himself working directly in military intelligence (The Second Bureau) 
which was one of many official intelligence agencies at the time. As the new Free State 
emerged from the civil war, psychologically scathed and resting on shaky foundations, 
Dan Bryan exerted a calming influence. He established a uniform defence policy for the 
state and helped prevent the destabilising affects of the Army Mutiny in 1924. Although 
the scaling down of the army and the dissatisfaction of army officers with the Army 
Council were the main causes of the affair, the mutineers were greatly encouraged by the 
support of a faction of the Cumann Na nGaedhael government. The Army Mutiny topic 
has been covered in detail before, however this thesis shall examine the intelligence war 
which took place between the mutineers and the intelligence department. Dan Bryan was 
deeply involved with monitoring the actions of the mutineers and was closely associated
with the members of the Army Council who resigned as a result of the affair. Despite his 
close affiliation Bryan managed to survive the Army Mutiny and went on to become a 
formidable driving force behind the Second Bureau Military Intelligence Department in 
it’s infancy.
Throughout the early 1920’s Military Intelligence managed to establish itself as 
the premier agency for gathering information. Dan Bryan and the network of informers 
and agents he built up made it very difficult for the defeated republican IRA to survive. 
Military Intelligence due to it’s success during the Civil War period (1922-23) not only 
managed to maintain its jurisdiction over external foreign secret affairs but also internal 
civil affairs. This brought the organisation in contact with the republican IRA and placed 
it in direct competition with the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), the secret civil 
police force at the time. This strenuous relationship lasted up until late 1925 when a 
decision was enacted that gave the newly established Garda Siochanna control over all 
political surveillance, which included taking possession of all political files, informers 
and agents held by Military Intelligence.6
During the period 1926 to 1938 Irish Military Intelligence now known as G2, was 
ordered to concentrate solely on foreign and defensive issues concerning Ireland. The 
years 1926 to 1938 have been described as marking a form of limbo for G2.7 Despite this, 
Irish Military Intelligence commanders assumed a role which had many more functions 
and greater scope than their European counterparts. It’s officers who were highly 
regarded within Irish Army circles were now the chief actors in determining strategic 
planning for the whole army. Dan Bryan in 1928 transferred to the Defence Plans 
Division which concentrated on forming an official defence policy. He was also involved
6 Over 30,000 files were handed over to the Garda in 1926. Record from the Bryan papers (UCD Archives, 
Bryan papers, P71/404).
7 See Brian Martin, The role of Irish Military Intelligence During World War Two, M.A. Maynooth, 1994, 
p. 4.
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in establishing a three way public air service between London, Dublin and Belfast.8 In 
1930 he accompanied the Irish delegation to the Imperial Conference in order to establish 
a unified coast watching service with Britain.9 Between 1931 and 1934 Dan Bryan 
worked in the office of the Chief of Staff. In 1935 he transferred back to the G2 
Intelligence department which he unofficially never lost contact with. In 1932 he was 
present when Fianna Fail came to power for the first time amid fears by the public o f a 
revolt within the Army. Dan Bryan was involved mainly with these issues but he also 
involved himself in training and lecturing other officers on Intelligence Staff courses.
In 1936 the then Director of G2, Colonel Liam Archer had forecast a major war 
looming and had warned government officials but to little affect10. On the 3 September 
1939, Britain and France declared war on Germany. Ireland declared her intention of 
remaining neutral, something which had only in reality been feasible since the release of 
the treaty ports by the British in 1938. The ports of Cobh, Lough Swilly and Berehaven 
were to play a major role in Ireland’s Emergency history. At different stages throughout 
the war Ireland’s stance of neutrality brought veiled promises of a united Ireland from 
both British and German sides. 11 The British desire to reoccupy the treaty ports grew as 
the war progressed and fear of a British invasion was entertained as a realistic threat. 
1939 saw the stepping up of the IRA’s S-Plan bombing campaign of mainland Britain. 
This increased fears in British war cabinet circles of possible IRA collaboration with the 
Germans and the formation of a fifth column. On the other side the German secret service 
the Abwehr did make attempts to contact the IRA during the war. This made Ireland and 
especially Irish Military Intelligence G2 who were partly responsible for the country’s
8 Development o f  Civil Aviation, 1930 (UCD Archives, Bryan papers, P71/7).
9 Imperial Conference, 1930 (UCD Archives, Bryan papers, P71/8).
10 Copy o f  Archer to Brennan, 2 Feb. 1936, with Brennan to minister for defence, 22 Sept. 1936 (UCD  
Archives, MacEntee papers, P67/191 [3]).
11 See Joseph T. Carroll, Ireland During the Emergency 1939-45 (Dublin, 1972).
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defence very wary of both Allies and Axis powers encroaching on the state’s policy of 
neutrality.
With the outbreak of war, G2’s role and staff increased immediately and the
organisation obtained a similar powerful position to that which it held at the close of the
Civil War. G2’s role expanded, taking over or being included in much of the security
operations o f the State. It’s principal responsibilities according to Bryan included the
development o f the air and marine intelligence organisation, foreign armies, air 
and marine movements, censorship and control o f  communications, signals 
detection and control, publicity and press relations and military and security 
problems with various countries. 12
The enlistment o f Defence Forces personnel reached 40,000 at its height with 
98,000 in the reserve.13 G2’s staff numbers like the rest of the defence forces expanded 
rapidly and by 1940 had formed a supplementary intelligence service (S.I.S) which 
operated in the southern half of the country.14 Dan Bryan was second in command to 
Liam Archer, the Director of Military Intelligence up to 1941 when Bryan was promoted 
to head of G2, a position which he held until March 1952. Bryan oversaw the running of 
all G2 operations and is accredited with the success of the organisation during the 
Emergency. The success of its counter espionage department was impressive. It is 
thought that all German agents bar two were captured within a few days of arrival. G2 
also managed to crack some German codes. The Combat Intelligence department of G2 
planned and prepared well in case of invasion, although this hypothesis was never tested. 
G2 played a large part in the strict censorship of radio, newspapers, speeches, post and 
other information media that were available at the time. The then Minister for Co­
12 Taken from a lecture summary sheet given by Dan Bryan on “Military Intelligence 1939-1945”, 16 Feb 
1983. Quoted in Eunan O’ Halpin, “Aspects o f  Intelligence” in Irish Sword, xix, no. 75& 76 ( The 
Emergency 1939-45, 1993), p. 57.
13 See Patrick Keatinge, A Place Among The Nations (Dublin, 1978), p. 90.
14 Eunan O ’ Halpin, “Aspects o f  Intelligence” in Irish Sword, xix, no. 75& 76 ( The Emergency 1939-45, 
1993), p. 62.
ordination of Defensive Measures, Frank Aitken worked closely with G2 in applying their 
successful strict censorship scheme. Censorship played a vital role in the political 
juggling game President De Valera was playing with all the belligerents at the time. 
Invasion of Irish airspace and waters were made by both sides, but its extent was hidden 
from the general public. Similarly the Irish public was not informed of the atrocities 
Hitler was committing at the time on mainland Europe. Bryan’s censorship department 
and other government censorship bodies managed successfully to isolate the country from 
outside political influences other than the approved propaganda.
On the other hand Bryan has been particularly criticised for favouring the allies 
cause, despite Ireland’s neutral stance. His contacts with British MI5 and the American 
OSS during the Emergency have given credence to the description of Ireland’s neutral 
policy as that of “friendly neutrality”. The major role Bryan played in co-operating with 
British Intelligence has been further revealed with the recent release of MI5 files on the 
operations of their Irish Section during this period. The final chapters deal with Dan 
Bryan’s controversial dealings with MI5 and British agents working in Ireland at the time. 
It also discusses the possibility of Irish envoys and foreign diplomats who were possibly 
used as spies for both the Irish and American governments at the time. Despite Bryan’s 
co-operation, after the war both the British and Irish press bodies portrayed Ireland as 
taking a pro-nazi line.
With the conclusion of the war Bryan remained in charge of G2 and was involved 
in the scaling down of the organisation and fitting it for a peacetime role. With the 
outbreak of the Cold War he conducted studies on the U.S. and the then U.S.S.R and 
Ireland’s position was examined in the event of another global conflict erupting. In 1951 
he visited a series of U.S. bases in mainland Europe. The following year he stepped down 
as Director of Intelligence and was appointed the Commandant of the Military College.
He was involved in giving staff courses and training many intelligence officers as he had 
done in the 1930’s. In 1956 he retired and was appointed to the reserve.
Bryan’s career in military intelligence reflects the highs and lows of the 
department. His work on the periphery of the department in it’s infancy and his early 
enlistment as a junior officer in the department reflects the similar early development of 
Military Intelligence during the War of Independence( 1919-1921). Bryan’s movement to 
the fore of the organisation during the post Civil War years (1923-25) sees the department 
become a well organised professional body, distinguishing itself as the premier 
intelligence agency in the state. Similarly the demise of the department following the 
removal of it’s internal role against subversion sees Bryan move back into the shadows of 
the organisation while taking up another military position. His re-emergence in 1935 as 
Deputy Director and eventual promotion to Intelligence Director in 1941 mirrors the re­
birth of the department in the lead up to the Second World War. His contribution as 
Director sees the department reclaim much of the power it had lost. Therefore Bryan’s 
military career is a good benchmark from which to study the evolution of the military 
intelligence department and the fact that his career was filled with mutinies, plots and 
major state threatening situations is an indication that life in the department was far from 
dull.
Life after intelligence was far from dreary for Bryan. He himself was very 
interested in history and politics and got involved in many historical societies and 
conferences. He was involved in the Irish Historical Society and gave lectures at some of 
their meetings. He also campaigned for an Irish military history museum, something 
which has yet to be achieved and wrote extensively on Irish military matters for the 
Military History Society of Ireland which he founded in 1949. In later years Bryan 
became disillusioned with Irish politics. He wrote about it’s problems and gave his own
political views on Irish history. 15 Through this study o f the topics mentioned above the 
reader will not only find an informative guide to the workings o f  Irish Military 
Intelligence but also gain an insight into the intriguing character that was Dan Bryan.
l5See Commandant Lang’s introduction to the Bryan papers (UCD Archives, Bryan papers, P71).
CHAPTER 1
THE BIRTH OF IRISH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 1917-21
Irish Military Intelligence was bom in the face of British Intelligence mobilisation 
during 1919. The guerrilla nature of the war the IRA was fighting meant that if was to 
succeed, an effective intelligence system was of paramount importance. An intelligence 
and counter intelligence system had to be established to eliminate informants and spies 
and to determine what targets to hit. Before 1919 Irish Military Intelligence did not exist. 
There had been a pre 1916 Rising intelligence operation, put into effect by James 
Connolly and Thomas McDonagh. It operated around Beggars Bush Barracks and Dublin 
Castle, but this network ceased after the rising.1 It was not until the political and military 
machinery of the Republican movement came under attack, that any constructive attempt 
was made to organise an Intelligence system. The Intelligence Department whose initial 
function was to protect the underground republican movement, was a product of the 
Republican Volunteer organisation.
The Irish Volunteers were founded in 1913, but split over John Redmond’s 
decision to support the British in the First World War. By 1917, those who were left 
behind became the military wing of the republican movement, and at some undetermined 
point became known as the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The Volunteers came under the 
covert control of the IRB which used them as the basis for the 1916 rising. The force was 
suppressed by the authorities after the rising but it re-emerged in 1917 as the paramilitary 
wing of the new Republican movement. It grew in size alongside Sinn Fein and expanded
during the conscription crisis of 1918, although the numbers contracted slightly after the
1 Cited in John P. Duggan, A History o f the Irish Army (Dublin, 1991), p. 24 reference 37.
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crisis had passed.2 The stature of Republican Volunteer leaders grew after many of them 
were wrongly arrested by the authorities for involvement in an imaginary “German Plot”.3 
Other factors increased support for the Volunteers. John Hanley suggests that the half 
hearted coercion methods introduced by the British were a determining factor.4
Although popular support was growing for Sinn Fein and the Volunteers, the
internal relationship between the political and military wing of the Republican movement 
was not clear cut. Theoretically control of the Volunteers passed from the Volunteers 
own elected executive, to the Dail Minister for Defence Cathal Brugha, when the Dail
first came into existence in January 1919.5 On 10 April 1919, Eamon de Valera told the 
Dail that “the minister of national defence is of course in close association with the
voluntary military forces”. This carefully worded statement suggested that the Volunteers 
were “closely associated” rather than subordinate to the Dail minister. Unlike de Valera,
Brugha wanted a more controlling Dail influence. On August 20 1919, he proposed that
all Ddil deputies and all Volunteers should take the same oath of allegiance to the state.
Contained in this oath was a recognition of the Dail as the government of the Irish
Republic, and a pledge of allegiance to support the Dail. The Dail ministers took the oath
and it appears that the Volunteer executive agreed to recommend acceptance at the next 
Volunteer convention. However due to the War of Independence it was too risky to call a 
convention to alter the Volunteer constitution. Instead representatives of local units were
2 Kevin B. Nowlan “Dail Eireann and the Army: unity in division”, in Desmond Williams et al. The Irish 
Struggle 1916-26 (London 1966), pp 67-77.
3 F.S. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine (N ew  York, 1971), pp 395-396.
4 John P. Hanley, Truce, Treaty and Civil war in Dublin city 1921-23, M.A. Maynooth 1995, p. 5.
5ibid.
invited to signify their approval or disapproval of the oath. The majority o f them accepted 
it eventually, which was undoubtedly a considerable concession to Brugha6
Four groups vied for control of military policy throughout the War of 
Independence. The Dail, the IRB, Volunteer GHQ and local IRA commanders. Cathal
Brugha as D£il Minister for Defence occasionally tried to influence military strategy.
Bold military gestures such as the attempted capture of Lord French and the burning of 
the Custom House appear to stem from a political rather than a military perspective. 
Although Brugha and the Dail ministers allocated some funding to the Volunteers and
reported on their activities, they did not interfere with its running throughout the War of 
Independence. Kevin B. Nowlan notes that the consultations which took place between 
the Cabinet, the Ministry of Defence and Volunteer Headquarters is unknown.7 The link 
between the Volunteers and the Dail is reinforced by its dual members. Richard Mulcahy
was Chief of Staff of the IRA and head of volunteer General Headquarters(GHQ), was 
also an elected member of Dail Eireann. Similarly, Michael Collins was both Dail
Minister for Finance and simultaneously Director of IRA Intelligence and sat on the 
volunteer executive. Collins position meant that although as Director of Intelligence he 
was supposedly subordinate to his Minister for Defence, Cathal Brugha, at the same time 
he held the purse strings from which Brugha could spend, in his capacity as Minister for 
Finance. These complexities lead to confusion and conflict, but by and large, the 
Volunteers saw themselves as independent of Dail control.
The secret IRB organisation was small, but had many prominent members in high 
positions who saw themselves as players in determining military decisions. Until the IRB
6 Kevin B. Nowlan “Dail Eireann and the Army: unity in division”, in Desmond Williams et al. The Irish 
Struggle 1916-26, (London 1966) p. 71.
7 Ibid p. 73.
constitution was changed in 1919, they had maintained that the President of the IRB was 
by right the President o f the Irish Republic. Although this claim was dropped, they still 
maintained a strong interest in determining military policy. The IRB contained Michael 
Collins as its leader, Richard Mulcahy the Volunteers Chief of Staff and also Liam 
Lynch. Lynch played a major role in urging the Volunteers to intensify attacks on Royal 
Irish Constabulary (RIC) barracks and British military installations in order to secure 
arms.8
The day to day running of the Volunteers remained in the hands of the full time 
officers of the Volunteer General Headquarters (GHQ).9 GHQ was the administrative 
centre of the Volunteers and was established at the beginning of 1918.10 It was based in a 
network of safe houses in Dublin under the command of the Volunteer Chief of Staff, 
Richard Mulcahy. The other leading officers were Michael Collins, Adjutant General, 
Director of Organisations and Director of Intelligence. J.J. O’Connell, Assistant Chief of 
Staff. Sean MacMahon, Quartermaster General. Dick McKee, Director of Training and
Commander of the Dublin Brigade. Rory O’Connor, Director of Engineering and Piaras 
Beaslai, Editor of An t-oglach.11 GHQ sought to regulate Volunteer activity throughout
the country. In reality they were not in a position to influence policy outside Dublin. 
Many rural IRA commanders resented attempts at control and interference from GHQ. 
They did not take much notice of standard orders and acted independently of GHQ. This 
was especially relevant in the case of the South Tipperary Brigade.12 GHQ to a lesser 
extent experienced some friction from Dublin Brigade officers who ironically felt 
aggrieved over their lack of freedom in comparison with the country Brigades. It was in
8 Ibid p. 72.
9 John P. Hanley, Truce, Treaty and Civil war in Dublin city 1921-23, M.A. Maynooth 1995, p. 11
10 Richard Mulcahy, “Chief o f  Staff 1919” in Capuchin Annual 1969, p. 345.
11 Ibid p. 342.
12 Ibid p. 348.
4
this setting that Dan Bryan entered and worked in the Dublin Brigade section of the 
Volunteers throughout the War of Independence.
Dan Bryan served in the C Company of the Fourth Battalion Dublin Brigade under 
the command of Dick Mckee. When Bryan joined the Brigade it was mainly made up of 
1916 veterans released from prison in Frongoch.13 As the War of Independence developed 
the ranks of the Brigade swelled. Bryan was recruited in 1917, before the main body of 
recruits joined following the anti-conscription crisis in 1918 and after the truce was 
signed in July 1921. According to Brigadier Oscar Traynor, the Brigade was made up in 
the main of Dublin artisans with a sprinkling of students from the National University and 
Trinity College.14 Dan Bryan was one of the sprinkling from the National University 
along with others such as Todd Andrews, Fergus Murphy. Richard Mulcahy and Ernie 
O’Malley. O’Malley like Bryan was studying medicine but joined a year after him.15 Due 
to the number of University students absent on leave at different times, the Brigade’s 
strength fluctuated from time to time.16 Dan Bryan organised a special volunteer unit in 
UCD which ran an anti-conscription campaign, parades, raids and armed patrols.17
The Dublin Brigade consisted initially of six battalions. The 5th Battalion was an 
engineering unit that operated city wide and was mostly concerned with manufacturing 
and using explosives. The 1st and 2nd Battalion operated in the North East and North West 
of Dublin. The 3rd and 4th operated in the South East and South West. The 6th Battalion 
was formed later in 1920. It was detached to form the nucleus of a second Dublin
13 Many o f  the prisoners with lighter sentences i.e. internees were released in December 1916, this was 
followed by the release o f  sentenced prisoners in June 1917.
See Maryann Gialanella Valiulis,_A3r/ra/7 of a Revolutionary General Richard Mulcahy (Dublin, 1992), p. 
21.
14 Quote taken from John P. Duggan, A History o f the Irish Army (Dublin, 1991), p. 33.
15 See the Introduction to the Ernie O ’Malley papers (UCD Archives, O ’Malley papers, P I 7).
16 See Interview with John Cullinan (UCD Archives, Ernie O ’Malley Notebooks, P17b/106).
17 Dan Bryan Pension file, 24 SP 11398 (Military Archives, Dublin).
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Brigade. By the time of the truce this unit had expanded to field four more battalions. 
This Second Dublin Brigade operated in south County Dublin and north Wicklow.18
Within each battalion there was a further division into six or seven companies 
and then in turn into sections. Dan Bryan started his active service in the C Company of 
the 4th Battalion which recruited and operated in south Dublin where he was living and 
attending college.19 C Company was led by Company Captain John Joyce and First 
Lieutenant Sean Dowling. Bryan in his early days as a volunteer private participated in 
raids, armed patrols, observation work and attended the various training meetings. 
Training included signals, first aid, cycling and chemicals. Instructors would operate on a 
company basis.20 For many of the student members of the Dublin Brigade in its early days 
of 1917 and 1918 the Brigade functioned more as a social club and a medium to express 
varying nationalist and sometimes republican ideals. As the battalion leaders began to 
organise and regroup support for the Volunteer movement became more popular. After 
the effective anti-conscription campaign at the end of 1918 the companies took on a more 
aggressive militant nature.
No major fighting took place until after the shootings at Soloheadbeg, in 
Tipperary on 21 January 1919, which marks the beginning of the war. By early 1919 
patrolling for enemy targets became a regular feature of Dublin Brigade volunteer activity 
The 4th Battalion C Company patrols were carried out by ten to twelve men with the aim 
of attacking any weak enemy post or escort they should pass. C Company were poorly 
armed with a scattering of grenades and pistols amongst the patrol men. They met at 
Winetavem Street and patrolled along Thomas Street attacking passing armoured lorries 
and Auxiliary raiding parties. All C Company patrols had to close down before the
18 John P. Hanley, Truce, Treaty and Civil war in Dublin city 1921-23, M.A. Maynooth 1995, p. 12.
19 For a fuller account o f  the Dublin Brigade structure see John P. Duggan, A History o f the Irish Army 
(Dublin, 1991), p. 34.
20 Different types o f  training in the Dublin Brigade is mentioned in Todd Andrew, Dublin made me: An 
Autobiography (Dublin, Cork, 1979).
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imposed curfew since if a patrol was spotted they could not disperse into the crowd.21 In 
addition to raids, the Dublin Brigade marched and drilled frequently. In December 1918 
the entire Dublin Brigade paraded at the funeral of Richard Coleman a prisoner at Usk 
prison and one of the first “martyrs” of the War of Independence.
The War of Independence escalated in 1920 as did support for the Volunteers. In 
April 1920 the Dublin Brigade was ordered to bum all income tax offices, a move which 
proved popular. According to 2nd Lieutenant Patrick Coughlan, between April 1920 and 
March 1921 Dan Bryan’s military activity increased. One of his first assignments was the 
capture of arms from the Custom House.22 The Custom House attack on 25 May 1921 
was ordered by de Valera and backed by GHQ. It was primarily a political move to show 
the British government that the IRA had sufficient power to hold down a large centre. Its 
secondary aim was to paralyse the British administrative system by destroying most of its 
files. It was the biggest operation since the 1916 rising, especially for the Dublin Brigade. 
According to Hanley "the operation seems to have required the involvement o f  just about 
every volunteer that could be found". The Custom House attack, although a propaganda 
success, cost the Dublin Brigade the heavy price of nearly eighty men. Needless to say the 
Custom House operation caused some friction between the Brigade officers and GHQ.
Despite this setback, recruits for the Dublin Brigade continued to filter in. During 
the summer of the previous year, 1920, the ranks of the 4th Battalion’s C Company 
swelled and the area it covered increased to include from the city south of the Liffey to 
Dolphin’s Bam and Crumlin. As a result it was decided to form another company, G 
Company. G Company was given jurisdiction over Rathmines where Dan Bryan now 
resided and was commanded by Sean McCurtain. Many of C Company’s swollen ranks,
21 Interview with John Cullinan (UCD Archives, Ernie O ’Malley Notebooks, P17b/106).
22 Information came from Coughlan’s testimony for Bryan’s years o f  service in (Military Archives, Dan 
Bryan Pension file, 24 SP 11398).
23 John P. Hanley, Truce, Treaty and Civil war in Dublin city 1921-23, M.A. Maynooth 1995, p. 14.
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including Dan Bryan, were sent to G Company in the summer of 1920 when G Company 
had a paper strength of one hundred men but only about forty were active.
At the beginning of the war neither side had an adequate intelligence network. 
The British had let intelligence files on Irish subjects lapse. The “black list” drawn up in 
1916 was not kept up to date. British military intelligence was controlled by an RIC 
officer who had no formal military intelligence training and was primarily concerned 
with counterespionage against potential German spies. By the beginning of 1919 the RIC 
officer was replaced by a General Staff Officer and the Volunteers began to be 
investigated as a hostile force. However the RIC’s Crimes Special Branch which was 
responsible for political intelligence gathering was under funded.24 During the Liberal 
Chief Secretaryship of Mr. Birrell, the flow of secret information ceased due to financial 
cutbacks. Despite this, towards the end of 1919, British troops in Ireland were 
reorganised and intelligence officers were appointed to various battalions. In addition to 
military intelligence, civil police agents were sent to Ireland, directly controlled by the 
Scotland House Organisation in London. They were known as the “Cairo gang”. They 
worked independently of the Dublin Metropolitan Police and its detective wing the G 
Division.
The Irish intelligence system was equally disorganised at the beginning of the 
war. Despite the large scale re-organisation of the Volunteers in 1917 following prisoner 
releases, no provision was made for an intelligence section. At the first Volunteer 
Convention since the rising in October 1917 many military staff appointments were 
made, but intelligence went unmentioned. It was not until around March 1918 that an 
Intelligence Department was established by Volunteer GHQ. Ironically, it was the 
pressure of the increased scale of British Military Intelligence, that gave birth to a counter
8
Irish Military Intelligence unit.25 Eamonn Duggan a solicitor was its first Director.26 He 
ran the Department with one member o f staff, Christopher Carberry, from his office in 
Dame Street. Although open fighting had not yet broken out, the Department because of 
its size was not functioning effectively. The authorities soon learnt of Mr. Duggan’s 
office and found intelligence files hidden amongst deed boxes.
Soon after the Department had been set up, information on police raiding parties 
became known to republicans, not via the Intelligence Department but through 
connections and friends of the Volunteer Adjutant General and Director o f Operations, 
Michael Collins. From within the ranks of the DMP’s own G Division two detectives in 
sympathy with the republican cause decided to aid it. Eamonn Broy, who worked in G 
Divisions headquarters in Brunswick Street, passed to a Sinn Féin friend, Michael Foley,
a list of prominent men who were to be rounded up. They were charged on the pretence 
of being involved with what was called the “German Plot”. This list quickly found its way 
to Michael Collins. Two days later Joseph Kavanagh a G-man who worked in Dublin 
Castle, gave a republican contact Thomas Gay, a Librarian in Capel Street, the details of 
preparations for the same raid which was to be carried out that night. This information 
was quickly passed to Collins, who notified the names on his original list of the danger. 
Along with Collins own name was, de Valera’s, Griffith’s and Cosgrave’s. The later three 
were captured despite the warning, but Collins and the majority of the military active 
Volunteers on the list evaded capture.
24 Record o f  the Rebellion in Ireland in 1920-21 and the part played by the Army in dealing with it, Vol II 
Intelligence. British General Staff, War office document May 1922, found in (UCD Archives, Bryan papers 
P71/181).
25According to Sean Kavanagh, one o f  Collins’ agents, “About the time Collins became Adjutant General an 
intelligence Department was set up”. Collins became Adjutant General in March 1918.
Sean Kavanagh, “The Irish Volunteers’ Intelligence Organisation” in Capuchin Annual 1969, p. 354.
26 Duggan later became Minister for Home Affairs(Justice). See Development o f  Military Intelligence (UCD  
Archives, Bryan Papers P 71/171(l)).
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Within a few days Collins, probably through Foley and Gay made contact with 
both Broy and Kavanagh (neither o f whom until now knew the political feelings o f the 
other).27 A little later he was introduced to a third detective who worked in Dublin Castle, 
James MacNamara. Later again, Collins managed to secure the services o f David 
Nelligan, another double agent in G Division.28 Quite coincidentally, Collins’ cousin 
Nancy O’Brien, was appointed by Sir James MacMahon to handle all of Dublin Castle’s 
most secret coded messages. This Collins exploited to its full potential.29 Collins had 
another female agent working in Dublin Castle. Lily Merin, a cousin of Republican Piarás
Beáslaí. She was a typist who smuggled files to Collins and walked arm in arm with
Intelligence Officers such as Tom Cullen or Frank Saurín, up and down Grafton Street, 
identifying British agents for the Squad. Josephine Marchmont a secretary in a barracks 
in Cork supplied Collins with valuable information. Ms. Marchmont agreed to aid the 
IRA after they kidnapped her children who were in the custody of her mother in law in 
Wales, and returned them to her.30 These men and women became the nucleus o f a 
powerful counter intelligence system and were present at the birth of Irish military 
intelligence.31
Although Collins kept these informers closely under his control and began to 
expand his network of contacts, officially he had nothing to do with the running of the 
Volunteer Intelligence Department in Dame Street. Despite this, due to his counter 
intelligence successes and his large influence within the IRB and the Volunteer 
movement, he was officially named Director of Intelligence (D/I), early in 1919. He
27 Collins gave Thomas Gay £5 for Detective Sergeant Joe Kavanagh after he supplied the names o f  those to 
be arrested in connection with the German plot. However Gay never passed the money on. See T Ryle. 
Dwyer, Michael Collins -  The man who won the war (Dublin, 1990), p. 63.
28 Conor Brady, Guardians o f the peace (Dublin, 1974), p. 32.
29 Tim Pat Coogan, Michael Collins (London, 1990), p. 82.
30 Ibid p. 83.
31 See the article by one o f  Collins’ agents, Sean Kavanagh, “The Irish Volunteers’ Intelligence 
Organisation” in Capuchin Annual, 1969 pp 354-367.
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maintained the position as D/I throughout the War of Independence, while still holding 
the posts of Director o f Organisation(D/0), Adjutant General and Minister for Finance. 
He eventually gave the position as D/O to Diarmuid O’Hegarty and Adjutant General to 
Gearoid O Suileabhain in the summer of 1919, so that he could concentrate on
intelligence.
It was during the summer of 1919 that the Intelligence Department started to 
develop. Dan Bryan commented that Intelligence under Collins began purely as a 
protective measure, but developed into a machine which was used to destroy British 
Intelligence in Ireland.32 Collins went about creating an intelligence network and system 
from scratch, selecting men he knew from his links in the IRB and the IRA. He made 
Liam Tobin the then Intelligence Officer of the Dublin Brigade, Assistant D/I. Tobin ran 
a secret intelligence office set up in Crow street in Dublin over a print shop, which 
Collins himself never visited in case he attracted too much attention.33 Collins made 
Frank Thomton and Tom Cullen his main lieutenants. Gradually a staff was built up, with 
Frank Saurin, Joe Guilfoyle, Charlie Dalton and Joe Dolan all serving in the GHQ 
Intelligence Department. The GHQ Intelligence Department attempted to keep 
comparatively few written intelligence records and reports. The system itself was as 
decentralised as possible and control was maintained by Collins and his other travelling 
staff officers issuing oral directives to different commands. Due to the danger of records 
falling into British hands, it is easy to understand why IRA GHQ feared the formation of 
a large central intelligence office.34
In June 1919, Collins through his intelligence network organised de Valera’s and 
Harry Boland’s safe passage to the U.S. In October his Department orchestrated Austin
32 Development o f  Military Intelligence (UCD Archives, Bryan Papers P 7 1/171(1)).
33 T. Ryle Dwyer, Michael Collins -The man who won the war (Dublin, 1990), p. 62.
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Stack’s rescue from Manchester prison to take up his position as Minister for Home 
Affairs.35 Collins through his IRB connections in British and American ports, ran and 
controlled arms purchasing and communications. The end of July 1919 saw the first 
British government spy shot by members of Collins’ intelligence network. This was 
followed by another assassination in September and two more in November.
At the close of 1919 Collins through ERA GHQ in Dublin ordered all commands 
to establish an intelligence section of their own which would report frequently back to 
GHQ intelligence. This order marked the first attempt at applying a formal structure to 
information gathering and processing within the Republican camp. Up until 1919 there 
were only ad-hoc appointments o f intelligence staff made within the general Volunteer 
body. The Dublin Brigade who had appointed Liam Tobin as their intelligence officer 
before he was transferred to GHQ was unusual, most Brigades at this stage had no 
intelligence staff whatsoever. Intelligence gathering was left to the quartermasters of 
Brigades and Battalions.36 The order from GHQ not only made it compulsory to appoint a 
Brigade Intelligence Officer, but also a Battalion I/O and a Company I/O. The Company 
I/O who was usually the Company’s captain who reported information on a regular basis 
to the Battalion I/O. In turn the Battalion I/O on gathering reports from all his companies 
would report to the overall Brigade I/O who was in direct contact with the GHQ 
Intelligence Department. In order to reduce the chances of this long chain of command 
slowing up the flow of information, any information that could be acted upon 
immediately was given priority. The officer in question did not have to wait for his 
weekly or fortnightly meetings with his superior I/O to despatch the information. The
34 Record o f  the Rebellion in Ireland in 1920-21 and the part played by the Army in dealing with it, Vol II 
Intelligence. British General Staff, War office document May 1922 p. 41, found in (UCD Archives, Bryan
dealing with it, Vol II
Intelligence. British General Staff, War office document May 1922 p. 41, found in (UCD Archives, Bryan 
papers P71/181).
papers P71/181).
Richard Mulcahy, “Chief o f  Staff 1919” in Capuchin Annual 1969, pp 343-344. 
36 Record o f  the Rebellion in Ireland in 1920-21 and the part played by the Army ii
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company area intelligence system became the backbone of the intelligence organisation.
Through this system of instant reporting, an efficient front line intelligence system
operated in certain areas of Ireland, where various groups acted quickly on information
given to them. Company front line intelligence was used to good effect by the rural flying
columns. Immediate intelligence information on British and RIC troop movements was
supplied, so that ambushes could be carried out. In Dublin the constant flow of
information on British military vehicles leaving barracks made them a constant target of
different companies of the Dublin Brigade. This system worked to such a powerful effect
in some areas that Dan Bryan records,
The most intensive activities in Dublin took place almost against the walls of 
Dublin Castle,...Aungier Street, Redmond’s Hill and Wexford Street. The Ship 
Street Military Barracks which was the military centre of the Dublin Castle 
enclave, almost extended to those streets, at the junction of Stephen Street and 
Aungier Street. Those streets were the direct and shortest route from Dublin 
Castle to Portobello (Cathal Brugha) barracks. The persistence and successive 
bombing attacks on lorried military parties,...led to this route being known as the 
Dardanelles/7
A feature of the Republican intelligence system which has largely gone unnoticed 
was the role of the Republican auxiliary units. Each Battalion in theory had an attached 
auxiliary youth division. These male youth groups were most active in Dublin and were 
collectively known as Na Fianna Eireann. Their training manual included a programme 
for intelligence training and they were actively used at company level as scouts to prepare 
ambushes and supply information on enemy movements. Another auxiliary group which 
had intelligence functions was Cumann na mBan. An all female organisation, they carried 
information all over Dublin as it was thought that they were less likely to be stopped and 
searched. Cumann na mBan members were encouraged to go out with British officers and 
personnel to pick up information. British authorities suspected many Cumann women and
37 Dan Bryan, “Guerrilla Warfare in Dublin” in An Cosantoir (July 1964) p. 399.
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women with republican sympathies were encouraged to work as domestic servants in 
centres of British administration and other republican target areas to gather information.38 
For a plan of how these auxiliary bodies fitted into the overall intelligence structure, see 
Table 1 below.
This GHQ intelligence order was enforced to some degree in Dublin, where it 
was widely thought that the war would be won or lost. But the establishment o f rural 
intelligence units was to a large degree at the discretion of the local company commander 
and was often haphazardly run. The standard of intelligence gathering and reporting 
varied considerably over the country. It was near the end of the war before a formalised 
structure of intelligence gathering was applied in the majority of commands. The 
assignment of Divisional Intelligence Officers in April 1921, forced rural commands 
outside the disciplining power of Dublin GHQ, to establish the prescribed intelligence 
system. The Divisional Chief of Intelligence was issued with a typist and given a 
freehand by GHQ to develop the intelligence service in his division. It was normal for 
Battalion I/O’s to circumvent the chain of command and report fortnightly to the 
Divisional Intelligence Officer, thus his appointment made the Brigade I/O’s job 
redundant. Despite this circumvention, Divisional I/O’s proved very effective. Although 
due to their late appointment their full potential was not achieved. According to the 1st 
Western Divisional I/O, “in my area it was not in working order until shortly before the 
truce.”39
38 Record o f  the Rebellion in Ireland in 1920-21 and the part played by the Army in dealing with it, V ol II 
Intelligence. British General Staff, War office document May 1922 p. 42, found in (UCD Archives, Bryan 
papers P71/181).
9 Record o f  the Rebellion in Ireland in 1920-21 and the part played by the Army in dealing with it, V ol II 
Intelligence. British General Staff, War office document May 1922 p. 42, found in (UCD Archives, Bryan 
papers P71/181).
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TABLE 1.
Organisation of Republican Intelligence 
1919 to 1921
_L
Uctiael Colins
Director of inteBgence
I
GHQ Volunteer 
In fe re n c e  Dept.
Divisional Intelligence Officers 
Appointed April 192)
Brigade Inteligence Officeis 
Sometimes with Secretary
Battalion Intelligence Officers
X
Company Intelligence Officer 
Sometimes Captain
ZL
Auxiliary Inteligence Groups
Cumann Na Mban
Na Fianna Eireann
1
Colins Personal 
Intelligence Network
RIC informers
DMP informers,
Post Office,
Railway
Civil Service
T h e  Squad'
PoUcal InteHgeoce
X
Publicity D ept
Irish Self Determ ration League 
London
Active Service Unit
Pans and Rome Embassy 
Gavan Duffy J Kelly
Source: Based on research carried out by the author and information from: Record o f the Rebellion in 
Ireland in 1920-21 and the part played by the Army in dealing with it. Vol. II Intelligence. British General 
Staff, War office document May 1922, found in (UCD Archives, Bryan papers P71/181).
In Dublin measures to increase the effectiveness of the intelligence system were 
being implemented in the early days of the war. In September 1919 Paddy O’Daly 
organised a group to supplement Collins’ network of agents.40 O’Daly started with eight
40 Richard Mulcahy, “Chief o f  Staff 1919” in Capuchin Annual 1969, p. 348.
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men. A year later its strength increased to twelve and eventually fifty. This group was 
known as the Active Service Unit (ASU) and was formed from the best men in the Dublin 
Brigade. These trained gunmen were made available to the GHQ Intelligence Department 
to carry out work acting directly on intelligence information.41 However the ASU saw 
themselves as independent of control from the Intelligence Department, their loyalty was 
to their respective Dublin Battalion commands from which they had been picked and also 
to Collins and Paddy O’Daly who had regular meetings with them. It was because of this 
independent spirit that the ASU got on so well with men from the South Tipperary 
Brigade who also worked independently of GHQ. Early on in the struggle they became 
closely associated with activities in Dublin and through a number of contacts co-operated 
with the Dublin Brigade.
The success of the ASU prompted the formation of another group of trained 
gunmen known as “The Squad” or “The Twelve Apostles” who acted on information 
from Collins and his intelligence contacts. This group of men were under Collins’ direct 
control and did not act or move without his authorisation. Both the Squad and the ASU 
took their orders from their respective commanders and Collins. Outside influence and 
control of these groups particularly from the GHQ Intelligence Department did not exist.
The Squad began recruiting in 1920, although according to Mulcahy a small group 
of seven men had formed to work directly under Collins in July 1919.42 At first this group 
concentrated on the security and protection of Dail members and subsidiary workers. This
protection role was paramount in safeguarding the success of the republican movement 
during the War of Independence. Without the guarding and warning functions carried out 
by republican intelligence forces, the republican political and military machinery which 
in the main was scattered throughout safe houses spread across Dublin, was likely to have
41 Richard Mulcahy, “Chief o f Staff 1919” in Capuchin Annual 1969, p. 348.
42 Ibid.
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collapsed. Between July and December 1919, the increased volume of protection required 
and the demand to neutralise potential DMP and RIC agents and informers, threatening 
the underground republican movement, put pressure on Collins to increase the number of 
active agents. A selection committee from GHQ Intelligence led by Collins went about 
recruiting. Initially a group of five men were selected on a part time basis. The Squad was 
initially organised by Mick McDonald, a Wicklow man before he left for “important 
assignments outside Dublin”.43 The number of Squad men by the autumn of 1920 had 
increased to twelve, paid on a full time basis. The Squad would at first meet regularly at 
Oriel house, until it came under suspicion. The Squad comprised of: Tom Kehoe, Jim 
Conroy, Frank Bolster, Paddy Griffin, Ben Byrne, Johnny Dunne, Jim Slattery, Mick 
Kennedy, Eddie Byme, Vinny Byrne, Mick Reilly, Bill Stapleton. Also included was Pat 
McCrea, part time Squad driver. They operated mainly in Dublin as a separate unit until 
the truce in July 1921.44
Through GHQ Intelligence Department, the Active Service Unit and his own 
personal agents, Collins managed to establish a highly effective disciplined intelligence 
system in Dublin. So much so that by January 1920 he managed to effectively destroy the 
DMP’s G Division and their agents. G division was easy to infiltrate and intimidate since 
most of its constables resided with their families in Dublin city. The first British 
government agent was shot at the end of July 1919, a second in September and two more 
in November which extinguished Dublin Castle’s eyes.45 Sir Basil Thompson a senior 
British Intelligence chief realised that G Division was not working. He wrote a report 
which resulted in G Division’s Superintendent being replaced with a Belfast RIC man 
named Redmond. He immediately increased the number of active agents and 
concentrated on infiltrating the military wing of Sinn Fein. During his few days in office,
43 William Stapleton, “Michael Collins’ Squad” in Capuchin Annual 1969, p. 368.
44 John P. Duggan, A History o f  the Irish Army (Dublin, 1991), p. 75.
45Richard Mulcahy, “Chief of Staff 1919” in Capuchin Annual 1969, p. 348.
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Collins found himself in Sinn Féin headquarters at 6 Harcourt Street when it was raided
by Redmond’s men. Collins managed to bluff his way out pretending to be a lowly clerk. 
Collins’ men in January 1920 shot Redmond and thereafter G Division ceased to operate 
directly against Sinn Fein and the IRA as an intelligence service.46
The general body of the RIC who had been the eyes and ears o f the British 
government were targeted by the Volunteers. From 1919, the IRA supplied with 
information from the Intelligence Department, carried out a systematic murder campaign 
against the “more energetic RIC officers”. Many were killed and others were transferred 
to places were their local knowledge was useless. Consequently the RIC Crimes Special 
Branch was paralysed47 Many RIC men resigned, some through fear and some for 
patriotic reasons.
Despite this the British military had managed to build up a fairly accurate picture 
of formations and units in Dublin and Cork and on 30 and 31 January 1920 they rounded 
up sixty four “prominent” IRA Volunteers. However they found it impossible to obtain 
definite information on IRA GHQ and its subsections. In rural areas British Intelligence 
was in the hands of the RIC commanders who were more of a hindrance than a help being 
set in their ways and sceptical of military intelligence, their information was sparse and 
unreliable. British Military Intelligence was given the perception that IRA staff work was 
primitive and that its GHQ did not know which units comprised their own Second 
Southern Division.48 In order to counteract the inactivity of the G Division and the 
inaccuracy of the RIC, the British Authorities despatched their own agents directly 
controlled from London. The brunt of British intelligence work was left to these agents 
from the Scotland House organisation in London. They were known as the Cairo gang,
46 John P. Duggan, A History o f  the Irish Army (Dublin, 1991), p. 37.
47 Record of the Rebellion in Ireland in 1920-21 and the part played by the Army in dealing with it, Vol II 
Intelligence. British General Staff, War office document May 1922, found in (UCD Archives, Bryan papers 
P71/181).
after a Dublin café they used to frequent. This force was independent o f Dublin Castle 
HQ and responsible to someone in London. Sir Basil Thompson creator o f the Special 
Branch at Scotland Yard, claims not to have had any say in the organisation. It is 
probable that Vernon Kell Director of MI5 played a part in its organisation although he 
remained silent on the subject. It is most likely that Sir Hammar Greenwood, Minister for 
Irish Affairs supervised the group of agents.49 The Cairo gang set about building up a 
network of informers with a view to infiltrating and destroying the upper echelons of the 
Volunteer organisation. They became known in intelligence circles to be brutal and 
violent. One of the Secret Service officers, Bowen, a former British officer with a 
distinguished war record became so disgusted with their tactics that he foolishly told his 
superiors in the gang that he would report the irregular way in which the service was 
being run to David Davies an influential Welsh politician. Some time later Bowen’s dead 
body was pulled out of the Liffey.50
Another set back for British Military Intelligence was the introduction of the 
infamous Black and Tans. Their reputation for brutality helped dry up support for the 
British administration and discouraged potential informants. The Black and Tans often 
exceeded their duties by crudely indulging in counterespionage. This constantly upset the 
work of Basil Thomson’s Special Branch and also of the MI5 agents that were 
despatched. According to Thomson “Many lives would have been saved if, instead of a 
force of thugs, a disciplined counter-espionage unit had been organised and moved to 
Dublin”.51
Despite these setbacks the Cairo gang was making plans to destroy the Volunteer 
IRA leadership. Michael Collins realised that it was only a matter of time before IRA
48 John P. Duggan, A History o f  the Irish Army (Dublin, 1991), p. 37.
49 Richard Deacon, British Secret Service, (London, 1991), p. 231.
50 Richard Deacon, British Secret Service, (London, 1991), p. 231.
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GHQ would be infiltrated and his intelligence network destroyed. Already attempts had 
been made by British agents to join the IRA. Suspected double agents were fed false 
information and if the British acted upon it these double agents were immediately killed 
by the IRA. Both a Scotland House agent and a double agent from British GHQ had been 
caught and killed. However Collins realised that this system was not fool proof.52 He 
learned of a planned Cairo gang attack to assassinate all the Sinn Fein leaders. In 
anticipation of this, on Sunday 21 November 1920 at 9 a.m the Active Service Unit 
assassinated twelve British intelligence officers.53 The Dublin Brigade 4th Battalion G 
Company where Dan Bryan was working, provided cover for members o f the Active 
Service Unit operating in Aylesbury Road at that time.54 That afternoon (Bloody Sunday) 
angry troops went to Croke Park and killed ten spectators and wounded sixty five. The 
Commandant and the Vice-Commandant of the Dublin Brigade Dick McKee and Peadar 
Clancy who had been picked up were tortured and killed.
As the war continued the British sent in more troops. By June 1921 another 
eighteen battalions arrived in the country. Although troop numbers increased, the British 
intelligence network was in disarray. The RIC had been silenced, informants and agents 
were drying up. During the Chief Secretaryship of Birrell the secret service had 
practically ceased to exist.55 Collins and GHQ intelligence used this time to organise. 
They planted a mole in the Central Telegraph Office who supplied copies of confidential 
telegrams to Liam Tobin, Assistant IRA Director of Intelligence. Information on 
impending raids and arrests was deciphered and distributed. The British changed their
52 Record of the Rebellion in Ireland in 1920-21 and the part played by the Army in dealing with it, Vo! II 
Intelligence. British General Staff, War office document May 1922 p. 44, found in (UCD Archives, Bryan 
papers P71/181).
3 According to Dan Bryan “The Active Service Unit itself was limited and controlled by the Dublin 
Brigade ”, probably because many of the units members were also Brigade members, (UCD Archives, Bryan 
Papers, P71/191(4)).
34 Interview with John Cullinan (UCD Archives, Ernie O’Malley Notebooks, PI7b/106).
33 Despite saying that British secret service was having major problems in Ireland in 1921 he also says 
between 1920-1921 the British organisation of Intelligence was paying off, but sources this information as
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code for sending orders every month or so, but the code was changed using the old code, 
so the Volunteer Intelligence Department had no problem in deciphering. Collins 
managed to use a network of personal agents to infiltrate military mail and telephone 
messages. He also had an efficient and secure message delivery service courtesy of 
sympathetic railway employees and station masters who would pass on messages the 
length and breadth of the country. Other areas which proved valuable once they were 
infiltrated were the Civil Service and a series of hotels.56 British Intelligence also had 
direct evidence to suggest that IRA agents were trained and ordered to enlist as soldier 
clerks in the British Army at British Military GHQ in Dublin and at the Adjutant 
General’s office in Cork.57
While serving in the Dublin Brigade Dan Bryan received his first taste of 
intelligence gathering. In January 1921 Joe Kinsella the head of intelligence in the 4th 
Battalion was transferred to aid in grenade manufacturing and Dan Bryan after four years 
service in C and G Company, at the age of twenty, was promoted to Assistant Battalion 
Intelligence officer for the 4th Battalion. The Battalion’s intelligence section worked in 
co-operation with each of the Battalion’s company leaders and intelligence officers. 
Bryan also liaised with the overall commanding Dublin Brigade Intelligence Officer who 
reported directly to Collins.
Dan Bryan as the 4th Battalion Assistant Intelligence Officer, gave intelligence 
reports to the 4th Battalion Commandant Sean Dowling, the G Company Captain Sean 
McCurtain, the E Company Captain F. X. Coughlan and to his own Fourth Battalion 
intelligence section. Bryan spent much of his time correlating information from the
n21 “A confidential source”. Information from John P. Duggan, A History o f  the Irish Army (Dublin, 1991), 
p. 62.
Record of the Rebellion in Ireland in 1920-21 and the part played by the Army in dealing with it, Vol II 
Intelligence. British General Staff, War office document May 1922 p. 43, found in (UCD Archives, Bryan 
papers P71/181).
”  Ibid.
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Kildare Street Club. The billiard room in this club was the meeting place for many British 
officials working in Dublin. Tommy Daly, the battalion’s intelligence officer, worked 
undercover in the club and reported to Bryan who in turn processed and distributed the 
information. Daly was very successful and because of his accurate reporting he was 
appointed to work directly for Collins’ GHQ intelligence.58 For substantial periods of the 
War of Independence Dan Bryan held the position of Battalion I/O when the I/O was 
missing. According to a Lieutenant O’Hanlon, Dan Bryan was acting Battalion I/O from 
January 1921 up until the Anglo Irish truce in July 1921.59 He met with the I/O’s of all the 
Battalion’s companies and knew what they were doing and working on. He saw reports 
James Dwyer G Company’s I/O, had on Sir James McMahon who was an old class mate 
of Dwyers and at the time Under Secretary for Ireland. The reports detailed the political 
situation in Dublin Castle and the feeling amongst individual government officials 
towards the nationalist movement.60 Political intelligence was important to the political 
wing of the Republican movement. Steps were taken to secure political intelligence not 
just from company and battalion I/O’s, but from republican groups which could access 
this information more readily. The Irish Self Determination League led by Arthur O’Brien 
in London supplied information on trends in British public opinion and political attitudes 
towards Sinn Fein within parliamentary circles. Erskine Childers and Desmond Fitzgerald
supplied similar information. Political intelligence which gauged support for and against 
Sinn Fein on the continent came from Sinn Fein ambassadors in Rome and Paris.61
38 Information on Bryan’s entry into intelligence came from Padraic O’Farrell, A who's who o f  the Irish War 
o f  Independence 1916-21, (Dublin 1983), p. 22.
39 See Lieutenant O’Hanlon’s testimony for Bryan’s years o f military service in (Military Archives, Dan 
Bryan Pension file, 24 SP 11398).
60 (UCD Archives, Bryan papers, P71/198).
61 Record of the Rebellion in Ireland in 1920-21 and the part played by the Army in dealing with it, Vol II 
Intelligence. British General Staff, War office document May 1922 p. 44, found in (UCD Archives, Bryan 
papers P71/181).
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Between April 1921 and July 1921 Dan Bryan worked closely with former T.D. 
James or Seamus Dwyer gathering intelligence reports on police raids and suspects .62 
According to Company Commander F.X. Coughlan, Bryan showed a natural aptitude for 
the business of intelligence and gave the greatest satisfaction to his company and the 4th 
Battalion.63 He probably also had knowledge of the figures for the number o f R.I.C. and 
Auxiliaries in operation in Ireland at the time.64
Dan, within C and G Company was responsible for the removal and safety of 
many arms dumps hidden around the area.65 Between April 1921 and July 1921 the 
targeting and destruction of the Dartry Dye works as enemy property was orchestrated by 
Dan Bryan.66. As well as collecting intelligence reports, filling the position of acting 
Battalion I/O, Bryan also held the position of Battalion Unemployment officer67. GHQ 
had issued a mandate to stop emigration of potential and current Volunteers. Bryan was 
involved in encouraging this policy within the 4th Battalion.68 These new positions meant 
that Bryan did not have much time for study. Unknown to his parents in Kilkenny, he 
dropped out of medical school and did not sit his summer exams in 1922 despite having a 
good attendance record.
On 11 July 1921 an Anglo-Irish truce was in place and was followed in December 
1921 by the infamous Anglo-Irish treaty. Many historians have tried to gauge the 
strengths of the IRA at this period to ascertain if the fight could have been continued.
62 See F.X. Coughlan’s testimony for Bryan’s years of military service in (Military Archives, Dan Bryan 
Pension file, 24 SP 11398).
63 See F.X. Coughlan’s testimony for Bryan’s years of military service in (Military Archives, Dan Bryan 
Pension file, 24 SP 11398).
64 According to F.S. L. Lyons, in an interview with Bryan in 1983 he disclosed that between Oct 1920 to Jan 
1922 the number o f Auxiliaries had increased from 770 to 1,418. Similarly in this period the R.I.C. had 
increased from 11,056 to 14,174. Whether Dan Bryan had access to this information during or after the War 
of Independence, is not clear.
See F.S. L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine (New York, 1971), p. 416.
65 See Lieutenant O ’Hanlon’s testimony for Bryan’s years of military service in (Military Archives, Dan 
Bryan Pension file, 24 SP 11398).
66 Military Archives, Dan Bryan Pension file, 24 SP 11398.
67 See testimony o f Captain J Fulham (Military Archives, Dan Bryan Pension file, 24 SP 11398).
68 For reference to anti emigration policy see Maryann Gialanella Valiulis, Portrait o f  a Revolutionary 
General RichardMulcahy (Dublin, 1992).
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There is little doubt that at the time of the truce, the IRA was experiencing some
difficulties. The dramatic increase in the pace of operations between January and July
1921 had left the military organisation tired and weary. This coupled with improved
British tactics, a critical shortage of arms and ammunition and the pyrrhic victory at the
Custom House meant that the Truce had come at the right time. The British Military who
were at first hampered by the disarray of their intelligence system, began by April 1921 to
adopt a systematic approach to raiding which began to yield results.69 By the time of the
truce British Intelligence estimated that,
nearly all the officers o f  the Dublin Brigade were known and a good percentage 
o f them had been arrested, including the IRA Director o f  Intelligence... .and four  
Battalion I/O's. ” “Eight o f  the principal departments o f  Di/7 Eireann and the IRA 
had been successfully raided and three arms dumps taken. Twice was GHQ o f  the 
IRA raided. On one occasion the Chief o f S ta ff s personal office and plans were 
captured, and only three days before the truce the office o f  the IRA police was 
taken.10
This is not to say that the IRA was unable to sustain the campaign, rather a much 
needed breathing space would be beneficial. During 1921 British pressure, increasingly 
applied where it mattered in Munster, was making life extremely difficult for the IRA. 
Collins’ intelligence system was feeling the strain. According to Mulcahy, had it not been 
for the truce, plans would have gone ahead for another Bloody Sunday to ease the
  _ i
pressure from British Intelligence agents. Volunteer GHQ towards the end of the war 
realised that they had to change tactics to avoid open military conflict, since they were 
sure to lose. Guerrilla warfare tactics prevented large scale open military conflict, but 
even attacks on British military convoys or personnel had to be limited since this too was 
using up men and ammunition. Instead unguarded enemy property and communication 
lines were targeted. This policy proved more effective and much more cost effective.
69 Charles Townsend, British Campaign in Ireland (Oxford, 1975), pp 130-131.
?0Quoted from, Record of the Rebellion in Ireland in 1920-21 and the part played by the Army in dealing 
with it, Vol II Intelligence. British General Staff, War office document May 1922 found in (UCD Archives, 
Bryan papers P71/181).
71 Michael Hopkinson, Green Against Green the Irish Civil War (Dublin, 1988), p. 9.
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However these new tactics were never fully implemented, since the Truce removed the 
necessity.
The Truce period was used by the Dail and Sinn Fein, the political wing of the 
nationalist movement, to formally establish control over the military section. The Dail
issued proclamations verifying it’s authority over the Volunteers and the IRA, and 
emphasised the subordinate nature of the relationship between the two. In March 1921, 
de Valera sought to tighten the links between the Volunteers and the D£il by issuing a
press statement acknowledging that the government was responsible for the actions o f it’s 
army. Although this strengthened links, military policy decisions were outside the realm 
of the Dail’s Defence Ministry. Hostilities were officially suspended but it was feared by
many that if the talks in London should break down, the British would launch a massive 
military assault. Both Brugha and de Valera wanted a reorganisation of the army under 
their Dail control, in case the war should resume. According to Nowlan, there is some
evidence to suggest that early on, part o f this reorganisation meant replacing Collins as 
Director of Intelligence, although this is likely to have been more a personal vendetta of 
Brugha’s .72 In October, the Dail cabinet decided in favour of army reorganisation. The
Dail’s “New Army” plan, offered new commissions issued under Dail authority to
existing officers. Brugha as Minister for Defence sent a circular letter to every officer 
which at this stage included Dan Bryan, offering a fresh commission in the Dail
controlled “New Army”. This “New Army” was to come into existence on 25 November, 
the eighth anniversary of the founding of the Volunteers.73 The initial response from
72 Kevin B. Nowlan “Dail Eireann and the Army: unity in division”, in Desmond Williams et al. The Irish 
Struggle 1916-26 (London 1966), p. 75.
73 Maryann Gialanella Valiulis, Portrait o f  a Revolutionary General Richard Mulcahy (Dublin, 1992), p. 105.
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officers was disappointing for de Valera and Brugha. The majority o f officers were 
surprised to receive any notice from the Minister of Defence. Frank Aitken, O/C, 4th 
Northern Division said that the circular “was the first we ever received from the Minister 
for Defence”. Other officers such as Dan Hogan expressed their need to consult with 
GHQ and the Chief of Staff before taking any commission.74
Under the reorganisation plan the oath of allegiance to the Ddil and the Republic
was to be re-administered to all the Volunteers. After the constitutional ruling of the 
Dail’s power over the army, the Dri.il would then have jurisdiction to appoint new people
to military commands and even onto GHQ staff. On 25 November the cabinet met with 
GHQ staff to discuss the reorganisation. GHQ was upset about Brugha’s proposal that 
Eoin O’Duffy, a member of the Supreme Council of the ERB, should be removed from the 
office of deputy chief of staff and be replaced by Austin Stack. Mulcahy as Chief of Staff 
said that he would take his commission in the “New Army”, only if he was given 
jurisdiction to appoint his own GHQ staff. Brugha refused this request and so a stalemate 
emerged. Mulcahy’s stance was supported by many influential IRA officers including 
Liam Lynch, de Valera attempted a compromise at the meeting, which would have kept 
O’Duffy’ as deputy chief of staff and appointed Stack as a “Ghost deputy” at the same 
time. This was rejected and the government’s plan was dropped. Some commentators 
have interpreted Mulcahy’s position as an attempt to preserve military autonomy and 
cultivating the seeds for a military dictatorship. Valiulis argues that if his position in 
appointing the GHQ staff was undermined, the ERA Volunteers would have been in a 
divided and much weaker position, if fighting had resumed. The IRA would be 
handicapped by a divided and antagonistic central staff. Brugha’s man Austin Stack, was
74 Ibid.
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openly critical and on unfriendly terms with some of the staff members. To a large 
extent de Valera’s and Brugha’s motives for bringing the army under D£il control was not
for democratic political reasons but they needed to exert a tighter control as the 
popularity and cult status of IRA men such as Lynch, Collins and Mulcahy was seen as 
threatening.
Between July and December 1921 membership of the IRA and the Dublin Brigade 
grew rapidly.76 It became more acceptable and to a degree less dangerous to join the 
organisation during this period. Although numbers in the Dublin Brigade grew larger, 
military activity declined during the period of the truce. On the ground during the truce, 
the brunt of the rank and file IRA and its staff were too busy reorganising, replenishing 
and recruiting to give any major attention to political moves to bring them under control. 
IRA Volunteer GHQ, was wary of the fact that members might become lax and be 
unprepared if fighting should resume. Training camps all over the country were organised 
to keep recruits on their toes. It was also used as a public relations exercise, to 
demonstrate their power. After several complaints by the British authorities about this 
open drilling, the media coverage was significantly reduced.
GHQ also set about tightening it’s control over the whole of the IRA. As 
mentioned before many IRA units in rural areas, were not monitored by GHQ and acted 
solely on their own initiative. The period of the truce allowed GHQ the space to 
manoeuvre and exert their authority. However many of these attempts were resented and 
there was a complaint that GHQ in Dublin was attempting to form an officer corps solely 
from UCD students.77 However GHQ’s main worry was not it’s chain of command, rather 
the indiscreet activities of some of their members during the period. Their public displays
75 ibid. p. 108.
76 See Eunan O’Halpin, “The Army in Independent Ireland” in Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffrey (ed.), A 
Military History o f  Ireland (Cambridge, 1996), p. 408.
77 Uinseannn MacEoin, Survivors (Dublin, 1985), p. 497.
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and open drilling threatened the underground character of the IRA, which the Intelligence 
Department had worked so hard to preserve. GHQ feared that, if  the conflict resumed, 
British Military Intelligence would have been able to infiltrate and destroy the 
Republican movement.78 To what extent this is true is hard to judge without access to 
British Military Intelligence records for the period. However it would be naïve to think 
that the British intelligence agencies working in Ireland at the time abandoned their work 
with the signing of the truce. Despite a significant drop in British troop levels during this 
period, intelligence reports on IRA meetings and rallies were continuous during the lead 
up to the Irish Civil War.79
78 Tim P. Coogan, The I.R.A. (London, 1970 ), p. 47.
79 For drop in troop levels see John P. Hanley, Truce, Treaty and Civil war in Dublin city 1921-23, M.A. 
Maynooth 1995, p. 27. For an example o f British Intelligence gathering after the truce see, Weekly situation 
report by G.O.C. Ireland to cabinet, week ending 1 April 1922. Public. Record .Office. London, CAB 
24\136 cp. 3933. Public Record Office, London, henceforth cited as PRO.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE CIVIL WAR 
A CATALYST FOR INTELLIGENCE DEVELOPMENT
Treaty negotiations took place between July and December 1921. The Treaty was 
put to a vote in the Dail 7 January 1922 where it was passed narrowly by sixty four votes
to fifty seven. On 14 January 1922 under the terms of the Treaty the Provisional 
Government was established to administer the twenty six counties until the Irish Free 
State government was established on 6 December 1922. This effectively curbed the 
power of the Dail. The country was divided over the treaty issue and civil war loomed.
An election on the treaty was held in June 1922 which favoured the pro treaty wing of 
Sinn Fein.
Although the Dail and the elections of 1922 highlighted the majority support the 
pro-treaty political elements had over the anti-treaty side, this was not reflected militarily. 
Like the politicians the army was split over the treaty but unlike the politicians the split 
was not as clear cut. The Dail had voted on the issue of the treaty whereas the Army did
not have to make a decision until the last minute. The IRA which had grown out of the 
Irish Volunteers always regarded themselves as independent of the political control of the 
Dail. They took their orders from their respective IRA commanders such as Liam Lynch,
Tom Barry and Ernie O’Malley. They did not believe that they were under the supreme 
control of the Minister of Defence, Cathal Brugha, rather the commander in chief of the 
Army Michael Collins was their leader. So anyone who thought that the IRA would 
naturally support the treaty after the Dail voted in favour of it was foolhardy. The IRA, 
who had borne the brunt of the War of Independence, did split over the Treaty. Unlike
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their political counterparts Sinn Fein a very formidable group of IRA officers was 
opposed to the treaty.
In Munster the majority of IRA leaders and rank and file members were anti- 
Treaty. They had sworn to uphold the Irish Republic, as established by Pearse in 1916 
and had no wish to join in any government or army which might be used to disestablish 
the Republic. The Munster republican officers called for an army convention to renew the 
army’s allegiance to the republic. The convention was held on 26 March 1922 to discuss 
the attitude of the army towards the treaty. It was clear from the results of brigade 
elections o f delegates to the convention, that there was a considerable anti-treaty 
majority. The provisional government treaty supporters realised that if the convention 
went ahead the strength of the anti-treaty troops would become known. Arthur Griffith 
issued an order banning the convention on 16 March. Despite this, fifty two out of the 
seventy three brigades in the country had delegates attend the convention. In April 1922 
the Republican army appointed a seven-strong Army Council, with Liam Lynch as chief 
of staff. On 13 April Rory O’Connor and a number of other Republicans occupied the 
Four Courts and issued a declaration in which they refused to recognise the provisional 
government. This was interpreted as an act of open rebellion by the provisional 
government but it hesitated to be the first to use force. Moreover it realised that its 
military strength was far from adequate at the time.
The Provisional Government had immediately moved to form a new National 
Army as soon as it was realised the IRA had split and could not be depended on. This 
Provisional Government recognised the urgency in forming this new army since British 
military evacuation had left a scramble for bases and barracks around the country. 
Towards the end of January the first full time regular unit of the Provisional Army was 
established. It was made up of the Active Service Unit and the Squad who had up until
then shared camps together in Glenasmole and Kilmore. They formed firstly into a
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company commanded by Capt. Paddy O’Daly and assembled for fitting out in Celbridge. 
In February they marched with Collins to take over Beggar’s Bush Barracks from the 
departing British forces. The Provisional Government immediately went on an army 
recruiting drive. Unlike the Republican forces the Provisional government had powerful 
economic backing, could afford a strong advertising campaign and offer steady wages. 
Their campaign proved successful. The Dublin Guards as the first unit were now known, 
had expanded from a company in February to a battalion by March and a brigade by May. 
However all this was not happening without serious dissent. All of the original unit had 
pre-truce active IRA service, the new recruits tended to be looked down on since most of 
them had not participated in the War of Independence. In the Provisional Government’s 
hurry to create an Army for itself, the criteria for recruits were very lax. A body of British 
officers from the old regime was recruited since trained officers were scarce. These 
decisions were to prove problematic in the future but in the short term the Provisional 
Government had managed to raise a force of 3,500 by April.
Lessons from the War of Independence highlighted the importance of an effective 
intelligence system. The Provisional Army commanders realised this and began to 
organise their own Irish Military Intelligence Department. The government also realised 
the importance of efficient intelligence agencies and allocated large amounts of financial 
aid to keep them going. Intelligence agencies funded from the Secret Service vote spent 
almost twice the size of the largest amount spent by the British authorities in Ireland in 
any one year.1 The Provisional Intelligence Department worked initially from Military 
GHQ out of the old British officer’s club in Kildare Street. This is where Dan Bryan had 
his first real dealings with Collins and GHQ intelligence2. Military GHQ then moved by 
May 1922 to Beggars Bush Barracks, after it had been handed over by the British. GHQ
1 This was £118, 762 8s 3d in its first year, See Eunan O’Halpin, “Intelligence and Security in Ireland 1922- 
45” in Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 5, no.l (January, 1990), pp 51-83.
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operated here until August 1922 when it finally moved into Parkgate Street.3 However 
during this period it was not uncommon for intelligence staff and the Department to be 
moved around to other locations. Frequently reports would come from the Office of 
Director of Intelligence located in Portobello Barracks. Also intelligence staff lists came 
from 2nd Eastern Division headquarters at Oriel House. The Criminal Investigation 
Department(CID), a supplementary Intelligence Department had its headquarters there.
The Military Intelligence branch of GHQ developed within the army from the 
original Intelligence Department of pre-treaty days. Significantly, unlike the rest of the 
IRA, the intelligence section was not affected that badly by the split. The majority o f the 
GHQ staff which included the Intelligence Department had declared their support for the 
treaty. Richard Mulcahy as head of GHQ and as Chief of Staff of the Army was the most 
senior figure in the army, alongside Collins. Mulcahy’s backing of the treaty had an 
important effect on the manner in which the split affected the army. His influence could 
particularly be felt amongst the GHQ staff. Hopkinson suggests that the secret IRB 
society controlled by Collins, also played a large part in influencing the GHQ staff. As a 
result the core of the GHQ Intelligence Department from the War of Independence 
remained intact for the civil war. In May 1922, the Intelligence Department consisted of: 
Liam Tobin Deputy Director of Intelligence, Tom Cullen Assistant Deputy Director, 
Frank Thornton Acting I/O Wellington Barracks, followed by officers, F. Saurin, J. 
Dolan, J. Guilfoyle, C. Dalton, C. Byrne, H. Conroy, D. McDonnell, J. Shanahan, and J. 
Murray.4 Michael Collins remained as Director of Intelligence until June 1922. He then 
took up a nominal position of Commander in Chief of the army.5 As a result of his
2 P17a\171 O’Malley papers. Also Dan Bryan’s Personal Recollections, Memoir Notes from 1984, (UCD 
Archives, Bryan Papers, P71/404).
3 Letters marked from D/I’s office in Beggars Bush and Parkgate Street August 1922 (UCD Archives 
Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/29).
4 List of GHQ Military Intelligence Staff, 16th May 1922 (UCD Archives Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/26).
5 List of Commanders in Chief See J.P. Duggan, A History o f the Irish Army, (Dublin: 1991) Appendix 1.
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military promotion, the position of Intelligence Director was opened. Joseph McGrath a 
member of the Provisional Government was appointed to the position and served here 
until the Dail reassembled and declared that all ministers serving in military
appointments had to return to ministerial duties.6
The second side of the Intelligence operation was made up of Collins’ own men. 
Although the Intelligence offensive units, the Squad and the Active Service Unit would 
tend to be more militant in their outlook, they were strongly influenced by their leader 
Collins and also sided with the Treaty supporters. At an early stage during the truce 
Collins had kept the Squad and the ASU together in training camps separate to the rest of 
the army. During the early months of the Provisional Army, intelligence work was 
confined mostly to Dublin with the remnants of the old intelligence service throughout 
the country. It initially dealt with internal army matters owing to the uncertain state of 
affairs at the time.7 These internal military matters were most likely to have concerned 
finding out which way relevant IRA commanders were going to side, as well as 
monitoring those influential officers who had come out in support of the anti treaty side. 
As early as January some IRA units in Munster had issued anti treaty statements. While in 
Dublin anti treaty literature was posted around the city. Provisional military Intelligence 
was particularly concerned about Liam Mellows. He was a GHQ officer who began 
editing an anti treaty newspaper called “Poblacht na hEireann” in January 1922.8
While Irish Military Intelligence and the Provisional government army were 
desperately mobilising personnel for the anticipated Civil War, Dan Bryan had returned 
home to Kilkenny. In December 1921 at the time of the treaty negotiations up until the 
first major outbreak of civil war fighting in June 1922, Bryan was officially absent from
6 Development of Military Intelligence 1916-45 (UCD Archives Bryan Papers, P7/171).
7 General Sean MacMahon’s statement to the Army Inquiry Committee Section IV Matters affecting him as 
Chief of Staff September 1922 to March 1924 pi 7 1924 in (UCD Archives Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/14).
8 John P. Hanley, Truce, Treaty and Civil war in Dublin city 1921-23, M.A. Maynooth 1995, p. 44,
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duty. During this six month period his personal file claims that he kept in touch with his 
own Dublin battalion intelligence and indeed GHQ intelligence on matters connected 
with the split. Once home, Bryan had to explain his six months absence from medical 
school. According to his nephew Bartley Bryan his family were under the impression that 
he was still attending college.9 He possibly blamed the lapse of his studies on the 
disruption the War of Independence was causing. Apart from Bryan’s own desires, it is 
quite likely that GHQ encouraged him to return home also. Bryan was still reporting to 
GHQ during this period and it seems reasonable to suggest that he was working for GHQ 
as an agent.He was possibly gathering information on the strengths and weaknesses of 
different IRA commands and gauging support for and against the treaty outside Dublin. If 
he did carry out this work, it was most likely to have been connected with his home area 
of Kilkenny. On 1 July 1922 Dan Bryan is recorded to have officially enlisted in the 
Provisional Army as an officer at a Kilkenny recruitment centre in the 2nd Southern 
Division.10
After a brief period in the 2nd Southern he was transferred to the 2nd Eastern 
Division. The 2nd Eastern Division was made up of the Fingal Brigade in north county 
Dublin and beyond, Dublin No. 1 Brigade and Dublin No. 2 Brigade which had been 
formed due to increase in numbers in the first brigade during late 1920 and 1921.11 While 
serving in the 2nd Eastern Division of the Provisional Army, he was quickly recruited to 
work directly for the new Provisional Army Intelligence Department at GHQ, which at 
this stage operated from Beggars Bush Barracks in Dublin.
Bryan returned to a Dublin which was undergoing the first fighting of the civil 
war. This move back to Dublin also brought him immediately into direct opposition to his 
former colleagues in the Dublin Brigade who had rejected the treaty in favour of their
9 Author’s Interview with Bartley Bryan, Bridget Bryan 20-09-98, Dunbell Co. Kilkenny.
10 Dan Bryan Pension file, 24 SP 11398 (Military Archives, Dublin).
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republican ideals. Unlike Dan Bryan who came from a strong land owning background, 
most of the Dublin Brigade who’s rank and file were made up of working class Dublin 
men, rejected the treaty. There is no doubt that class lines and divisions had much bearing 
on determining support for or against the treaty, but within military IRA circles it was 
also determined by the views of respective commanders.
It is very difficult to estimate the support for and against the Treaty within the 
Dublin Brigade. In an April 1922 edition of An t-Oglach, the pro treaty Chief of Staff
General Eoin O’Dufiy, estimated that, within the Dublin Brigade 1,900 men supported
1the treaty whereas 1,250 sided with the anti-treaty forces. He also estimated that a 
further 920 men joined the Provisional Army in the Dublin Brigade area. In Dan Bryan’s 
own 4th Battalion, O’Duffy claimed that 250 supported the treaty and 100 supported the 
anti-treaty forces. But although the Brigade seemed to favour the pro-treaty forces in 
Dublin it is noted that the majority of the company and battalion officers of Bryan’s 
Dublin Battalion, were in favour of the anti-treaty side.13 O’Dufiy himself also notes that 
the total figures for each Battalion was based on the numbers that were in them before the 
truce. Therefore all the recruits between July 1921 and April 1922 are not accounted for. 
A group of plainclothes British military observers in the crowd of a Dublin Brigade 
meeting at Smithfield record a different figure. The Republican Dublin Brigade meeting 
addressed by Traynor and O’Connor was said to have had 3,300 Dublin Brigade 
republicans attend.14 If this figure of 3,300 estimated by the British Officers is correct, it 
would mean that the forces in Dublin were very finely balanced, since at the time of the 
Four Courts attack the Provisional Government had an armed force of 3,000.15 According
11 Information from An t-Oglach April 25th 1922, vol. iii, no. 51 National Library of Ireland.
12 Information from An t-Oglach April 25th 1922, vol. iii, no. 51 National Library o f Ireland.
14 See John P. Hanley, Truce, Treaty and Civil war in Dublin city 1921-23, M.A. Maynooth 1995, p62.
Quote from Weekly situation report by G.O.C. Ireland to cabinet, week ending 1 April 1922. P.R.O. CAB 
24\136 cp. 3933.
15 See John P. Hanley, Truce, Treaty and Civil war in Dublin city 1921-23, M.A. Maynooth 1995, p. 63.
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13 Ibid.
to Provisional Army General Sean MacMahon an effort was made to bring the Dublin 
City and South Dublin Brigades in on the Treaty side in order to counteract the 
Republican organised Army Convention. A divisional staff was established especially to 
recruit the Dublin Brigade members. Officers in Dublin Brigades were targeted to boost 
support from the general rank and file. The 1st Battalion Dublin Brigade formed two 
companies, the 2nd Battalion five companies, the 3rd Battalion three and Bryan’s own 4th 
Battalion formed one company. General MacMahon attributed the success of the 2nd 
Battalion in recruiting due to the fact that most of the recruiting staff came from this 
battalion and also that one of their officers ASU member Major General Tom Ennis had 
concentrated on swamping Republican influences in the Battalion.16
Despite several moves at negotiating a settlement in military IRA and IRB circles, 
by June 1922 the Civil War was inevitable. Collins’ negotiations with Republican leader 
Liam Lynch were crucial in delaying the outbreak of civil war and thus gave the 
Provisional forces some necessary precious time in which to build up their armed forces. 
Although they had superior financial backing and military support from Britain had they 
required, the Provisional Government army was in an inferior military position to the 
Republican armed forces. The Provisional Army needed more time to mobilise and train 
recruits since the brunt of the officers had sided with the Republic. It had only 6,000 
armed men at the time hostilities broke out.17
On 22 June 1922, two IRA men in London assassinated Sir Henry Wilson and 
were caught. It appears that this assassination was ordered by Collins. Joe Dolan and Tom 
Cullen squad members and senior GHQ Intelligence officers, were sent by Collins to 
London to investigate a possible escape, but they failed and O’Sullivan and Dunne the 
assassins were executed. Wilson’s assassination put further pressure on the Provisional
16General Sean MacMahon’s statement to the Army Inquiry Committee Section II The General Development 
of the Army 1924, p. 10 (UCD Archives Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/14).
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Government to attack the Four Courts from where the Republican Executive operated.
The British authorities although suspicious of Collins’ involvement in the assassination
believed it was orchestrated from the Four Courts. On 27 June Free State troops began to
shell the Four Courts which marked the official start of the civil war.
The Republican Four Courts Executive itself had not planned well for an attack.
The members of the Republican Dublin No.l Brigade had been contacted and reformed
and were ordered to issue relief to the Four Court garrison. This was hampered by the
lack of satisfactory lines of communications between the Brigade commanders and the
Four Courts garrison. Before the attack there was considerable disagreement between the
Brigade and the Four Courts leadership. The commanders of No. 1 Brigade were opposed
to sending relief, according to a Republican officer in the Dublin Brigade, Todd Andrews,
their was little confidence in the Dublin Brigade as a relieving force...the senior 
anti-treaty officers of the Brigade who were left could hardly be said to be over 
endowed with qualities of leadership, I could not believe we were going to
• 1 Rindulge in such a foolishly futile military exercise.
Both Oscar Traynor and Ernie O’Malley urged that the buildings around the Four Courts 
should be fortified so as to prevent access by Free State troops instead of sending more 
troops directly to the Four Courts. However the Republican Four Court executive appear 
not to have shared the same view. According to Bryan there was a split within the Four 
Courts executive over what action to take, just before the Provisional Army attack. Bryan 
notes, that the failure of the Provisional Army’s intelligence Department to become 
aware of this, highlighted that the Department initially was not as well informed as it 
could have been.19 A number of buildings in various parts of Dublin were taken over by 
the Republican Dublin Brigade but with no coherent military plan. The brigade 
headquarters was established in Barry’s hotel, which was poorly placed for any projected
17 Ibid. p. 13.
lsTodd Andrew, Dublin made me: An Autobiography (Dublin, 1979), p. 230.
19 Development of Military Intelligence 1916-45 (UCD Archives Bryan Papers, P7/171).
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relief of the Four Courts. On 29 June Oscar Traynor took over the Hammam and Gresham 
Hotels, together with two other adjacent hotels on the east side of O’Connell Street. The 
four hotels were linked up by smashing the walls through. All Republican Dublin Brigade 
captured buildings on the south side were vulnerable and retaken quickly by Free State 
troops. Free State firepower was then concentrated at the Four Courts and O ’Connell 
Street. On 5 July, five days after Dan Bryan had enlisted in the Provisional army in 
Kilkenny the Republican O’Connell Street garrison surrendered. This surrender was 
followed by a Republican evacuation of Dublin. Both Oscar Traynor and Ernie O’Malley 
managed to escape capture during their surrender from the Four Courts and O ’Connell
Street. A Provisional Intelligence report notes that many of the republican leaders
20managed to escape from the Hammman Hotel dressed up as nurses. Both O’Malley and 
Traynor were now in charge of reorganising and reforming the Dublin Brigade members 
who had been evacuated.
Oscar Traynor was chagrined that Liam Lynch, the Republican commander had 
not sent in support from country units to aid the fighting in Dublin. But Lynch only 
wanted to use the fighting in Dublin to stall the Provisional Government forces and give 
the Republicans more time to organise. This is similar to what Collins had done for the 
Provisional forces a month earlier. Collins delayed the outbreak of conflict through IRB 
negotiations with Lynch himself. During the Dublin fighting a column of a hundred men 
from the South Tipperary Brigade led by Mick Sheehan were the only response to 
Traynor’s call for relief. They descended on Blessington in County Wicklow with the 
intention of then moving on to support Dublin. After the surrender in Dublin, they were 
joined in Blessington by O ’Malley, Traynor and other Dublin Brigade evacuees. They 
were also joined by two hundred men from the South Dublin Brigade and from Kildare.
20 Intelligence report, Captain Dalton North City District, 4th July 1922 (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers 
P7/B/I06).
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Traynor reorganised the Dublin Blessington forces into units. He felt a swoop on Dublin
or Blessington could not be made. The South Dublin Brigade men had failed to cut roads
which would have stopped the Free State troops advancing and secondly many of the
Tipperary men were agitated and wanted to return home.
Sean Moylan the Republican Tipperary leader wrote to Ernie O’Malley
“We have no food supply, base transport or intelligence. The local volunteers are 
scarce and of very little assistance. I am therefore taking my fellows back to 
concentrate on Thurles, Nenagh and perhaps Kilkenny. I hate leaving here but I 
can see no use in having a column here which has no knowledge of the country 
and which would be blind and useless.”21
The Provisional Government troops learned of the IRA reorganisation in 
Blessington from numerous Intelligence reports. The Director of Intelligence Joseph 
McGrath on 5 July 1922 had received a report from one of his intelligence officers, 
Commandant Tom Ennis. Ennis said one of his men had overheard an injured republican 
in hospital saying, he had come with a party of 150 men and materials from Tipperary to 
Blessington and met with a further 135 men from Dublin.22 Consequently Free State 
troops advanced in an encircling motion at Blessington on 8 July from the Curragh, 
Dublin and the coast. However the Blessington post had been deserted and little fighting 
took place. The Republican Dublin Brigade were ordered by Traynor to hide their arms in 
dumps and slip back into the city.
This move proved fatal for many of the Republican Dublin Brigade since, naively 
many of them stayed at home and were immediately arrested. Due to his experience as an 
intelligence officer in the War of Independence and his connections Dan Bryan had now 
been enrolled to work directly for Provisional GHQ intelligence as an officer against the 
Blessington Republicans. He had detailed knowledge and files on all the Republican
21 Quote from Moylan to O’Malley 10-07-22, republican documents captured at Blessington, Daily reports 
to GHQ June-July 1922, (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers P7/B/94).
22 Daily reports to GHQ June - July 1922, 5th July Intelligence report (UCD Archives, .Mulcahy Papers,
P7/B/94).
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Dublin Brigade members since they had all fought together in the War of Independence. 
Dan Bryan now at the age of twenty two was one of the main intelligence agents working 
in Dublin picking up Republican soldiers. He orchestrated the large capture of his old 
Dublin Brigade colleagues following their evacuation from Blessington. According to 
Republican Dublin Brigade Volunteer John Cullinan, “It was difficult to stop off at home 
for Dan Bryan our former Intelligence Officer knew us all and he also knew all our old 
haunts. I did not stay at home”.23
After his move into military GHQ intelligence Bryan had proved very effective. 
He managed to establish himself as one of the main cogs in the Provisional intelligence 
system. His information and tracking down of Republican IRA men in the city made him 
a target of Republican IRA GHQ. The failure in O’Connell Street and Blessington had 
greatly weakened the Republican Dublin Brigade. After the large scale round up of 
Republican troops on their return home to Dublin, the Brigade was close to breaking 
point. According to George Gilmore “There was practically no one left in our 
battalion”.24 Dan Bryan and Military Intelligence began to monitor a number of suspects. 
They captured a suspect Liam Clarke shortly before 5 August, and found he carried a 
series of Republican plans to blow up all the major bridges in the city. On the night o f 5 
August Dan Bryan and his intelligence men captured and arrested 104 men including Pat 
Sweeney the officer in charge. This swoop sounded the death knell for Republican 
activity in the city. According to Republican Christy Smith “It was the bridges job that 
crushed the Dublin Brigade”.25
As is evident from above, GHQ had by August 1922 established its intelligence 
network firmly in Dublin but elsewhere it was poor. Following the death of Collins in 
August 1922, General Sean Mac Mahon was appointed Chief of Staff. He was given the
23 Interview with John Cullinan (UCD Archives, Ernie O’Malley Notebooks, P17b/106).
24 Quoted in Michael Hopkinson, Green Agaimt Green the Irish Civil War (Dublin, 1988), p. 143
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task of developing military intelligence. Collins had handed over his post o f Director of
Intelligence(D/I) which he held throughout the War of Independence, to his assistant and
squad member Liam Tobin, following a brief spell by Joseph McGrath. There had been
many problems during Tobin’s reign as D/I. According to a former Intelligence chief
Mickey Joe Costello,
“Tobin was never given a clear cut job. The old Intelligence Department which 
Tobin inherited was badly messed about. There was talk and promises o f  forming 
a Scotland Yard fo r  Ireland, but there never was any time to consider details and 
consequently interest was lost’’.26
Once Civil War fighting began there was an immediate rush to establish new 
intelligence agencies in the Dublin area. Along with Military Intelligence, a number of 
new supplementary agencies were set up. The Criminal Investigation Department(CID) 
which had its headquarters in Oriel House was established. CID was run by Pat Moynihan 
one of Collins’ most trusted agents. Moynihan had played a large role in Collins’ 
intelligence network in the investigation branch of the Post Office. He was given the title 
of Director of CID and staffed with three Lieutenants. Joe Kinsella, a 1916 veteran and an 
explosive distributor, who had also been Dan Bryan’s I/O in the 4th Battalion. Finion 
O’Driscoll, a tough intelligence officer from Cork, and Peter Ennis who went on to 
become head of the Garda Siochana’s Special Branch. Both O’Driscoll and Ennis were
97Superintendents and Kinsella was an Inspector. The organisation headquarters at Oriel 
House on Westland Row was an old squad meeting place. The headquarters transferred to 
Merrion Square in February 1923, although the organisation was always popularly known 
as the Oriel House gang.
25 Ibid. p. 145.
26 Quote from Costello’s statement to the Army Inquiry Committee (UCD Archives, .Mulcahy Papers, 
P7/C/25).
27 Conor Brady, Guardians o f  the Peace (Dublin, 1974), p. 32.
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It was reportedly established to combat armed crime and aid Military Intelligence 
in supplying information on Republican suspects working in Dublin. According to Bryan, 
the army and in particular intelligence in Dublin was often saddled with pure crime duties 
which could only be performed by a well trained gendarme or military police force. CID 
was established to deal with the extensive amount of armed crimes which came in the 
aftermath of the British administration withdrawing their forces. However after a short 
period of time CID gradually involved itself with all aspects of civil and military trouble 
which infringed on the realm of military intelligence. In fact many members of the 
GHQ Military Intelligence Department had been despatched to work for CID. Frank 
Saurin, Joe Guilfoyle, Charlie Dalton and J Murray all had connections with both CID 
and the GHQ Intelligence Staff.29 This did not harmonise relationships between the two 
bodies, rather it proved to be a source of conflict.
CID was organised along military lines. As well as its Director and three 
Lieutenants which ran the organisation, it had an Acting Officer in Command, this was 
Frank Saurin the GHQ intelligence officer. Like the army it had an Adjutant General, 
Sean Tumbleton and a Quartermaster General Martin Hoo.30 Initially CID was divided
into four divisions of ten to eleven men per division.31 This number quickly grew. By the 
time the Civil war was underway, CID consisted of seventy five ex-IRA men and soldiers, 
who now operated in plainclothes, mainly in Dublin city. Many of its recruits came from 
the Republican Police Force which had been formed to administer the Republican courts 
during the War of Independence. The CID officers were exclusively composed of pre- 
truce IRA volunteers. They were now chasing their former comrades around Dublin city.
28 Development of Military Intelligence 1916-45 (UCD Archives Bryan Papers, P7/171).
29 List of GHQ Military Intelligence Staff, 16th May 1922 (UCD Archives Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/26),
30ibid.
31 List of GHQ Military Intelligence Staff, 16th May 1922 (UCD Archives Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/26).
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The force at its peak never contained more than a hundred men, of which only forty were 
active at any one time. Despite this they had an effect which far outweighed their size.
Over a short space of time CID acquired a reputation for brutality.32 The CID 
commander said that, while his organisation had some useful agents in the IRA, most of 
its information came from “the judicious interrogation of prisoners”.33 There is little 
doubt that suspects were tortured and that some prisoners were killed in cold blood. CED 
operated with the main aim not of penetration of the IRA but of its eradication. 34 It 
appears that the government knew of, and tolerated a certain amount of ill-treatment of 
prisoners at the hands of interrogators.35
A large part of CID work consisted of raiding places looking for Republicans. 
They collected information for raids from a network of informers which they built and 
also from the interrogation or torture, as the Republican press insisted, of prisoners. It 
practised mouse trap raiding around Dublin. This entailed going to well known haunts of 
IRA members and arresting everyone present. Then interrogating everyone until IRA 
members were found. The CID officers patrolled the city at night, raiding houses for men 
and arms. The more usual type of CID operation was the sit down raid, where CID 
officers quietly occupied suspected houses and arrested any callers for interrogation. 
Another innovation was the use of female searchers at checkpoints. This put a halt to 
much of the activity of the Republican Cumman Na mBan movement which had operated 
quite freely delivering messages around Dublin until then. As well as raiding and 
interrogating Republican’s, CID officers also attempted to infiltrate the movement. Two 
of these double agents were arrested by British police while working undercover in an
32 Proposed Disbandment of CID, Report by Captain A.S. O’Muireadhaigh, CID, 12th Oct 1923, Department 
of Home Affairs S. 3331 (N.A. Dublin).
33 See Eunan O’Halpin, Intelligence and security in Ireland 1922-45 in Intelligence and National Security 
Vol 5, no. 1 Jan 1990, p. 53
34 See Eunan O’Halpin, Intelligence and security in Ireland 1922-45 in Intelligence and National Security 
Vol 5, no. 1 Jan 1990, p. 53.
35 Conor Brady, Guardians o f the Peace (Dublin, 1974), p. 125.
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arms smuggling operation in Cardiff. 36 As early as October 1922, Moynihan as Director 
of CID was complaining that he was finding it difficult to supply enough men to fill 
guard detail.37 The demand for guard details increased as Republican forces started their 
burning campaign and widened the circle of legitimate targets. This demand reached such 
a level, that a supplementary body was set up within CID, specifically aimed at guard 
duty.
In November 1922 the Protective Officers Corps also commanded by Captain 
P.M. Moynihan was hurriedly established as an auxiliary force to CID. It was made up 
initially of twenty demobilised pre truce IRA men. Its numbers increased rapidly to one 
hundred and seventy five men at its peak. As well as acting as an auxiliary force its main 
function was in protecting buildings, Ministers, senior civil servants, journalists, Dail and
Seanad members thought to be potential Republican targets during the Civil war.
A third force called the Citizen Defence Force was also formed, in October 1922. 
It had 101 members and was made up of ex-British Officers and some Irish Volunteers. A 
former British Officer Captain H. Harrison was its commander. Although the force was 
initially organised by Sheamus Dwyer and others closely linked to Cumman na 
nGaedhael. It was organised on semi-secret lines and was involved with guarding, 
patrolling and intelligence gathering. Little is known about the Citizen Defence Force. 
Even a casualty list of its personnel during the civil war, attributes deaths to several 
accidents, but seemingly none to the IRA. Apart from these new intelligence gathering 
bodies the state did inherit one unit from the British. That was the G Division of the
36Telegrams on subject in the P.R.O. CO. 906\21 vol 2. 1922.
John P. Hanley, Truce, Treaty and Civil war in Dublin city 1921-23, M.A. Maynooth 1995, p. 127.
37ibid. p. 129.
Department of Justice H6\30, Director CID to Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs 28/02/23, (N.A. 
Dublin).
38 John P. Hanley, Truce, Treaty and Civil war in Dublin city 1921-23, M.A. Maynooth 1995, p. 130.
44
DMP, but as mentioned earlier Collins had effectively neutralised it and it learned to 
avert its eyes from political crime.
The Citizen Defence Force, the Protective Officers Corps and CID all 
amalgamated in February 1923. This was an attempt by the government to gain a more 
direct control over these agencies. However, despite attempts to exert control, CID 
continued to act on its own initiative. Its situation was ambiguous. Although militaiy 
leaders claimed jurisdiction over the organisation and it was supposedly a supplementary 
body to Military Intelligence, it operated veiy much independently. CID’s brief was left 
open and its limits were never clearly defined. Its statutory basis was doubtful and it was 
unclear for a time to which government department it was responsible, Defence or Home 
Affairs. In the past the members had simply just reported to Collins. But Collins’ death 
had left them with no greater authority in their eyes. On numerous occasions CID co­
operated with the RIC, the Republican Police, the British Army, the DMP and on one 
occasion the Black and Tans39. These measures helped increase their unpopularity in 
Dublin.
The republicans had found it hard to combat CID activities even though they had 
managed to place their own sources in Oriel House. They attacked Oriel House in 
September 1922, killed one officer but failed to take the building. In October another 
attack was launched by Ernie O’Malley himself. A mine was detonated in front of the 
building which caused extensive damage, but it also trapped Republican prisoners kept 
there under rubble. The building was plunged into darkness. In the basem ent, detectives 
who had been guarding prisoners were rescued by their charges who had literally been 
blown out of their cells. In the end, there were only three casualties. Three of the 
attacking party were captured and shot by firing squad at Westland Row station under the
39 Conor Brady, Guardians o f  the Peace (Dublin, 1974), pp 32-33.
new Emergency Powers legislation brought in by the Provisional Government. Questions 
were asked regarding the possibility o f a Republican agent who might have been 
responsible for smuggling the mine. The Republicans by December deliberately adopted 
a policy of assassination of CID officers. They managed to kill Inspector Matthew Daly 
on 23rd December.
In late 1922 and early 1923 evidence came to light of the maltreatment of 
prisoners. This evidence was given further credence when the Republican press alleged 
that a number of murders and assassinations had been carried out by CID officers. Rightly 
or wrongly, Oriel House had been suspected of responsibility for the murder of two young 
Republicans shot at Yellow Lane in Drumcondra in August 1922.40 They were also 
implicated in the death of Noel Lemass who was taken into custody in Dublin in July and 
whose body was found in the Dublin Mountains in October. Ironically CID came under 
pressure when claims of ill-treatment of prisoners started to come not from republicans 
but from members of the Free State Army. Some Free State soldiers had been picked up 
by CID in Dublin for relatively trivial offences. But while they were prisoners they 
claimed they were tortured, physically beaten, deprived of sleep and had guns fired 
behind their heads. By the end of 1922 even hard line Cumman Na Gaedhael members 
were wary of CID. Collins’ death in August 1922 meant that CID was virtually free of 
any outside control. Liam Tobin as D/I had little or no power to keep CID in line and had 
lost his job as a result. Accountability and control of CID was transferred from the 
Minister of Defence to the Minister for Home Affairs in September 1922 and Tobin was 
replaced by Dail TD Joseph McGrath. This was an astute political move which
transferred power from Richard Mulcahy to Kevin O’Higgins who was now emerging as 
a formidable force. It was also an attempt to bring CID under more direct government 
control, as O’Higgins unlike Mulcahy had no army ties.
Despite these attempts to control CID, its name was closely associated with a 
Dublin murder gang. Although never proven it was alleged that some CID officers were 
members of a gang that targeted Republicans around Dublin, which was to claim the life 
of nearly twenty victims by November 1923.41. 28 August 1922, Bernard Daly an IRA 
volunteer was found dead in Malahide. According to Hanley there were a number of other 
definite victims. These are listed in Appendix 2. Although it is not possible to say who 
was definitely responsible for the murder gang, most of its victims were being actively 
sought by the authorities at the time. Robert Blondfield was wanted for the suspected 
killing of Sheamus Dwyer. Dwyer who was a TD and was a founder of the Citizen 
Defence Force, had worked very closely with Dan Bryan in Intelligence during the War of 
Independence. Witnesses at the coroners inquests of several of the victims reported 
military raids on the family homes of the victims shortly before the murders. In a number 
of surviving documents the Republican IRA’s intelligence department expressed its 
conviction that both CID and army officers were involved. Two 17 year old boys, Alfred 
Colley and Sean Cole both of whom were active republicans were found dead on 26 
August 1922. According to Brady, Free State intelligence officers dragged the two young 
Republicans from a car at Drumcondra, placed them against the piers of a gate and shot 
them in full public view.43 Michael Staines who was Commissioner of the Civic Guards, 
made a point of turning up at the inquest to stress that the Civic Guards had no 
connection with CID or Free State Intelligence. Republican Intelligence named CID 
officer Cecil Loftus as a participant in the Clondalkin murders, and two army officers 
Bolster and Dolan were implicated in another shooting.44 Presumably Republican 
Intelligence was referring to Frank Bolster and Joe Dolan. Both these men fit the profile
40 Ibid. p. 125.
41 John P. Hanley, Truce, Treaty and Civil war in Dublin city 1921-23, M.A. Maynooth 1995, p. 130.
42 Ibid. p. 131.
43 Conor Brady, Guardians o f the Peace (Dublin, 1974), p. 91.
44 John P. Hanley, Truce, Treaty and Civil war in Dublin city 1921-23, M.A. Maynooth 1995, p. 132.
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of possible members of a murder gang. Frank Bolster was a trained gunman and an 
original member o f the Squad. While Joe Dolan was a GHQ Military Intelligence officer 
who was involved with the attempted rescue of Sir Henry Wilson’s assassins and was 
later connected with the killing of Republican prisoners in Ballyseedy, Co. Kerry. He was 
also a major player in the Army Mutiny plot of 1924. All evidence for this “Murder 
Gang” is circumstantial, however it seems likely that it did exist within CID and indeed 
within military circles. It was never seriously investigated and highly likely that it was 
quietly closed down at the end of the Civil war.
Although the CID, Protective Officer Corps, Citizen’s Defence Force and the 
DMP all had intelligence functions, they were all deemed supplementary to Military 
Intelligence at the time. These supplementary intelligence agencies dealt with particular 
areas within the ambit of Military Intelligence which required special treatment.45 The 
result of all these new intelligence agencies led to internal conflict. Instead of co­
operating with each other they vied for information and for funding and recognition. Both 
CID and the Protective Officer Corps were funded under the CID vote whereas the 
Citizen Defence Force was financed from the Secret Service Vote. Both CID and the 
Protective Officers Corps acted as an outlet for Collins’ former agents in the War of 
Independence to remain active.46
Military Intelligence on the other hand was not. Although Bryan and other pre 
truce intelligence officers were recruited, Military Intelligence was largely staffed by 
civilians.47 This lack of pre-truce calibre caused further animosity between the rival 
intelligence agencies. The functions of all these agencies overlapped as they competed 
for coups. Despite an abundant flow of information from the general public throughout
45 General Sean MacMahon’s statement to the Army Inquiry Committee Section IV The General 
Development of Military Intelligence p. 17. 1924 (UCD Archives Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/14).
46 Liam Tobin was D/I, Tom Ennis was a Superintendent in CID. See Proposed Disbandment of CID, Report 
by Captain AS. O’Muireadhaigh, CID, 12th Oct 1923, Department of Home Affairs S. 3331 (N.A. Dublin).
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the civil war, work was seldom co-ordinated between these intelligence agencies and 
many activities were poorly directed. However the republican IRA as the war went on 
became disorganised and were an easy target without unified leadership.48
Liam Tobin’s nominal control over CID did not last too long. He had been heavily 
criticised for letting CED become semi-military in character and out o f control.49 His 
authority over CID was undermined by the government appointment o f Joseph McGrath 
as director of CED in August 1922. McGrath had worked as an Intelligence agent in GHQ 
previously and had been the Departments first Director of Intelligence in July 1922. He 
had processed a report from former Squad member General Tom Ennis o f the Republican 
regrouping at Blessington.50 McGrath who was later to become Minister for Industry and 
Commerce kept CID under his influence. Despite McGrath’s appointment to CID, he did 
not have any sway over the operation of Military Intelligence. Technically Military 
Intelligence was still under the direct command of Tobin. But following Collins’ death 
Tobin was taking a back seat. Much of Tobin’s work as Director o f Intelligence can be 
attributed to Collins. When Tobin took over the position of D/I from McGrath, Collins 
supplied him with information. Although Collins as Commander and Chief had strictly 
left the Intelligence Department, in reality he was very much propping it up. He still kept 
his network of agents very close to him and through himself supplied Tobin with 
information. As Commander in Chief he required regular intelligence summaries from 
Tobin and demanded to be kept up to date. On numerous occasions Collins ordered Tobin 
to pursue a certain area or aspect of intelligence, as if in fact Collins himself had never
47 See Eunan O’Halpin, Intelligence and security in Ireland 1922-45 in Intelligence and National Security 
Vol 5, no. 1 (Jan 1990), p. 52.
48ibid. p. 53.
49 Michael Hopkinson, Green Against Green the Irish Civil War (Dublin, 1988), p. 225.
50 General Ennis himself had received a report that an injured republican in hospital was overheard saying he 
had come with a party of 150 men from Tipperary to Blessington and met with a further 135 men. This 
information was passed on to McGrath in GHQ. Daily reports to GHQ 5th July 1922 (UCD Archives, 
Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/106).
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left the Department. Although Collins was now commander in chief and Tobin D/I, 
Collins appears to have conducted his relationship with Tobin as if he had never left the 
Intelligence Department. Collins gave Tobin access to his informer network through 
himself. Right up until Collins’ death, Tobin was highly reliant on Collins’ instruction. 
On 2 September, Collins gave Tobin a list of potential IRA spies that were operating in 
the Provisional Army encampment at Wellington Barracks.51 On 3rd September Collins 
issued Tobin with an order to examine the setting up of a coast watching force as an 
intelligence force.52 Following Collins’ death Tobin found himself out of his depth. As a 
result between September and December 1922 the main driving force behind Military 
Intelligence came not from Tobin, but from the measures General Sean Mac Mahon was 
taking to reorganise it following his appointment as Chief of Staff in August 1922.
General MacMahon initially looked at Dublin, where Bryan and his fellow GHQ 
intelligence staff had an efficient network operating. They had wire taps applied in the 
Crown Alley phone Exchange. This managed to pick up a number of planned Republican 
offensives. It also uncovered some of the brutal treatment Republican prisoners were 
subjected to in Mountjoy prison.53 Along with Telephone interception, agents were also 
placed in the Post Office as they had been in the War of Independence.54 Although the 
scope and work of the Intelligence Department was increasing greatly, it had elements 
which were being associated with strong arm tactics. Dan Bryan himself at the time was 
in charge of a unit of plain clothes army intelligence officers which patrolled Dublin, 
looking for Republicans. This was an initiative of Collins. Bryan’s patrols spent the bulk 
of their time trying to locate IRA volunteers on their way to and from operations. On 
more than one occasion Bryan’s men shot innocent civilians who refused to halt for them.
51 Commander in Chief Collins to D./I Tobin 2nd September 1922 (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers,
P7/B/46).
52 Commander in Chief Collins to D/I Tobin 3rd September 1922 (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/46).
53 Daily reports to GHQ 13th July 1922 (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/106).
54 Ibid.
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The unit operated from a network of their own informants they had built up and 
catalogued. Some of the units men were implicated in the murder of a number o f IRA 
members and have been associated with a Dublin Murder gang.55 Overall though, the 
GHQ Intelligence Department had established itself as a substantial force in the capital.
Despite all the Intelligence Departments early measures at expansion, its 
influence outside Dublin was still very poor. General MacMahon set about developing an 
intelligence service throughout the country. Most of the men picked for the job had, like 
Bryan been acting I/O’s in pre-treaty days. In some cases men from Dublin were sent to 
take on this work. On some occasions though even the men sent from Dublin to fill rural 
intelligence positions were not very effective. Commandant Frank Thornton the GHQ 
Intelligence officer was appointed to act as the main Intelligence Officer for the 2nd 
Southern Command operating around Kilkenny. Despite this his reports which filtered 
back to GHQ were criticised heavily by Collins at the time, who pointed out they were 
ineffective and being sent through the wrong channels.56 As the Civil War progressed and 
the Free State troops moved into rural areas, an intelligence officer was appointed at 
almost every post they held.
The system of processing intelligence was similar to the pre-treaty one. 
Information was passed from intelligence officers to their command intelligence officer. 
The Command Intelligence officer in turn was required to make daily and weekly reports 
to GHQ. An officer at GHQ like Bryan was then responsible for preparing Summary of 
Intelligence reports to the D/I and the Commander in Chief and other Army Council 
members57. For a period Command Intelligence Officers were left to work from their own
55 John P. Hanley, Truce, Treaty and Civil war in Dublin city 1921-23, M.A. Maynooth 1995, p. 127.
Collins to acting Chairman Provisional Government 29.7.22., (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/29). 
Undated report in UCD Archives, (O’Malley papers, P. 17.A.35.)
56 Letter from Commander in Chief Collins to Chief of Staff Mulcahy on 7th August 1922 (UCD Archives 
Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/43).
57 Following the death of Collins on 22nd August, the Army Council on 28th September 1922 had been 
constituted as follows: Richard Mulcahy Commander in Chief, Sean MacMahon Chief of Staff, Gearoid
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resources. However the Intelligence Department in GHQ expanded rapidly and gradually 
assumed direct control over all their Command I/O’s. The Chief of Staff General Sedn
MacMahon’s scheme of Intelligence reorganisation was fully functional by January 
1923.58 However its effectiveness began to be felt towards the end of 1922. Military 
Intelligence was starting to show beneficial results not only in the Dublin area but outside 
it as w ell.59
Bryan was now working hard at GHQ processing information from Command
Intelligence Officers all over the country as well as gathering information himself in the
Dublin area. In October he orchestrated raids on the work places of many Republicans in
Dublin. He raided a bank, the workplace of John Cullinan a former officer who had
served alongside Bryan in both C and G Company of the 4th Battalion and had also been a
medical student in UCD. Cullinan had now become the G Company commander after
Frank Dowling was picked up in June 1922. Bryan’s work against the Republicans in
Dublin was greatly restricting any offensive activity that might have been planned for the
city. The focus was now entirely on the rest of the country.
By November 1922 Tobin had stepped down as D/I and was replaced by the
Director of Organisations Diarmuid O’Hegarty. O’Hegarty like MacMahon had realised
the importance of expanding the intelligence network outside Dublin and had worked to
the same aim. Writing in October 1922 he said
While some commands were doing well, in Limerick it was stated that an 
intelligence service was being set up, but so far we do not know of its existence 
beyond the absolute lack of any form of communication with this Department. 60
O’Sullivan Adjutant General, Joseph McGrath Director of Intelligence and Diarmuid O’Hegarty Director of 
Organisation. See John P. Duggan, A History o f  the Irish Army (Dublin, 1991), p. 62.
38 General Sean MacMahon’s statement to the Army Inquiry Committee Section IV The General 
Development of Military Intelligence p. 18. 1924 in (UCD Archives Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/14).
39 Ibid. p. 17.
60 See Intelligence Organisation, 13th Oct. 1922 (UCD Archives, O’Hegarty papers, P8/7).
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Limerick itself had proved a problem to the Free State forces from the outbreak of 
Civil war. If the Republicans had gained control of Limerick, it would have cut and 
isolated the Free State forces in Athlone under Mac Eoin and in Clare and Galway under 
Brennan. Also Republican success in Limerick and the south east could have become a 
springboard for a move on Dublin.61 On 4July 1922, a truce was signed allowing the 
Republicans into Limerick. Pro-Treaty GHQ were alarmed at this fact since they had not 
ordered this truce and they knew that Free State commander Michael Brennan and Liam 
Lynch the Republican commander had strong IRB ties and links from the War of 
Independence. On 11 July 150 men were sent to Limerick from Dublin and Brennan 
ended the truce. On 19 July the Provisional Government forces began attacking Limerick 
City with a British 18 pounder Gun. Limerick city was quickly taken by the Provisional 
Forces and General O’Duffy set up a base there from which to launch an offensive into 
the rest of the “Munster Republic”.
A large number of Republicans retreated from Limerick to Clare and managed to 
take over West and Mid Clare. Provisional Government Forces were despatched to 
reinforce the 1st Western Division. The Dublin Guards made up the brunt of the 
reinforcements. Meanwhile another attack was made by the Provisional Government 
forces from their new base in Limerick on Kilmallock directly South. For probably the 
first time in the civil war intelligence information started to come into GHQ from areas 
outside Dublin. Intelligence reports claimed that 500 republicans were in Kilmallock and 
that 1,000 were based in Buttevant south of Kilmallock ready to support.62 On 20 July 
some of the garrison in Bruff, situated between Kilmallock and Limerick deserted to the 
Republican side. On 22 July, thirty Free State soldiers had been captured between 
Kilmallock and Bruff. O’Duffy ordered that no troops should advance south of
61 Michael Hopkinson, Green Against Green the Irish Civil War (Dublin, 1988), p. 146.
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Kilmallock, until Limerick had been cleared and reinforcements had arrived. Ned Cronin 
disobeyed this order, and he and 47 of his men were captured at Thomastown.
The reinforcements that O’DufTy was looking for in order to advance south of 
Kilmallock arrived at the beginning of August. The reinforcements coincided with the sea 
landings of Free State troops in Cork and Kerry. On 5 August Free State troops took 
Kilmallock with only a token republican force to contend with. The Cork and Kerry 
Republicans in Kilmallock had learnt o f the sea landings and returned to defend their 
native counties.
The 500 Free State soldiers that landed at Fenit in Kerry on 2 August, were made 
up from the Dublin Guards and commanded by General Paddy O’ Daly. Paddy Cahill the 
Republican leader in Tralee at the time could only offer limited resistance, with the 
majority of Kerry Republicans still returning from Kilmallock. O’Daly’s forces were 
reinforced further by the 1st Western Division which had taken control of Clare and had 
travelled south to Kerry by boat via Tarbert. O’Daly’s men encountered their first real 
resistance when trying to take Farranfore. Republican leader Johnny Connor’s men were 
back from Kilmallock and they kept the Free State forces at bay. Despite this, by late 
August Free State troops had managed to control most o f the major towns in Kerry. 
O’Duffy admitted, although Kerry Republicans had been driven from their bases and 
towns have been captured, very few men and arms had been captured. From August 22 
onwards guerrilla warfare tactics were adopted by the Republicans in Cork and Kerry. On 
26 August a convoy of 100 Free State soldiers were ambushed operating between Tralee 
and Killorglin. Large sections of the population, especially in Tralee supported the 
Republicans, which made Kerry particularly difficult for the Free State forces to control. 
More violent and extreme tactics were used by Paddy O’Daly and his men in their 
attempts to find Republicans and their dumps in the countryside. Free State army
62 Michael Hopkinson, Green Against Green the Irish Civil War (Dublin, 1988), p. 151.
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inspection reports claimed that O ’Daly’s command left much to be desired in discipline 
and behaviour. O’Daly himself was reported as saying “ nobody asked me to take my kid 
gloves to Kerry and I did not take them”. He and his officers which included many of 
Collins’ old squad men, such as Joe Dolan and also some of Collins’ agents such as 
David Nelligan, were accused of violence and murdering prisoners. They were associated 
with the Ballyseedy affair, where IRA prisoners were killed in mysterious circumstances 
clearing mines that their own organisation had allegedly planted.63 Despite this little 
attempt was made by GHQ to deal with this problem.
However GHQ and indeed the Intelligence Department had became better 
organised and more efficient as the war progressed. The beginning of 1923 which 
heralded the retreat of the IRA republican forces, gave the Department time to expand 
their field of organisation and study. The wide scale organisation of subject files within 
the Department had taken place under General Sean MacMahon’s reorganisation in 
August 1922. The success of his scheme of record keeping meant that by early 1923, 
there was a need for a separate record section within the Department to deal exclusively 
with the files that were generated. In June 1923 the record section itself introduced a 
whole new index card system. All files were cross referenced and divided into two 
distinct categories, Biographical or Subject.
A report from the record section of the Intelligence Department from June 1923, 
highlights just how much the Department had developed. It would be wrong to 
presuppose that it was only engaged in monitoring Republicans operating within the Free 
State. It defined its own brief as, monitoring “persons of all parties suspected of acting in 
a manner inimical to national progress”. In accordance to the file subjects it had, it 
appears it did this and much more. The Record Section was divided into basically six
63 For account of Ballyseedy and references to Free State Intelligence Officers who were involved see 
Michael Hopkinson, Green Against Green the Irish Civil War (Dublin, 1988).
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categories. Ulster, Foreign, Ireland, Britain, USA and Intelligence staff. Within the Ulster 
section, files were kept on the Special Constabulary, Orange Lodges, Orange Agents and 
British Agents. The Intelligence Staff sub sections dealt with Free State operatives in 
Ireland, Ulster, Britain, America and other Foreign states. Free State agents in the US 
were monitoring the activities of sympathetic republican organisations, such as Clan Na 
Gael. The surveillance of republican gun running from Britain, the US and other Foreign 
countries was monitored. Also Communist bodies in Britain and their supporters in the 
Free State were watched.64
Irish Military Intelligence had undergone a profound transformation. It had 
developed from the effective but ad-hoc organisation under Collins, into a specialised and 
organised machine. It distinguished itself as the premier intelligence gathering agency in 
the state. The Civil War had obviously acted as a catalyst in the Department’s 
development, but ironically it had facilitated its growth to such an extent that it no longer 
was solely focusing on the Republican threat. By the time the Civil War officially came 
to a close on 24May 1923, Military Intelligence was now examining British, and Unionist 
forces as well as Communist and other continental forces that were perceived as a 
potential menace. This broader perspective demonstrates a maturity of the Department 
despite its short history.
64 Departmental Orders Intelligence Branch No. 5, 4th June 1923, Records Section, Intelligence Files 1925- 
30, Box 6 (Military Archives, Dublin).
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CHAPTER 3
THE INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT 
AND THE ARMY MUTINY
In the early hours of 19 March 1924 a number of Free State Army troops raided 
Devlin’s public house on Parnell Street in Dublin. They arrested a group of army officers 
that were allegedly plotting to assassinate government officials. The raid culminated in a 
series of Dail debates on the issue, the resignation of the Army Council and the
establishment of a government inquiry into the whole affair. Superficially the mutiny 
presented itself to the bewildered public as a storm in a tea cup. But underneath the 
surface lay a series of intricate political events and faction fights that could have evolved 
into another bloody civil war and crippled the Free State in its infancy. However the 
Army emerged from the whole affair significantly reorganised for a peace time existence 
and suitably acknowledging the power and authority of government structures, something 
which was doubtful not less than twelve months before. Dan Bryan and the Second 
Bureau played a major part in the whole affair and had much bearing in the dramatic 
transformation of the army.
Although the mutiny took place in March 1924, the actual foundations of the 
whole episode can be traced back to the early months of 1922. After the ratification of the 
treaty by the Dail on 7 January 1922, the Army Chief of Staff and Chief of the secret Irish 
Republican Brotherhood, Michael Collins, attempted to negotiate at leadership level with 
the IRA. Since most of the IRB held controlling positions in the IRA, it was Collins 
intention to use his influence as head of the IRB to stop or minimise the split in the IRA 
over the treaty. He had used this tactic before to control the IRA and to good effect. Even
during the War of Independence, although Mulcahy was Minister for Defence, in reality
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Collins had control. But the IRB did not survive the treaty. It had declined as a force after 
the truce had been called in July 1921.Collins influence could not prevent the split in the 
IRA ranks. He held the last IRB meeting on 19 April 1922 in a vain attempt to persuade 
men like Harry Boland and Liam Lynch to accept the treaty.1 During the civil war many 
of the Supreme Council which ran the IRB were killed. Collins was dead on the treaty 
side and later during the Civil war on the anti treaty side Liam Lynch and Harry Boland 
were both killed. With the exception of a journal it ran for its members called the 
Separatist between January 1922 and September 1922 the original IRB did not meet or 
function after April 1922.2
Despite the split in the IRA and the ending of the IRB all Collins’ Squad men and 
the majority of his agents remained loyal to him. Collins had continued to meet them 
informally in Vaughan’s Hotel which had been their meeting place during the War of 
Independence. But as the War of Independence came to a close Collins’ “apostles” as 
they were sometimes known were becoming restless. Their specialised trained gun talents 
were less in demand and they began to feel somewhat alienated. In the early months o f 
1922, the mere presence of Collins and his assurances to them that “you will be alright” 
kept them in check.3 But the seeds of mutiny were there.
Initially Collins’ Squad and intelligence men were seen as important and loyal 
pro-treaty men that could be relied on in a time of uncertainty in what was a veiy weak 
pro-treaty army. They were used on important missions. In the spring of 1922 there was a
1 O’Donoghue was present at these final IRB meetings. For an account see Florence O’Donoghue, No Other 
Law (Dublin, 1954), pp 231-246.
2 The IRB after the declaration of the treaty accepted “the present governmental position of An Saorstat” but 
declared once more that the Supreme Council of the IRB would remain the sole government o f the Irish 
Republic until Ireland’s complete independence was achieved, and that the President of the Supreme Council 
was president of the Republic.
See Leon O’Broin Revolutionary underground The story of the Irish Republican Brotherhood 1858-1924 
(Dublin, 1976), p. 203.
This statement made by the IRB appears to be somewhat ironic since they suggest the establishing o f a 
military dictatorship in reality in order to safeguard a republic.
3 Col. C. Russell, supplementary statement to Committee of Inquiry into army mutiny, 10th May 1924 (UCD 
Archives, .Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/20).
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scramble throughout the country for barracks left unoccupied by British forces. This 
competition for barracks between pro and anti-treaty forces came to a head in Limerick. 
On 18 February a mid-Limerick brigade passed a resolution declaring loyalty to the 
Republic. The provisional government felt that if Limerick was lost it would directly link 
their lack of control in the west with Munster. It was decided to send commander 
Michael Brennan and the 1st Western Division based in Clare to occupy the vacant 
barracks. Brennan was also given support by troops from Dublin led by Collins’ old 
squad members. Jim Slattery was one of these squad members who took control o f the 
castle barracks. He and his men were issued an ultimatum to leave by Republican leader 
Rory O’Connor and his far superior force outside. But fighting was averted when it was 
decided that the Limerick Corporation should hold the barracks and all other troops 
return to their own area.4
As the civil war developed Collins had placed Liam Tobin and other squad 
members in charge of the new Civil Police Intelligence Department at Oriel House. But 
he soon became unhappy about the failure to establish an efficient service and it was 
brought directly under government control in September 1922. Collins decided to send 
some of his old Squad men to Cork under Charlie Dalton and some to Tipperary, in the 
belief that they would respond better to fighting. This initiative did not prove fruitful 
since both former intelligence officers Charlie Dalton and Tom Ennis were keen to 
negotiate with leaders of the Republican forces who had been their comrades in arms less 
than a year before and were therefore unhappy with their work in Cork. Tom Ennis and 
other officers opposed the execution of three Republicans in Cork and refused to execute 
any in his area.5 Dalton had left Cork briefly in September 1922 to get married and,
4For an account of the Limerick affair see Michael Hopkinson, Green Against Green the Irish Civil War 
(Dublin, 1988), p. 64.
5 ibid
Taken from Doyle’s interview (UCD Archives, O’Malley Notebooks, P17B/33).
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evidently, had returned to his job with no great fervour. In November Dalton left his Cork 
command altogether in mysterious circumstances.6 He may have left because of the lack 
of co-operation from other commanding officers. Dalton maintained, that had Eoin 
O’Duffy’s troops “in Banteer, Millstreet and Killamey on the Blackwater line pushed in 
and co-operated with him, the fight would now be over.”7 Collins himself admitted that 
his old squad members constituted a problem, and had contemplated sending them on a 
mission to the U.S.A ,8 After Collins’ death at Bedl na Blath on 22 August 1922 his men
were now leaderless and felt that any say or control they had over the running of the army 
or indeed the country died with him.
Collins successor as Commander in Chief of the Army was Richard Mulcahy. 
Although Mulcahy had fought in the War of Independence and was a prominent IRB 
member, he never enjoyed the same rapport as Collins had with these men. Unlike 
Collins, Mulcahy did not meet informally with them in Vaughan’s hotel. According to 
Valiulis he was a shy individual and did not have the powerful communication skills of 
Collins.9 Instead of selecting Mulcahy as their leader, Collins’ men began to look to Liam 
Tobin, a former squad member who had been the assistant Director of Intelligence during 
the War of Independence. As the numbers in the Free State army increased in the autumn 
of 1922 so did the gap between Collins’ men and Mulcahy and his men at GHQ. Liam 
Tobin was unhappy with his position in the army as ADC to the Governor General. 
Similarly more of Collins’ intelligence unit were disgruntled with their positions. Charles
6 Quoted in Michael Hopkinson, Green Against Green the Irish Civil War (Dublin, 1988), p. 203.
Taken from Dalton to Commander in Chief, 18lh November 1922, (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers,
P7/B/67).
7 Dalton to Commander in Chief, 11th September 1922, Military Archives. Dalton to Commander in Chief 
12lh August 1922, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/20; Dalton to C of GS, 2, 5 Sept. 1922, ., P7/B/71 Dalton to 
Commander in Chief 18 Nov 1922, P7/B/67; O’Dufty to C of GS, n.d., probably early September 1922. 
P7/B/71.
8 Quoted in Michael Hopkinson, Green Against Green the Irish Civil War (Dublin, 1988), p. 138.
Provisional Government Minutes, 26 Aug 1922, GI/3; O’Sullivan at Army Inquiry, (UCD Archives, Mulcahy 
Papers, P7/C/12). David Nelligan (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/17).
Charles Russell, (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/18, 20, 28).
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Dalton was not satisfied initially with his position as Adjutant of the tiny Irish Air service 
before he was made a GOC in Cork. Neither was Frank Thornton content with being a 
Brigade Major, he felt he should have been named Director of Intelligence, a job that 
went to Joe McGrath at the time.10 All three of these men felt that they were being 
excluded from positions of power in the army because they did not hold enough influence 
in the dormant secret IRB organisation. Dan Bryan in a later interview offers an 
alternative reason for their frustration. He claimed that although they had performed well 
in the War of Independence and the civil war, with peace time approaching they were 
officers poorly suited to the bureaucratic work necessary in a professional peace time 
army.11 Bryan’s GHQ intelligence interpretation of the situation was most probably 
correct, but GHQ were naive in forsaking these men since they were likely to be a useful 
force in the future.12 The men from Collins’ intelligence unit believed strongly that 
Richard Mulcahy had secretly now become the IRB’s new leader succeeding Collins, 
although Valiulis argues that in fact, it was Sean MacMahon the Free State army’s chief 
of staff who held the position.13 Regardless of who really held the IRB chair, in the eyes 
of Collins’ men it was Mulcahy and his men at GHQ that were preventing their 
promotions and restricting their power and control over army matters.
In order to remedy their position Collins’ men started to mobilise. Towards the 
end of 1922 Major General Liam Tobin and Colonel Charles F Dalton, set about reviving
Material for preparation of Interim report o f Army Enquiry, (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/41, 42)
9 Maryann Gialanella Valiulis, Portrait o f a Revolutionary General Richard Mulcahy, (Dublin, 1992), p. 203.
10ibid.
“ interview between Valiulis and Dan Bryan Dublin 18th March 1975, see Maryann Gialanella Valiulis, 
Portrait of a Revolutionary General Richard Mulcahy (Dublin, 1992), p. 203 n21.
12 There is some suggestion that Collins’ was going to use these men in their IRB capacity to carry out 
political assassinations. According to Richard Barret a former close friend of Collins, these assassinations 
were to ensure that the government remained in the hands o f those prepared to resume the national advance 
once what concessions the treaty offered had been extracted. See Conor Foley, Legion o f the Rearguard 
(Dublin, 1985), p. 46.
13She argues that although Sean O’Murthuile the army’s quarter master general later publicly took 
responsibility for the IRB reorganisation, she has a taped interview between Mulcahy and General Sean 
MacEoin which puts Sean MacMahon the army’s chief of staff as the new head of the IRB. But if this fact 
was known to the IRAQ it would have made little difference. Since MacMahon, O’Murthuile and Mulcahy
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the IRB organisation within the Free State Army and met in circles and groups at 
Portobello Barracks. According to O’Broin the first meeting took place at the Vice Regal 
Lodge in the Phoenix Park where Liam Tobin was ADC to the Governor General
T.M.Healy. They agreed at their meetings that reviving the IRB was a bad decision since 
they would be unable to obtain a controlling influence over the dormant Supreme Council 
where the army leaders Mulcahy, O’Muirthuile and MacMahon sat. Mulcahy and the 
Army council according to Lee had brought the IRB organisation under their control in 
November 1922 in order to counteract an attempt made by Liam Lynch to revitalise it for 
Anti - Treaty purposes14.
Collins’ men therefore proceeded to form a new organisation called the Irish 
Republican Army Organisation (IRAO) in order to address their promotional grievances. 
Membership of the IRAO was confined to pro treaty supporters who had seen active 
service in the IRA before the Truce in July 1921. The IRAO leaders had a particular 
contempt for people who joined the army after the truce, referring to them as “trucers”. 
They held their first meetings in January and February of 1923. At these first meetings, 
Liam Tobin was appointed chairman and Tom Cullen another of Collins’ squad was 
made organiser. The scope of the agenda of the ERAO started to increase from just 
promotional issues to include political nationalist aims. Those asked to join were only 
officers with the “proper past and present outlook from a national point of view”.15 The 
goals of the organisation was to carry out Collins’ policy of using the treaty only as a 
stepping stone towards the republic, a policy which they believed the government had 
abandoned. The IRAO also started to complain about the number of ex British soldiers 
that were being taken into the army. According to Liam Tobin the Army was made up of
all belonged to the army council and all were associated with the Free State Army’s GHQ. Maryann 
Gialanella Valiulis, Portrait o f  a Revolutionary General Richard Mulcahy (Dublin, 1992), p. 203.
14 See Joseph Lee, Ireland 1912 - 1985 (Cambridge, 1989), p99 nl77 O’Beime Ranelagh, “The IRB”, HIS, 
xx, no. 77 (March 1976), pp. 34-36.
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40% Old IRA, 50% ex British soldiers and 10 % ex civilians.16 These figures were of 
course totally inaccurate, but it is true that some British officers were recruited into the 
army during the civil war because they were highly qualified and disciplined, although 
the political ramifications of such actions weren’t considered by the Army council at the 
time. Valiulis suggests that the reason that the IRAO dressed their grievances in a 
nationalist rhetoric was purely to appeal to a wider spectrum of people. She states “by 
merging nationalist aims with personal ambition, the old IRA created an effective 
patriotic platform from which to attack Mulcahy”.17
But it would be unfair to say that the IRAO leadership did not have a more extreme form 
of nationalist policy in mind for the Free State when they signed up. According to Bell 
when the IRAO leaders were initially toying with the idea of resurrecting the IRB, they 
made contact with some of their late opponents using links they formed in the War of 
Independence. Some of their contacts were still in Free State prisons.18
Dan Bryan working alongside Mickey Joe Costello in GHQ’s Military Intelligence 
section or the Second Bureau as it was then named, soon discovered this new secret 
IRAO organisation was in existence. They informed Mulcahy immediately who must 
have realised that until they had more detailed information on the exact names and 
numbers of officers involved they could not reprimand them. Instead in order to 
counteract the IRAO Mulcahy decided that he would try to deflect the nationalist 
patriotic appeal of the IRAO by using the IRB within the Army. Mulcahy increasingly 
became favourable to using the organisation directly against Tobin and the IRAO. Tobin, 
Dalton and Thornton were old IRB members but had never reached the organisation’s
15 Tobin Mutiny File, (UCD Archives Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/195).
16 See Leon O’Broin Revolutionary underground The story o f  the Irish Republican Brotherhood 1858-1924 
(Dublin, 1976), p. 208.
17 Maryann Gialanella Valiulis, Portrait o f  a Revolutionary General Richard Mulcahy (Dublin, 1992), pp 
202-203.
18 James Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army: A history o f  the IRA, 1916-70 (London, 1970), p. 47.
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upper echelons.19 Sean O Muirthuile who had sat on the IRB’s Supreme Council and was 
also a member of the army council now went about reorganising the IRB within the army 
with a nationalist appeal. A new IRB constitution was completed by June 1923 which 
reaffirmed their intention to establish a free and independent republican government in 
Ireland. It also provided for the establishing of clubs and divisions corresponding to Free 
State army formations.20 This decision accepted by Mulcahy was a bad one. By not 
incorporating the IRAO leaders into the IRB they only further alienated the IRAO from 
GHQ. It also politically gave the IRAO a stick with which to beat Mulcahy and GHQ.
The most important and pressing matter for Mulcahy and the Army Council at the 
time was their plans to reorganise the army. By February 1923 it was clear that the Anti 
Treaty IRA forces were on the defensive. The large Free State army during the civil war 
at its peak had swelled to nearly 60,000. This quadrupling of the army size had taken 
place between the autumn of 1922 and April 1923.21 It was obvious that this expensive 
force would have to be scaled down for peace time requirements. But the task of 
demobilisation proved more daunting than mobilisation. In a climate of desperate 
poverty, high unemployment and no adequate social welfare system it was to become 
even more difficult. The planned demobilisation was to reduce 52,000 men and 3,000 
officers in May 1923 to 30,000 men and 1,300 officers by January 1924. Final projections 
were for an army of 18,000 men.22 Mulcahy and GHQ not only wanted to significantly 
reduce the size of the army, they also wanted to restructure the army and implement a 
formal centralised organisation which would come under civilian control. During the War
19 None o f Collins’ intelligence unit had any power in the IRB except Collins himself and maybe Liam Tobin, 
who was put on an IRB committee with Diarmuid O’Hegarty, Sean O’Muirthuile, and Martin Conlon in 
order to represent the pro treaty army side in an effort by Collins’ to avoid civil war. But maybe not 
surprisingly these nominations were objected to by the anti treaty leader Liam Lynch on the grounds that he 
did not believe “they were in a position to act with any authority on behalf of the pro treaty side”. See 
Florence O’Donoghue, No Other Law (Dublin, 1954), p. 235.
20 IRB constitution, 1923, clause 13b, quoted in O’Beime Ranelagh, “The IRB”, in HIS, xx, no. 77 (March 
1976), p. 35.
21 See Joseph Lee, Ireland 1912 - 1985 (Cambridge, 1989), p. 99.
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of Independence and the Civil War it was evident that much of the army regarded 
themselves as operating independently and outside the jurisdiction of the Dail. Mulcahy 
believed the way to change this was through controversially altering the officer corps. 
The selection criteria for officers had up until now given preference to those with pre 
Truce service or those men likely to be most popular and win over other IRA personal to 
support the Free State . But Mulcahy now stated
An efficient army - bearing in mind the material from  which the present army 
has grown, and the necessity and the possibility o f  utilising the older roots o f  the 
army, but it is in no part o f  my conception o f  my policy to keep in the army men 
who are unfitted for it ...or do not have the proper attitude with regard to 
discipline. My general attitude too is that these men must be weaned away from
23the idea and the use o f  arms.
These moves at demobilisation and restructuring were interpreted as a 
direct threat by the IRAO. In their eyes not only were their chances of promotion 
and securing influence in Army Policy now undermined but their very jobs were 
under threat. They focused their grievances against GHQ, since this was the body 
which decided which officers and soldiers should be decommissioned and which 
ones could stay. Mulcahy and his staff sought to compile active records for every 
officer in the army so as to evaluate which ones to keep on. On many occasions 
the Director of Intelligence had to give evaluations o f different officers. Professor 
James Hogan who succeeded Diarmuid O’Hegarty as the Intelligence 
Department’s Director in April 1923, submitted numerous evaluation reports. 
Hogan was made D/I after he had threatened to resign from his position as 
General officer in Charge of Inspection. General Sean MacMahon had appointed
Hogan chiefly for the purpose of reorganising the Intelligence Department in the
22 Maryann Gialanella Valiulis, Portrait o f  a Revolutionary General Richard Mulcahy, (Dublin, 1992), p. 
202 .
23 Quote taken from Joseph Lee, Ireland 1912 - 1985 (Cambridge, 1989), p. 99 nl73.
Refers to Mulcahy to Cosgrave 11 January 1924 (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers ,P7/C/12).
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aftermath of the Civil War. However Hogan’s desire to leave the army couldn’t be
quelled and he resigned in August 1923.24
His succesor David Nelligan, only assumed the position as Director of
Intelligence for a month between September and October 1923. However Nelligan
who left the Department to develop the Armed Detective unit in the new Civic
Guards, still managed to submit evaluation reports in his new role. The Armed
Detective unit submitted a list of army officers who were “a social menace in
Dublin” to the Chief of Staff.25 Nelligan was succeeded as Director by Michael
Costello in October 1923.26 Costello had been a Volunteer during the War of
Independence, before he joined the Provisional Army in February 1922. He
transferred from Birr Barracks to Dublin in February 1923, where he worked as
Assistant Director in the Intelligence Department. Costello on his appointment as
D/I states he was ordered by Mulcahy to supply information regarding officers to
the Staff Duties Branch who were at the time dealing with demobilisation. He
submitted a list of officers that he believed to be members or in touch with the
IRA.27 Within the Intelligence Department itself Costello had to make
recommendations for the retention of officers. He says
I had to decide between the most efficient and capable officer in the 
Department and the officer with the best record. In some cases I had to 
recommend the ablest man in the Department for demobilisation because 
he was not sufficiently reliable.28
It is not clear which GHQ intelligence officers Costello was referring to. However many
of the original GHQ intelligence staff that had remained since the War of Independence
days, were now active members within the IRAQ. The power that Costello and other
24 Hogan’s Statement to the Army Inquiry (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/6)
25Report on evidence given at interview by Kevin O’Higgins to Army Inquiry 22nd April 1924 p9 (UCD 
Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/23)
26 For full run down of D/I appointments see Appendix 1.
27 Costello’s Statement to the Army Inquiry 28 April 1924 (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/25 D.7)
28 Costello’s Statement to the Army Inquiry 28th April 1924 (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/25 D.6)
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senior GHQ officers had over determining demobilisation was making them the centre of 
the IRAO’s fears. The Intelligence Department attracted particular attention since there 
were a considerable number of IRAO members working there. The atmosphere and 
tension in the Department between July 1923 and March 1924, resulted in Costello 
feeling that he could not trust some of his officers. This helped create a divide within the 
Department itself.
Despite being able to create this air of disruption, Tobin and his IRAO group
realised that at this stage they could not achieve their demands without outside support
and aid. Tobin and the IRAO leaders had been working secretly to use all their contacts in
order to get political backing. As it was they had urged their members to take
“control of vital sections of the Army and oust those undesirable persons who 
were holding those positions and secondly to establish a strong voice in army 
policy with a view to securing complete national independence when a suitable 
occasion arose”.29
At one of their meetings in April Major General Patrick O’Daly objected to the 
action proposed. He left the meeting and is alleged to have contacted Mulcahy 
and MacMahon afterwards and given them names of those present. O’Daly and 
some other senior officers who had been working for the IRAO were persuaded to 
come over and join the new IRB. O’Daly was given a place on the Supreme 
Council of the IRB. Dan Bryan alongside Mickey Joe Costello had agents 
infiltrating the IRAO and were processing reports on attendance at meetings, their 
objectives and lists of the main ring leaders. Combined with O’Daly’s information 
this could have provided the Second Bureau and Mulcahy with grounds for 
arresting some of the leaders of the IRAO. As a result of O’Dalys’ defection the 
IRAO were “forced to drop things for a while as it meant reorganising”.31 But any
29 Tobin Mutiny File (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/105).
30 See Leon O’Broin Revolutionary underground The story o f  the Irish Republican Brotherhood 1858-1924 
(Dublin, 1976), p. 208.
31 ibid.
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arrests Mulcahy could make were put on hold when the IRAO started to make 
overtures to political ministers.
They cleverly concentrated their complaints not on army policy but on the 
IRB. This won them sympathy from many government officials such as Minister 
for Home Affairs Kevin O’Higgins who disapproved of a secret revolutionary 
society, especially within the army. The reason for O’Higgins initial support for 
the mutineers can be seen as two fold. As well as his disapproval o f secret 
societies he was disgruntled with Mulcahy. He had initially backed Mulcahy over 
Cosgrave for the Presidency of the Executive Council in August 1922 because he 
believed Mulcahy would be more vigorous in prosecuting the civil war. However 
by January 1923 O’Higgins emerging as the strong man of the government now 
believed Mulcahy was failing to take sufficient measures against the Irregulars or 
agrarian anarchy.32 O’Higgins who was obsessed with attaining social order, 
argued that the execution of prisoners should take place in every county rather 
than just in Dublin, since this would considerably shorten the struggle.33 In 
February 1923, O’Higgins pushed through the establishment of the Supreme 
Council of Defence. This consisted of Cosgrave, Mulcahy, O’Higgins and 
Minister for Agriculture Joe McGrath. In affect it gave O’Higgins a say in army 
matters and reduced Mulcahy’s power and control. Mulcahy felt that this new 
Supreme Council of Defence just encouraged factions in the army to go behind 
his back with their grievances.
On 6 June 1923, the IRAO after receiving encouragement from O’Higgins 
and other cabinet members, sent a letter to President Cosgrave requesting a 
meeting with him and Mulcahy, in order to discuss the government’s deviation
32See Joseph Lee, Ireland 1912 - 1985 (Cambridge, 1989), p. 97,
33 Ibid. p. 98.
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from Collins’ position on the treaty.34 As a result of the letter a meeting between
Mulcahy, Cosgrave and the Attorney General was convened. Cosgrave’s main
worry was that the IRAO might move into the political arena and cause a split
within Cumann Na nGaedhael. Mulcahy insisted that they shouldn’t tolerate their
interference and continue with demobilisation.35 But despite Mulcahy’s objections
the IRAO met several times with Joseph McGrath in his capacity as Minister,
President Cosgrave and even Mulcahy himself.
During these meetings the IRAO officers condemned the re organisation
of the IRB, the current composition of the officer corps and demanded a
committee of enquiry to be set up to investigate the retention and demobilisation
of officers. The IRAO officers as these meetings gained in confidence, so much so
that their tone became more threatening. At one meeting they exclaimed
Until satisfactory arrangements are come to, we will expose this treachery 
and take what steps we consider necessary to bring about an honest, 
cleaner and genuine effort to secure the Republic.36
Mulcahy enraged left the room stating, “I do not think that in any country in the world
four officers would come in uniform and sit down in front of the commander in chief of
that country and read in his presence that document”.37
But Mulcahy under pressure from Joseph McGrath and Cosgrave agreed to continue 
meeting with the officers. Essentially Mulcahy was made keep lines of communication 
open with the IRAO at least until the elections in August 1923 were over. After the 
election GHQ and the army staff had no qualms with taking a hard line with Tobin’s 
group. In September and October 1923, 763 officers were dismissed for marked 
inefficiency or in-discipline. This demobilisation process was in stark contrast to the slow
34 Tobin Mutiny File (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/195).
35 Maryann Gialanella Valiulis, Portrait o f a Revolutionary General Richard Mulcahy (Dublin, 1992), p. 204.
36 Tobin Mutiny File (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/195).
37 Ibid.
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smooth one pursued between June and August 1923 before the elections. Following the 
step up in demobilisation, the ERAO wrote to Mulcahy requesting him to prevent 
demobilisation of certain officers. Mulcahy with election pressure gone, considered the 
letter improper and irregular and never replied.
While the political wrangling and letters were being passed between the 
government the army and the ERAO, the newly named Second Bureau was working hard 
behind the scenes studying the situation. The Department working from the Red House in 
Parkgate Street noticed that the ERAO group became very active between May and 
August 1923. But according to former D/I at the time Prof. Hogan, it only started to get 
out of hand in July. Intelligence reports started to come in to GHQ on a widescale in 
July 1923 of officers from Tobin’s base in the Vice Regal Lodge going up and down the 
country trying to seduce officers from their allegiance to the National Army. The 
Intelligence Department realised the importance and potential threat the IRAO group 
posed. So much so that two separate sections within the Department were set up 
specifically to deal with the problem. The Internal Army Supervision section and the Ex- 
Army Organisation section.39 Due to the delicate situation over loyalty which existed 
within the Intelligence Department itself, it was necessary to appoint Intelligence 
personnel who could be trusted. Dan Bryan due to his service and close relationship with 
the Director of Intelligence, Costello, was appointed to concentrate on the Ex -Army 
Organisation section. This section looked at the IRAO, IRB, Old IRA, Ex-National Army 
Officers, The Legion of Irish Ex-Service men and numerous other mushrooming Ex- 
Army organisations, which were being organised almost weekly.40 At first Bryan’s main 
concern was about the movements of the ERAO leaders, which he frequently relayed back 
to the Intelligence Department. Bryan and his fellow agents quickly managed to identify
38 Hogan’s interview 28th April 1924 (Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/25).
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the principal leaders and structures within the IRAO. There were three distinct groups 
within the organisation. Firstly, Collin’s old men such as Liam Tobin, Frank Thornton 
Charlie Dalton and even Minister Joseph McGrath, who had worked alongside many of 
these men as D/I and as D/G of CID. Secondly there was a group of 2nd Battalion old 
Dublin Brigade men who had milder views than the first group. Finally there was a 
section of rural western officers led by Col. Simmons and Col. Madden who also 
subscribed to Tobin’s organisation.
A large number of files were built up pertaining to the organisation and 
membership of the IRAO and its subsidiary bodies. The files which resulted from the 
reports of both of the Intelligence sections dealing with the affair could not be stored 
normally for fear of infiltration from within the Intelligence Department. Costello noted 
that “It was not possible to openly deal with the matter although a considerable amount of 
work was done otherwise”. 41 However despite these precautions to hide the work from a 
group of the Department, information on who was carrying out observation on the IRAO 
was soon relayed back to Tobin. According to an intelligence report, Ex -Commandant 
Joe Dolan had asked an agent from the Militaiy Intelligence Department to watch Dan 
Bryan.42 Dolan himself had been a member of the GHQ Intelligence Department under 
Collins and had also been connected with a Dublin murder gang and implicated in the 
Ballyseedy affair. Currently he was an active member of the IRAO executive and was the 
most feared of all the officers involved in the organisation. The majority of the leaders of 
the IRAO and its related organisations had considerable experience in Army Intelligence. 
According to Costello “At times the position resolved itself into a conflict between their 
intelligence service and ours, in which a number of them had been serving until a short
39 Annual Report on the Intelligence Service Oct 1924 -Dec 1925, (Military Archives Intelligence Files 1925- 
30 Box 5).
40 Ibid.
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time previously”. 43 Although serving intelligence officers in the IRAO posed a serious 
threat to the Department, Costello and Bryan managed to use them to their advantage. 
Commandant Frank Saurin who was attached to the Intelligence Department was also an 
active member of the IRAO. Costello learned of his IRAO membership through Bryan 
and his other agents working in the Ex Army Organisation section. Consequently Costello 
gave Saurin a room to himself with a telephone, in order that he might be free to organise 
the group from inside GHQ at the Red House in Parkgate Street. Costello placed a 
microphone in the ventilator in Comdt. Saurin’s room and had the telephone tapped. 
Conversations in the room and on the telephone were recorded by a relay of short hand 
writers and thus Costello was kept informed.44
This information combined with Bryan’s and other agents reports meant that the 
Intelligence Department had detailed information on IRAO movement and meetings long 
before the Mutiny erupted in March 1924. Consequently, when IRAO leaders began to 
infiltrate the Curragh command in October 1923, intelligence reports about their 
movements were relayed back to GHQ almost immediately. The Curragh was targeted by 
the IRAO because they realised it would be easy to ferment discontent in this command. 
Officers who had just completed the new training program in the Curragh, were the first 
officers to be released under Mulcahy’s demobilisation program. According to Costello 
who was serving as Assistant D/I at the time “It became a hotbed for the growth of a 
mutinous organisation”. 45 The Officer Training Corps (O.T.C.) at the Curragh training 
camp was spoken to by members of the IRAO. Intelligence recorded that “An outsider 
who had no business in the camp got in and spoke to them at an informal gathering.” It
42 Box no. S/12858 - Crisis/C/W/ Mutiny Box 24/ A Files 14th July 1925, (Military Archives Army Crisis 
Files).
43 Annual Report on the Intelligence Service Oct 1924 -Dec 1925, (Military Archives Intelligence Files 1925- 
30 Box 5).
44 Record of Conversation between General Costello and M Moynihan Secretary Dept. An Taoiseach 22 
December 1948. (National Archives, Dept. An Taoiseach S 3678 E).
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was thought from other sources that this man was Tom Cullen, there was even reports 
suggesting it was Tobin himself. However, although the Chief of Staff was informed no 
action against either man was taken.46 Following a number of secret IRAO meetings in 
the Curragh a protest against demobilisation occurred on 9 November 1923. Seven 
officers who were discharged refused to accept their papers. They were placed under 
arrest, charged with disobedience, and tried at a general court martial. In their defence 
they claimed they had sworn an oath to the Old IRA not to lay down their arms until 
Ireland was an independent republic.47 Consequently in sympathy with the seven officers, 
sixty other officers at the Curragh protested and refused to accept their demobilisation 
papers. The Army council removed them from the camp and denied separation pay and 
grants.
It appeared at this stage that the matter had come to an end. However the early 
warnings Military Intelligence had given to the Chief of Staff concerning the political 
overtures that the IRAO were making, were not heeded. The IRAO contacts within the 
Cumann na nGaedhael party were proving to be a formidable ally. So much so that in 
response to the protest at the Curragh, the government formed a cabinet committee on 
demobilisation consisting of Minister of Education MacNeill, Minister of Finance Ernest 
Blythe and Minister of Industry and Commerce Joseph McGrath. But despite McGrath’s 
protests the committee received and denied sixty applications for re-instatement from 
officers who had rebelled at the Curragh. McGrath now seen as the political voice of the 
IRAO resigned from the committee because some of the officers, whose cases he 
believed should be decided by the committee, had already been demobilised. According 
to Valiulis, after McGrath’s resignation Cosgrave managed to entice him back. McGrath 
and the IRAO leaders were given a guarantee that the cabinet committee’s decisions
45 Costello’s Statement to the Army Inquiry 28th April 1924 (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/25)
46 Costello’s Statement to the Army Inquiry 28th April 1924 (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/25 F:2).
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would be binding over Mulcahy and the Army council. This was a big enough incentive 
to entice him back on to the committee.48 The ERAO’s political bargaining power, in the 
person of McGrath appears to have kept their organisation alive in expectation. Mulcahy 
exclaimed that the incident in the Curragh would have ended any threat of mutiny were it 
not for the encouragement by politicians.49
Based on intelligence reports Mulcahy’s assertions were correct. They noted that 
IRAO activity after the Curragh incident centred around the political arena. Joseph 
McGrath was seen as the main man involved in this side of the operation. Military 
intelligence took a close look at Joseph McGrath’s involvement in the IRAO. The Second 
Bureau through observation and reports from their agents managed to uncover a network 
of touts and informers which McGrath and his private secretary Harry Murray were 
running. Intelligence found a number of IRAO agents and men that McGrath had kept in 
touch with since his days as Director General of CID, reporting to an office of his at 
Government Buildings.50 This highlighted the seriousness of the situation at the time. The 
fact that the IRAO movement were running a counter intelligence system whose primary 
function was to undermine the steps the Military Intelligence Department were taking to 
monitor their organisation. This is not surprising since the intelligence calibre and 
connections the IRAO had could be traced back to the War of Independence.
Following the Curragh, the IRAO stepped up their level of activity. It seems that 
the failure of the Cabinet Committee to sway army policy in the IRAO’s favour led its 
leaders to plan more drastic action. In January 1924, Intelligence informed GHQ that the 
IRAO intended to seize arms, take over a number of barracks and issue terms to the 
government. Consequently GHQ took their first active steps against the IRAO. Quietly
47 O’ Connor’s Statement to the Army Inquiry (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/1).
48 Maryann Gialanella Valiulis, Portrait o f  a Revolutionary General Richard Mulcahy (Dublin, 1992), p. 208.
49 Mulcahy’s Statement to the Army Inquiry (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/37).
50 Intelligence Report for Col M. J. Costello 1st April 1924 (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/189).
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commanding officers were notified o f a possible mutiny and certain troops thought to be 
mutinous were relocated.51 Mulcahy sent Cosgrave a memo on the situation and a 
meeting between Mulcahy, Cosgrave and McGrath was held as a result. Although no 
uprising took place for the first three months of 1924, the Cabinet Committee refused to 
alter Mulcahy’s demobilisation plan to suit the IRAO leaders.
Mulcahy’s reorganisation and demobilisation plan for the Army included the 
Second Bureau Military Intelligence Department. The Department was reorganised and 
scaled down. Due to the delicate situation that existed many officers were kept on. 
Although Costello probably used this as an opportunity to re assign some officers, did not 
use the situation to purge the Department of the IRAO men that were working there. 
Under the reorganisation of the Department two IRAO officers Captain Sean Tumbleton
and Commandant F.X. Coughlan held senior positions within the Department. To 
decommission these officers who had distinguished service records would have caused an 
uproar. One consequence however of this reorganisation, was that Dan Bryan on the 20 
February 1924 was made a Captain within the Department. His service record and the 
fact at the age of twenty three he was one of the few officers the D/I Costello could trust 
had a strong bearing on his promotion.
Following his promotion Bryan went on working as normal monitoring the IRAO 
and other Ex Army organisations. The months of January and February 1924 saw the 
internal activity of IRAO members significantly increase. The flow of recently 
decommissioned officers formed a natural growing bed for their organisation. 
Intelligence reports warned Mulcahy and his staff about the dangers of releasing trained 
gun men into a civilian population with high unemployment. Despite this large scale 
demobilisation pressed on. Intelligence reports at the end of February and at the
51 Maryann Gialanella Valiulis, Portrait o f a Revolutionary General Richard Mulcahy, (Dublin, 1992), p.
208.
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beginning of March were indicating a deteriorating situation. On 5 March reports came 
into intelligence of officers in Templemore under the Waterford Command absconding 
with weapons and being abusive and drunk. In addition, an attempt on the Waterford 
Commander’s life outside the Barracks was also reported. Following a series of 
Intelligence reports similar to the one just mentioned GHQ took steps to stop the leaders 
of the IRAO from meeting. An order was passed preventing officers leaving barracks 
without written permission and stopping officers who were on leave visiting Dublin from 
contacting GHQ where many of the IRAO leaders were based.
These steps at curbing the influence of the IRAO were taken too late by GHQ, 
despite the constant warnings from intelligence. The IRAO leaders egged on by some 
Cumann na nGaedhael politicians and under pressure to act from the large number o f Pre 
-Truce officers that were about to be decommissioned on 7 March, were now motivated 
to take direct steps so as to redirect army policy. On 6 March 1924 Liam Tobin and 
Charles Dalton signed an ultimatum which was presented to the Government. It 
demanded the suspension of army demobilisation and the removal of the Army Council. 
The government was given until 12 noon on 10 March 1924 to reply. Failure to comply 
meant that “we will take such action that will make clear to the Irish People that we are 
not renegades or traitors to the ideals that induced them to accept the Treaty”.52
This ultimatum caused chaos inside the Intelligence Department. There were 
reports coming in from all over the country of officers absconding with weapons as news 
of the mutiny spread. On 8 March a report came in from the Cork Command stated that 
officers had been individually approached and asked to sign a document tendering their 
resignations to Major General Liam Tobin.53 In Roscommon on the same day, Captain 
Madden ordered an arms inspection. He then ordered all the arms to be placed in cars
52 S3578D, Department of An Taoiseach, National Archives Dublin.
53 Intelligence Reports 8th March 1924 (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/189)
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waiting outside the barracks, being driven by Ex Col Simmons and Ex Col Madden who 
was the Captain’s brother.54 Col Simmons and Col Madden were leaders of the Western 
Officer clique within the IRAO. Madden and Simmons made a statement looking for the 
removal of certain officers including the present D/I Costello. They had also called for 
the appointment of Col. Frank Thornton as D/I.55 This information was relayed back to 
GHQ and brought about both officer’s resignations. The first few days following the issue 
of the ultimatum, the Intelligence Department was littered with radio reports from 
different Commands telling of officers absconding with arms. With government 
authority, the arrest of Tobin and Dalton was ordered. Several houses in Dublin were 
searched by the military including Joseph McGrath’s, but to no avail. In expectation of 
trouble resulting from the ultimatum’s deadline, Guards were strengthened after dark in a 
series of barracks around the country. Convoys of troops in Dublin had mounted machine 
guns on their tender vehicles in case of a revolt in the city. Because of the nationalist 
slant the IRAO had put on their ultimatum and the demands they had made in the past 
concerning the inadequacies of the current government’s nationalist policy, the Northern 
authorities were also worried. Irish military intelligence picked up a report on 11 March 
that the RUC and the Ulster “Specials” had mobilised on the border. They were checking 
all cars for IRAO captured arms being shipped to Derry City.56 During the ensuing days 
after the ultimatum was issued a number of declarations of loyalty to GHQ came in from 
different commands. However Waterford and the Cork command were the only two that 
GHQ were significantly worried about.57 The mutiny was an officers revolt and the 
majority of the rank and file did not involve themselves. For this reason intelligence
54 Ibid.
55 Costello’s Statement to the Army Inquiry 28th April 1924 (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/25 F:3).
56 Intelligence Reports 11th March 1924 (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/189).
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57 Intelligence Reports 12th March 1924 (UCD Archi  Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/189).
estimated that loyal personnel outnumbered IRAO supporters ten to one.58 Despite this 
Cork proved to be a problem. Dalton and Tom Ennis leaders in the IRAO had been given 
jurisdiction in the Cork command during the civil war. They had a strong influence over 
the officers and their loyalty could not be counted on if open fighting broke out. Within 
Dublin itself some weapons were taken from Gormanstown and Baldonell, but Reports 
suggested that the place of prime concern was Island Bridge. According to intelligence 
reports the IRAO had a strong position there.59 The Intelligence Department and GHQ 
sent out troops to hunt down the mutineers. It is not clear how successful they were, but 
on 13 March a child was shot in the leg accidentally while troops failed to apprehend a 
mutineer in Dublin.60
The increase in military activity was reflected in an increase in political activity. 
McGrath in sympathy with the mutineers and in condemnation of the way the government 
had handled the whole affair, resigned on 7 March from his post as Minister. In response, 
Cumann na nGaedhael, held several meetings throughout the army crisis, with a well 
regimented section within the party giving a certain support for the mutineers.61 McGrath 
minimised the mutiny at these party meetings, reducing it to a dispute between the IRB 
run by Mulcahy and the IRAO. Essentially what emerged at these party meetings were 
three distinct factions. Firstly McGrath and his followers, secondly Mulcahy and his 
support and thirdly Kevin O’Higgins who with the Minister for Agriculture Patrick Hogan 
formed another formidable faction of the party. In the background giving his support to 
all of the three sides was Cosgrave. As a result of the talks at these party meetings 
O’Higgins and his supporters had attacked Mulcahy and the Army Council. However 
their criticism was not that they failed to recognise the mutineers needs, but that they 
facilitated the existence of a secret society, the IRB, within the national army. This was
5g Costello’s Statement to the Army Inquiry 28th April 1924 (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/25 E: 1).
59 Intelligence Reports (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/189).
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used by O’Higgins to attack Mulcahy and introduce one of O’Higgins’ converts General 
Eoin O’Duffy into the equation. It was decided by the Government’s Executive Council 
that Mulcahy and his Army Council were tainted with their association with the IRB and 
therefore could not deal with the IRAO. So instead O’Dufiy was made General 
Commanding Officer of the Defence Forces of Saorstat Eireann on 10 March. O ’Dufly
himself was Chief of the Civic Guards which came under O’Higgin’s jurisdiction as 
Minister for Home Affairs. In reducing Mulcahy’s power and in installing 0 ’Duffy, 
O’Higgins had scored a strong political victory within the Cumann na nGaedhael party. 
Meanwhile Cosgrave delegated McGrath to unofficially approach the mutineers and 
induce them to “undo, so far as they can the mischief created by their actions”.62 This 
McGrath did. McGrath on behalf of the government offered lenient terms to those who 
mutinied and offered reinstatement without victimisation. He also promised them that an 
inquiry board would be set up to examine the whole demobilisation procedure. 
Consequently on 12 March the Executive council ordered the Intelligence Department 
and other army authorities to stop the search for the mutineers and gave them the 
opportunity to return all stolen property. As a result of these decisions, the mutineers sent 
another document to the government in which they repented their decision and McGrath 
on 13 March withdrew his resignation.
However, despite all these claims of repentance on behalf of the IRAO, the 
Intelligence Department was getting a completely different picture after the 12 March. 
Instead of IRAO activity scaling down it appeared to be more active than ever. A barracks 
in New Ross was attacked for twenty minutes with weapons taken by the IRAO. A sentry
60 Intelligence Reports 13th March 1924 (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/189).
61 O’Higgins’ Statement to the Army Inquiry (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/23).
62 Maryann Gialanella Valiulis, Portrait o f a Revolutionary General Richard Mulcahy (Dublin, 1992), p. 212.
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was wounded and the attackers retreated.63 Captain Bryan as he now was, had received 
reports from a number o f agents and informers within the IRAO of frequent meetings of 
the organisation. The tap room over a pub in Fleet Street was identified as a hive of IRAO 
activity.64 Technically the military authorities no longer had the power to arrest these men 
since the government had officially called off the search for mutineers on 12 March.
What made matters even more chaotic for the intelligence service was that seven 
senior intelligence officers resigned in sympathy with the IRAO leaders between the 10 
March and the 13 March. Commandant Saurin who’s office had been bugged, 
Commandant F.X. Coughlan and Captain Sean Roche all resigned on the 10 March. They
were followed by Lieutenant O’Neill, Lieutenant J. Byrne, Commadant S. Twomey and 
Captain J. Tumbleton by 13 March.65 These resignations needless to say caused large 
scale upheaval within the Department and would have posed a strong security risk. 
Despite taking precautions many of these resigning trained intelligence officers had 
knowledge of files and the movement of agents within the Intelligence Department, that 
were operating directly against the IRAO. The IRAO had enough men and expertise at 
their disposal now to set up a counter intelligence system and even enough power to 
possibly infiltrate the existing Intelligence Department. The worst fears o f GHQ were 
confirmed when the Intelligence Department picked up information on directives given to 
certain IRAO officers. Movements of Army Intelligence personnel were to be reported. 
The IRAO had already detailed an agent to shadow Dan Bryan. IRAO agents who still 
remained in GHQ were also encouraged to get copies of routine orders. Lists of reliable 
men to be attached to IRAO intelligence were sought as were lists o f arms stores in 
different barracks around the country. Special attention was paid to the holdings in the
63 Intelligence Reports 12th March 1924 (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/189).
64 Intelligence Reports 1924 (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/189).
65 Director of Intelligence Reports 1924 (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/189).
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Magazine Fort in the Phoenix Park.66 It appeared now that GHQ had an intelligence war 
on their hands and information security had to be tightened.
GHQ was also concerned that the mutineers appeared to be using their time of 
grace, supposedly to return stolen weaponry, to spread discontent not only in army circles 
but also into the Civic Guards. There were many Ex-Army officers in the Guards and the 
IRAO used this to further their aims.67 Many IRAO members like McGrath and Sean
Tumbleton had been members of CID during the civil war and maintained connections 
with members of the Civic Guard organisation which swallowed up the old Oriel house 
organisation in 1923. An intelligence report indicated that the head of the Armed 
Detective Unit former Director of Intelligence, David Nelligan “and his G Division were
ro
friendly to” the IRAO cause. The reliability of this assertion made at an IRAO meeting 
is indeterminable. Nelligan’s own testimony at the army inquiry and the fact that only six 
month before he himself as DA had listed officers for demobilisation, makes it unlikely 
that he was a staunch IRAO supporter. However he was one of Collins’ men and he had 
later stated it is undeniable that many of his officers were supporters, and indeed G 
Division men were supposedly caught at the scene of the mutiny a few days later.69
The mobilisation of the Mutineers after the 12 March was causing the Intelligence 
Department and other military authorities grave concern. Bryan stated that Mulcahy and 
GHQ were extremely worried about the unpredictable nature of some of the mutineers 
and that there were threats of “plugging all and sundry”.70 The intelligence reports of 
political intrigue and alleged assassination plots only helped fuel these fears.71 However 
despite these fears of a revolt conveyed by Intelligence, the political forces were taking a
66 Intelligence Reports 1924 (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/196).
67 Intelligence Report S/21.501 Military Archives, quoted in Maryann Gialanella Valiulis, Portrait o f  a 
Revolutionary General Richard Mulcahy (Dublin, 1992), p. 212.
68 Intelligence Reports 1924 (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/189).
69 Ibid.
70 Interview Valiulis had with Bryan 18th March 1975, quoted in Maryann Gialanella Valiulis, Portrait o f a 
Revolutionary General Richard Mulcahy (Dublin, 1992), p. 214.
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more lenient view of the situation. Cosgrave instructed McGrath on 17 March to relay to 
the mutineers that they had until 20 March to surrender, together with all stolen 
property.72 Despite this the Intelligence Department continued to monitor the mutineers 
movements very closely.
The tracking and gathering of information on the mutineers was proving easy for 
the Intelligence Department. According to Bryan its leading lights were hopelessly 
indiscreet.73 The Department had a surveillance operation in action at the Crown Alley 
phone exchange in Dublin. This had been operational at different times as far back as the 
Civil War. It was currently being used to track the mutineers. Bryan from this source 
received information that Tobin and some senior IRAO leaders had scheduled a meeting 
for the night of 18 March for Devlins’ Hotel in Parnell Street.74 Bryan immediately 
informed Costello and news of the planned meeting was conveyed to the higher staff of 
the Army. However the higher Army staff did not consult the Executive, General O’Duffy 
whom the government had put in charge of the affair or indeed General Mulcahy himself. 
Colonel Hugo MacNeill was detailed to surround the hotel with troops and await further 
instruction. MacNeill with his troops in place contacted a “higher authority” in Portobello 
barracks.75 MacNeill was told to maintain the cordon but not enter without further 
instruction. Costello who was with MacNeill outside the hotel went to Portobello. Here 
he met the Adjutant General Gearoid O Suilibheain and Diarmuid O’Hegarty the
secretary of the Executive Council. A discussion ensued on whether the Minister for 
Defence should be contacted, but it was felt it would take too long to get an answer.
71 Ibid.
72 Dermot Keogh, Twentieth Century Ireland (Dublin, 1994), p. 20.
73 Eunan O’Halpin, “Intelligence and Security in Ireland”, In Intelligence and National Security, vol. 5,
1990, p. 54 Reference to Bryan Tapes.
74 Recollection of Conversation Maurice Moynihan had with Michael Costello on 12th December 1948 
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Eventually it was agreed that entry and arrest should be effected. General Costello 
returned to Parnell Street with this information at about 1 am.
While Costello was gone, the mutineers had become aware that the hotel was 
surrounded. Liam Tobin who was late for the meeting had stepped off a tram in 
O’Connell Street and saw the troops outside. At which point he left without making any 
attempt to enter the hotel.76 The rest of the mutineers proceeded to make their way onto 
the roof top of the building. Many of them had a good knowledge of the surrounding area 
since Devlin’s had been an intelligence meeting place of Collins during the War of 
Independence. Intelligence recorded on 18 March that two mutinous officers had been 
ringing up from somewhere in town trying to locate a Minister. They had rang every 
Minister except Defence, but could not get hold of anyone.77 Despite this, a message of 
the mutineers plight had managed to find its way to McGrath. He arrived on the scene 
demanding that the troops withdraw. His protests weren’t entertained. Col MacNeill 
entered the building and eleven mutinous officers were captured, and a small quantity of 
arms were confiscated. It is not clear for what purpose the mutineers were meeting, or to 
what extent the Intelligence Department knew before the raid what they were planning. 
Intelligence reports dated after the mutiny on 22 March and 1 April 1924, suggest that 
they were planning to kidnap the governor general, the wife of the GOC in Dublin, Mrs. 
Hogan and a number of other officers.78 According to Sunday Press journalist John 
Murdoch who talked to one of the mutineers sometime after the incident, the purpose of 
the meeting was far more sinister. General Tobin had planned to kidnap the entire Free 
State Cabinet with the exception of Joseph McGrath. This was decided by the main IRAO 
leaders before they issued their ultimatum on 7 March. The purpose of the meeting in
76 Recollection o f Conversation Maurice Moynihan had with Michael Costello on 12th December 1948 
(National Archives, Dept. An Taoiseach S3678 E.)
77 Intelligence Memo 18th March 1924 (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/196).
78 Reports quoted in Maryann Gialanella Valiulis, Portrait o f  a Revolutionary General Richard Mulcahy, 
(Dublin, 1992), p. 215.
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Devlins was to inform the rank and file of the plan and how it was to be carried out.79 
This article by Murdoch doesn’t name the mutineer who gave him this information over 
forty years after the event took place. However the article’s assertion of a cabinet kidnap 
plan is given credence by the detail of how the plan was to be executed. Secondly, on the 
troops arrival in Devlins they found a significant amount of scorched papers recently 
burned in the room where the mutineers were meeting.
Bryan exclaimed that their scheme itself was launched “in a haze of whiskey”.80 
However despite the contention over whether a kidnapping plan was going to be 
implemented or not, on the night of the raid the main ringleaders of the IRAO seem to 
have managed to avoid capture. According to the report prepared for the D/I the 
following morning, Col. MacDonald attempted first to enter Devlins at 11:30 pm. He was 
held up at the door by mutineers Commandant Joe Dolan who had a gun in his pocket and 
Commandant Shanahan. Col. MacDonald retreated and proceeded to clear the 
surrounding streets of all civilians. At 12:15 am MacNeill’s troops entered the building 
and some shots were fired. Whether they were fired defensively or as a warning, was 
unclear. However MacNeill searched the building and couldn’t find any of the mutineers. 
However it became clear that they had escaped onto the rooftop. At 2:30am the mutineers 
commenced surrendering and retreated from the roof.81 Many of the mutineer party had 
managed to escape via the rooftop and only ten mutineers were arrested.82 However those 
arrested included some influential intelligence personnel. Three former members of the 
Squad were present. Col. James Slattery, Commdt. Pat Me Crae and Commdt. Patrick 
Griffin as were the three former GHQ intelligence officers, Joe Dolan, Joseph Shannahan 
and Frank Thornton. Following their arrests, McGrath was becoming more restless. He
79 Mutiny of the Generals, Sunday Press, 28th Nov 1965.
80 Eunan O’Halpin, “Intelligence and Security in Ireland”, in Intelligence and National Security, vol. 5 
1990, p. 54 Reference to O’Halpin’s interview with Bryan December 1983.
81 Report to Director of Intelligence 19th March 1924 (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/189).
82 Uinseann MacEoin, The IRA in the Twilight Years 1923 - 1948 (Dublin:), p. 97.
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demanded to stand the mutineers a drink before they were locked up. McGrath’s wish 
was granted before the arrested officers were removed in lorries to Arbour Hill barracks. 
Troops opened fire on an arrested mutineer who had jumped out of one of the lorries on 
O’Connell Bridge. He was not wounded, but was recaptured.83
The following day the political arena erupted as news of the events o f the night 
before came through. The Executive council met twice and Mulcahy was asked to furnish 
a report on the event. The Executive Council in the absence of Cosgrave, who was ill, 
demanded the resignation of MacMahon, O’Muirthuile, O’Suileabhain and Mulcahy
which made up the Army council. The Executive council dominated by O’Higgin’s in 
Cosgrave’s wake, were seeking the resignations because the army had broke the 
government deadline of the 20 March in arresting the Mutineers. The resignations were 
forthcoming and the Executive Council established a three man committee of inquiry to 
look into the whole affair. Essentially O’Higgins had successfully used the Mutiny to 
purge himself of Mulcahy who he now saw as a political rival for control within the party. 
Cosgrave’s illness had saved him from making any controversial decision.
The D/I Costello believed that this illness was a deliberate ploy on Cosgrave’s 
behalf. Cosgrave himself did not like Mulcahy or O’Higgins. His feelings towards Mr. 
O’Higgins was generated by O’Higgin’s “masterful way and perhaps his imperialist 
tendencies”. General Mulcahy was disliked for different reasons and generally because 
“he was a pain in the neck” to Cosgrave. It is Costello’s belief that Cosgrave who had the 
special confidence of McGrath, encouraged him to incite an ultimatum from the 
mutineers, thus provoking a situation that he hoped would force O’Higgins’ resignation 
from the Executive council. However O’Higgins who was the second in command in 
government and took over from Cosgrave, skilfully transferred the blame to Mulcahy and
83 Dermot Keogh, Twentieth Century Ireland (Dublin, 1994), p.21.
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forced his resignation.84 This theory of Costello’s has no firm evidence to support it, 
however given his position as head of Intelligence it must be considered possible.
O’Higgins emerged from the whole affair in a very strong position. He had 
established himself as a force to be reckoned with politically. His position as Minister for 
Home Affairs which gave him control of the Civic Guards also meant he had access to its 
intelligence department under Nelligan, which could keep him up to date on a whole 
series of contentious issues.85 O’Higgins following the Army Council’s resignations 
reversed his support or understanding of the mutineers predicament. Once Mulcahy and 
his Council’s power was undermined O’Higgins did not need the mutineers and ironically 
sought a more vigilant prosecution of the mutineers. However Cosgrave wanted to get the 
affair out of the public eye as quickly as possible. He issued a statement when the affair 
first broke to the public on 19 March that, “This government had never discussed 
questions of politics with Army Officers”, although Tobin and Dalton met with him at 
least once to discuss such issues. This fact was one of Cosgrave’s main motivations in 
designing the type of Committee of Inquiry that was formed to examine the whole affair. 
By the time the Army Inquiry Committee had issued its report in June 1924, both the 
political and military crises had been sufficiently defused to preclude the Dail from re­
lighting them. The committee itself was closed to the public and the Inquiry was 
instructed to ignore the actual mutiny itself which fell outside its scope.87 All these 
preventative measures ensured that the Mutiny would not rear its head in the political 
arena again or alert the public to what extent government members had contact with the 
mutineers before the crisis unfolded.
84 Dept. An Taoiseach S3678 E, Recollection of Conversation Maurice Moynihan had with Michael Costello 
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As far as the government and other politicians were concerned the Army 
Crisis was over and no more attention should be paid to it. However this was far from the 
attitude taken by the Intelligence Department. The events of the mutiny were traumatic 
for the Department. As well as bringing the resignation of seven of its more senior 
officers, the loyal ones were beginning to feel uneasy. Costello and many of the 
intelligence branch in GHQ were appalled at the way Mulcahy and the Army Council 
were treated. So much so that Costello himself is believed to have suggested that GHQ 
could repudiate the government measures. But the former Chief of Staff General 
MacMahon reprimanded him sharply. Other GHQ staff and intelligence officers shared 
Costello’s views but the resigned Army Council members encouraged them to tow the 
line. Mulcahy, MacMahon, O’Suilleabhain and O’Muirthuile were the chief victims of
the Mutiny, but ironically they were the men most responsible for creating a disciplined, 
non political army. The Army Council had reduced the army to a size manageable for a 
peace time existence and had secured its recognition of political authority. The 
contentious issue of recognition of political authority was something that was not 
guaranteed since the Irish Army was formed.
Despite the resignation of the Army Council, the dismissal of the mutineers and 
the government’s claim that the affair was now oVer, the Intelligence Department refused 
to believe so. Their refusal to let go of the affair was reinforced by the continued 
intelligence reports they received of mutineers being active in organising outside the 
Army. The Internal Army Section and The Ex-Army Organisation section of the 
Intelligence Department were picking up reports that were very alarming. It appeared that 
that the IRAO were attempting to make contact with the IRA. The Department realised 
the potential threat this would pose and continued to monitor the situation very closely. 
The mutineers were using the nostalgia of the War of Independence to good effect.
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Intelligence reported that there were attempts by decommissioned officers to re-establish 
their old commands from their War of Independence days. Captain Bryan recorded a 
meeting that took place at Foley’s Provision shop on the North Circular road, of 
disenchanted officers trying to reform the Dublin Brigade. Bryan noted that the question 
at issue was whether to let people “who had republican ideas and left the Free State Army 
because of them into their secret society”. There was not strong support for this proposal. 
However Bryan’s old commander in the 4th Battalion Dublin Brigade and one of the 
Intelligence Department officers who resigned, F.X. Coughlan strongly supported the 
idea.88 Despite the lack of support for Coughlan, the rest of the mutineer leadership toyed 
with the idea of dealing with the IRA to keep their ambitions alive. However if  they were 
to make overtures to the IRA, they would have to solve some differences. Early on in the 
Civil War, an intelligence report noted that Tobin had made the trustee of the Sinn Fein
party W. J.Griffm hand over £1,800 on his arrest by Free State troops. Although it was 
becoming more and more obvious that the IRAO were using their desires for a united 
Ireland as a political and recruiting tool rather than as a fundamental basis of their policy, 
they realised they needed support if they were to keep their designs on influencing Army 
policy alive.
Bryan reported that negotiations between Ex Army officers and IRA officers 
were underway. Intermediaries acceptable to both sides were being used to start talks.89 
Neutral IRA i.e. those who remained neutral during the Civil war were also approached.90 
The relations between Free State officers and IRA officers had been one of contempt 
throughout the Civil War. However towards the end relations were improving. According
88 Box no. S/12858 - Crisis/C/W/ Mutiny Box 24/ A Files, Intelligence report Bryan to D/I 13-07-25, 
(Military Archives Army Crisis Files).
89 Box no. S/12858 - Crisis/C/W/ Mutiny Box 24/ A Files, Intelligence report Bryan to D/I 15-07-25, 
(Military Archives Army Crisis Files).
90 It appears Florence O’Donoghue was approached. Intelligence Memo March 1924 (UCD Archives, 
Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/189).
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to Conor Foley, some jailers were facilitating ERA prisoner communication with the 
outside leadership. During the mass hunger strikes many Free State soldiers had 
expressed their sympathy for the prisoners. Two days before the mutiny became public, 
Peadar O’Donnell escaped from the internment camp in the Curragh, with the collusion 
of quite a number o f guards.91 Tom Barry an IRA leader in the South made 
representations to Mulcahy and some of his Army Council using his old IRB contacts 
during the Civil war. Barry was looking for the formation of a national organisation into 
which the best elements from both sides could co-operate. In return the ERA would 
release themselves from allegiance to de Valera and publicly destroy their arms. This 
proposal was thrown out by Cosgrave and O’Higgins when Mulcahy brought it to them.92 
They realised the ERA were defeated and they did not need to negotiate a settlement.
The IRAO leadership while toying with the idea of reconvening the IRB in 
November 1923, had made some contact with ERA members of the brotherhood, some of 
whom were in Free State prisons.93 However this never materialised and contacts weren’t 
pursued. Now the situation had changed the mutineers were seeking an alliance.
Tom Heavey a member of the IRA’s GHQ staff was sent to attend an ERAO 
meeting. The IRA Army Council gave serious thought to co-operation with the mutineers, 
but there was a strong group within the ERA leadership which doubted their authenticity. 
They counselled against involvement with what they saw as a squabble between rival 
cliques of careerists within the Free State Army. Another factor which influenced caution 
on the IRA’s behalf had been the record of some of the mutineers involved. Many of 
them had been the most ruthless Free State Army officers during the Civil War. Joe 
Dolan the former Intelligence officer and part o f the IRAO leadership was believed by the
91 Conor Foley, Legion o f  the Rearguard (Dublin, 1985), p. 48.
92 Ibid. p. 47.
93 Tim Pat Coogan, IRA (London, 1986), p. 47.
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IRA to have been involved in the Ballyseedy massacre in Kerry.94 The IRA’s leadership 
were also of the firm belief that the mutineers were not prepared to risk an all out clash 
with the authorities.
However according to Foley, IRA commander Frank Aitken believed that the 
mutineers resolve might be stiffened if a way could be found to provoke the common 
foe.95 According to Coogan IRA men acting independently of IRA GHQ, were sent to 
assassinate the British soldiers stationed at the Treaty port in Cobh.96 Civilians and 
British soldiers were shot and it was publicly announced by the assassins that this was 
done in the name of Tobin and Dalton. However this attempt to force the IRAO’s hand 
did not work, and the threat of an IRAO IRA alliance slowly deteriorated.
Although the Intelligence Department kept both their intelligence sections 
monitoring the Mutineers, the main threat had now subsided. The disgruntled officers 
continued to meet and indeed continued to be monitored. However the Intelligence 
Department’s main worry as they entered 1925 was not the mutineers but rather the 
Department of Finance and the lack of funding that had been made available to them. 
Despite the upheaval and controversy the mutiny affair created, the Intelligence 
Department had progressed significantly as a result. The mutiny had highlighted the 
important job the Department played in safeguarding and protecting the political 
institutions of the day. It also demonstrated to itself the need for internal and external 
monitoring. The Department’s response to the mutiny which facilitated the establishment 
of the two sub sections set up specifically to deal with the affair was very successful. This 
success helped bring about a series of new sections which specifically dealt with 
particular areas of Intelligence. However despite these progressions it was still
94 Conor Foley, Legion o f  the Rearguard (Dublin, 1985), p. 47.
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problematic that the Intelligence Department and indeed the Army as a whole were ready 
to cope with a peace time existence.
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CHAPTER 4
THE 1920’S 
AND THE SCRAMBLE FOR INTELLIGENCE DOMINANCE
As the Military Intelligence Department emerged from the Army Mutiny affair 
somewhat scarred but very much still the premier intelligence force within the new state, 
its destiny was unknown. The Department which had proved itself to be an intricate part 
of the new Free State administration, was entering an era of conservatism. These 
conditions had proved to be very conducive to the growth of state controlled intelligence 
agencies in many countries. However before the mutiny erupted in March 1924, 
demobilisation and reorganisation of the Army for peace time had significantly reduced 
military intelligence establishments outside of GHQ. All those Brigade, Battalion and 
Company intelligence officers positions which had taken so much energy to create and 
sustain during the War of Independence and the Civil War were surplus to requirements 
in the eyes of the government and especially the Department of Finance. The mutiny and 
the threat of a second republican rising left the government realising that they might have 
been a little too hasty in planning the dismantling of the military intelligence machinery. 
According to Bryan, “somebody was looking at British Peace Tables of organisation and 
not monitoring the actual conditions in the country at the time".1 Consequently following 
the Mutiny, many active agents outside of GHQ were retained although this was only a 
small concession before the inevitable removal of military agencies from the civil 
administration took place.
Throughout 1924 and 1925 Irish Military Intelligence was still the main 
intelligence force in the country. The organisation had undergone a radical change 
following the Civil War. In addition to the demobilisation and re-organisation plans of
1 Development of Military Intelligence 1916-45 (UCD Archives Bryan Papers, P7/171).
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Mulcahy, army circles wanted to create an identity separate to that of Britain. The 
organisation and the structure of the Free State army had been modelled on the British 
Army. In an attempt to break with this, the GHQ staff were divided into different bureaux 
based on the French Army system of organisation. In 1924 the First Bureau and the 
Second Bureau were introduced. The Second Bureau was primarily reserved for Military 
Intelligence and was henceforth addressed as such. Despite these attempts to give the 
army a more continental flavour, its grass roots structure was very much British in 
orientation. The different commands outside of GHQ still mimicked the British structures 
and the chain of command was not altered.
The history of the Second Bureau Military Intelligence Department between 1923 
and 1930 appears to be one of constant structural and organisational change. Its sections 
and divisions seem to be re-ordered every two years or so. This was probably a response 
to the fluctuating power and financial backing the Department had from year to year. The 
first major organisational changes within the Department occurred between October 1924 
and December 1925 with the ordering of specific intelligence sections into different 
divisions. These changes were a consequence of the large number o f new intelligence 
sections that had emerged since the Civil War.
The Army Mutiny affair brought two new intelligence sections into existence, 
The Internal Army Supervision section and the Ex-Army Organisation section. Added to 
this was the Press Survey section, which had been established by Intelligence officer, 
Commandant Whitmore at the close of 1923. It monitored a whole series of national and 
regional newspapers, along with journals, articles and books of the day. This move into 
the more military side of intelligence was followed by specific sections being established 
for, Censorship, Archives, Topographical, Statistical and Foreign Armies. The growth of
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internal sections was again facilitated when late in 1923, the Department took over the 
remnants o f the intelligence service which had existed in North East Ulster.
The Army Staff decided to reorganise the Second Bureau Intelligence 
Department again in 1925.2 The Department was divided into seven sections lettered A to 
G. Specific intelligence sub sections were appointed to each lettered Section.3 For 
example Section A, which was commanded by Commadant Egan was in charge of the 
North East Ulster Section and the Record or Registry Section. Section C under Captain 
Power controlled all press related sections.4 These included, Publicity, Censorship, Press 
Survey and An T-Oglac. The Volunteer magazine had been kept going since the War o f
Independence and the responsibility for its maintenance was given to the Second Bureau. 
Captain Dan Bryan who was attached to the Ex-Army Organisation section did not come 
under any of these lettered sections. Both the mutiny sections, presumably because of 
their internal sensitivity, were attached to the Second Bureau’s Personal Staff. This 
Personal Staff worked directly for the Bureau’s Director. The Bureau’s Director in 1925 
was Costello until he transferred and was replaced by Col. E. V. O’Carroll.5
Throughout the 1920’s the Bureau’s Sub sections were shuffled around from 
section to section as were the staff. Dan Bryan’s Ex Army Organisation section was 
transferred from the Personal Staff office to C section. While in C section, the activity o f 
the mutineers decreased and Bryan’s agents briefs were extended to include the 
monitoring of Labour and Communism. The Ex Army Organisation section officially 
ceased in November 1925 and its operatives were re-dispatched.6 Although this section 
closed temporarily, the other section bom of the mutiny, Internal Army Surveillance, was
2 Intelligence Monthly and Weekly reports 1925-32,(Military Archives, Intelligence Files 1925-30 Box 5).
3 Monthly Report Feb 1926 F- Section, Intelligence Monthly and Weekly reports 1925-32,(Military 
Archives, Intelligence Files 1925-30 Box 5).
4 2nd Bureau Personnel, (Military Archives, Intelligence Files 1925-30 Box 5).
5 Ibid.
6 Annual Report on the Intelligence Service for Oct 1924 to Dec 1925,(Military Archives, Intelligence Files 
1925-30 Box 5).
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kept open. As well as sub sections moving and forming during this period, whole new 
sections appeared from time to time. H Section appeared in 1927 specifically 
concentrating on Foreign Armies and Technical Military Research. This reshuffling of 
subsections and staff made the Bureau’s structure very fluid, however, despite the 
constant reorganisation the main sub sections remained the same. See Table 2 below for a 
guideline to the layout of the Intelligence Department.
TABLE 2 
2nd Bureau Organisation 1926-27
Director 
Col. CTCarroll 
Deputy 
Major T. Killeen
1
Personal Staff
-  Counter Espionage
Finance
-  Codes and Cyphers
A Section
-  Communists+ Others
-  Ex-Army Organisations
L  Interior Economy
8 Section
Records Section
Irregulars
Labour
Economics
North East Ulster
L- Foreign Elements
Field Intelligence
Topographical
Statistical
C Section
Printing Plant
Publicity
An t-Oglac
-  Press Censorship
Press Relations
D Section
-  Technical Information
Foreign Armies
Development of Wbr
Inventions
Arms Production
-  International Matters
Foreign Missions
Source: Diagram copied from 2nd Bureau Annual Report 1926-27, (Military Archives, Intelligence Files 
1925-30 Box 5).
One of the most controversial but least mentioned intelligence sections was the 
North East section. The North East Intelligence officers who had remained in service 
throughout the Civil War had been attached to the Military Customs Brigade active in the 
North. However after the Civil War they were transferred to the Intelligence Department
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and constituted the new North East Section which was established in 1924.7 The North 
East section of the Army had proved problematic ever since the Treaty was signed. The 
soldiers from the Northern command which supported Collins and Cosgrave had to be put 
somewhere, since their activity in the North would jeopardise the Treaty. Many Northern 
officers were brought to Dublin which caused much animosity amongst Dublin officers, 
particularly those connected with Tobin and the IRAO. Decisions on what to do with 
them varied between Government and Army leaders. According to military tradition, 
Collins had intended to use these men to launch a northern offensive after the Civil War. 
Although the truth of this intention is open to debate, in an interview carried out much 
later with former D/I Costello, he claimed that during the Boundary Commission talks in 
1925 steps were taken to form a force to take control of the six counties.8 Mr. Hughes the 
then Minister for Defence had instructed a number of officers who were known to have 
nationalist outlooks, to select a number of trustworthy men and hold themselves in 
readiness to act on further instruction. The following morning however they were told to 
regard the instructions of the previous night as being cancelled. Costello is reported to go 
on to say that a little while after the Boundary Commission a special unit of the Army 
was formed again by Mr. Hughes in the Curragh. Known as The Border Unit and under 
the command of an Ex- British Officer, they were installed to prevent the IRA from 
taking violent action against the six county authorities. According to Costello it was this 
change in the type of men selected for the first group compared with the Border Unit 
which marked the change in government policy on the North East.9
Despite these claims by Costello, the government’s change of policy on the North 
East appears to have fallen on deaf ears within GHQ. In 1923 Cosgrave issued a directive
7 Annual Report on the Intelligence Service for Oct 1924 to Dec 1925, (Military Archives, Intelligence Files
1925-30 Box 5).
8 Dept. An Taoiseach S3678 E Recollection of Conversation Maurice Moynihan had with Michael Costello
on 12th December 1948 (N. A. Dublin)
9 ibid.
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to Mulcahy while he was Commander in Chief, to withdraw all agents from Britain and 
the six counties.10 Whether this directive was later retracted by Cosgrave is unknown, 
however the Intelligence North East Section continued to function throughout the 1920’s. 
As well as carrying out surveillance operations on Unionist, Loyalist and Republican 
bodies in the North it also reported on suspected Unionist agents and sympathisers active 
in the Free State. A Second Bureau report noted that there were a number of “six county 
agents in the Saorstdt” and reportedly a sum of £5,000 had been spent by the Northern
government on agents and sympathisers in the South. The North East section’s 
Intelligence agents also reported on the strength and morale of the RUC, the Specials and 
the British Military personnel stationed there.11
Another section which expanded within the Second Bureau was the Communist 
and Labour section. Initially coupled with the Ex-Army section, its operatives and files 
grew into a completely separate section.12 The air of religious conservatism which was 
prevalent in the 1920’s helped to manufacture a “Red Scare”. The Intelligence 
Department personnel were no different from their government counterparts in fearing 
the threat of a communist take over. The perceived communist threat in Ireland never 
materialised, however, this didn’t prevent the Second Bureau from monitoring a whole 
series of organisations they perceived as having communist tendencies. Bryan was 
involved in monitoring a series of left wing organisations operating from rented meeting 
rooms in Pamell Street. He noted that between 1923-25 there was a small Irish 
Communist Party. However a number of workers clubs which were established and run 
by left wing IRA men and women were proving more threatening. The James Connolly 
Workers Club, at 47 Pamell Square contained within its leadership, IRA commander
10 February to June Army Council meeting notes and minutes, 15th June 1923, (UCD Archives, Mulcahy 
Papers, P7/B/178).
11 2nd Bureau Annual Report 1926-27(Military Archives, Intelligence Files 1925-30 Box 5).
12 2nd Bureau Personnel, (Military Archives, Intelligence Files 1925-30 Box 5).
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Frank Ryan, and Shiela Bowen a Cumman na mBan activist. The Second Bureau had 
detailed files on most of the principal members of the various workers clubs. These clubs 
were easily infiltrated and information was supplied to Bryan by a network of agents. 
Most of the workers club members had backgrounds in land agitation, union lobbying 
while many others were left wing IRA men and women. However it was noted by the 
Second Bureau that three members o f the Connolly Workers Club were supposed to be in 
Russia. Peadar Breslin, Bill Denn and Young Jim Larkin were thought to be in Moscow 
University training in techniques to provoke a workers revolution. Apart from Workers 
Clubs, the Second Bureau also monitored The Soviet Unity Committee, The Prisoner’s 
Defendants Organisation, The International Anti Imperialism League, and Cumann na 
mBan. The number of these groups could give the impression that left wing socialist and 
communist organisations were strong in number in the 1920’s. However this was not the 
case and the Second Bureau noted that there was much cross over in memberships 
amongst the various organisations.13
What appeared to be the most pressing of issues for the Communist and Labour 
Intelligence section, was the relationship these left wing groups had with the Republican 
movement. The Republican movement itself was starting to split by the mid 1920’s. De 
Valera’s constitutional push with the founding of Fianna Fail had brought this about. The
Second Bureau who had monitored left wing IRA men, started to examine the left wing 
of Fianna Fail. Frank Aitken, Frank Kearney, Eamonn Cooney, and Séamus Robinson all
came under suspicion. Intelligence reports claimed that Oscar Traynor who now owned 
the Fodhla Printing works was responsible for much of the communist literary material. It 
was also suggested later that Briscoe, a T.D. had revolutionary service in another country
13 1929 Report on Communism in Ireland, (UCD Archives, Bryan Papers, P71/6).
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apart from Ireland.14 The extent of left wing surveillance carried out by the Second 
Bureau was excessive in relation to the potential threat it posed. The desire to monitor 
these organisations stemmed more from the conservative right wing political orientation 
of the Free State administration at the time. The extent to which this anti -communist 
feeling grew is exemplified by Cosgrave who backed by the Irish Catholic Church, 
banned the republican left wing party Saor Eire from contesting the 1932 general 
elections.
Apart from monitoring groups and suspects internally and externally, much of the 
work of the 2nd Bureau was primarily concerned with dealing with pension and personal 
claims. Many of these claims arose from the Army Pensions Act 1923 which dealt with 
Volunteers killed, wounded or incapacitated in the War of Independence or killed by 
national forces. Free State soldiers demobilised and serving were granted a pension for 
service given in the Civil War and the War of Independence. Indeed recognition to the 
small number who fought in 1916 was also granted. Although the government were not 
disposed to issue pensions to those who had fought on the anti-treaty side during the Civil 
War, army pensions were on occasion used by the government to get IRA men to 
recognise the Free State. In a time of mass unemployment, thousands of applications for 
this pension and for various claims of loss during the Civil War were received and were 
referred to the Second Bureau. It was felt that the Second Bureau’s knowledge and access 
to their central registry record section, put them in a position to advise whether the claim 
was bona fide or not. Due to the amount of filing and secretarial work which this 
involved the Second Bureau recruited a large number of civilian clerks and typists. In 
September 1924 there were 18 civilian clerks and 10 typists working within the 
Intelligence Department. One of these typists was Lily Merrin the former intelligence
14 1929 Report on Communism in Ireland, (UCD Archives, Bryan Papers, P71/6).
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agent of Collins during the War of Independence. 15 The recruitment o f civilian staff 
while officers were being demobilised was one of the grievances the mutineers had 
expressed.
However despite these civilian appointments, the Army and especially the 
Intelligence Department were poorly funded following the conclusion of the Civil War. 
The salary of office clerks in the Second Bureau were reduced, as were many of its 
military employees. The Director Costello however made a special provision that those 
“engaged on work of a very special nature” would receive a wage supplement of between 
5 to 30 shillings.16 The Second Bureau’s history during the 1920’s is one dogged by 
financial inadequacy. From 1923 onwards submission of requests for more funding and 
personnel was made year after year. Bryan and other Intelligence officers were most 
worried by the possibility they might lose the resources to keep their outside informers 
operating. Two of Bryan’s informants listed as 100 A. and 101 A. were being paid £3 10 
shillings and £4 10 shillings a week respectively. This regular sum which came direct 
from GHQ came under scrutiny in September 1924 and was examined as a possible 
source of cutback. Bryan and his colleagues worked for a considerable time under this 
type of financial duress. An T-Oglac which had been handed over to Commandant 
.Whitmore who headed the Press Survey section, also suffered cutbacks. Despite the 
complaints of Whitmore (who claims he only took the job of editing An T-Oglac on as a 
favour) the car which was used to distribute and get articles for the journal was removed. 
Apart from informants and An T-Oglac another more pressing concern was the under 
staffing of the Department. Many experienced Intelligence officers who had resigned as a 
consequence of the mutiny and for other reasons were not replaced while many others 
were transferred out of the Department. Commandant Whitmore, Captain Power and
15Job 47 Adjustment of Pay September 1924, (Military Archives, Intelligence Files 1925-30 Box 5).
16 Ibid.
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Captain McGuinness all senior Intelligence officers, resigned in 1927 while Captain 
Nolan was transferred to the Army School of Instruction.17 The failure to replace these 
officers, seriously jeopardised the smooth running of the Bureau.
Despite these financial setbacks the Bureau did mange to arrest and harass what it 
saw as the states primary enemy, the IRA. The main Intelligence sub section within the 
Second Bureau between 1922 and 1925 was still principally concerned with IRA activity. 
Well after the Civil War had come to a close, surveillance and tracking down of 
Republicans was carried out by Bureau officers. Bryan as well as involving himself in the 
Ex Officers section had been involved in the arrest of the IRA Director of Elections. 
While Nelligan was Director of Intelligence in August 1923, Lieutenant Bryan as he was 
then, was ordered to find and arrest Eamon Donnelly. Donnelly had been identified as the 
Republican Director of Elections from documents captured in a raid on the Republican 
Publicity Department. Bryan tracked Donnelly to a series of offices in Suffolk street. An 
agent was sent with an envelope for Donnelly marked personal. This gave him access to 
Donnelly following which an arrest was made. A number of important Republican 
documents were captured during this raid. One contained correspondence between the 
secretary to the Northern Government W.B. Spender and a Captain White who claimed to 
be working on behalf of six county refugees and internees, with the view to obtaining an 
amnesty. Another captured document on this raid, was a Political Intelligence report 
given by the Sinn Fein envoy Leopold Kearney, to the acting Republican President P.J.
Ruttledge, detailing sympathy for the Republican cause in France and de Valera’s 
arrest.18
17 Memo on Functions and Organisation of 2nd Bureau 1926-1928(Military Archives, Intelligence Files 1925- 
30 Box 5).
l8Captured documents (UCD Archives, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/94).
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The Second Bureau carried out anti-republican raids throughout the first half of 
the 1920’s. Although the IRA were in complete disarray after their Civil War defeat, 
there were units throughout the country which continued to operate sporadically. Their 
number increased following the large scale political prisoner releases. By May 1924 the 
number of political prisoners had fallen from 12,000 to just over six hundred.19 However 
once these prisoners were released the Bureau monitored many of their movements. 
Many ex-prisoners returned to the republican cause. This was encouraged by the 
government policy of black-listing ex-prisoners for state employment. Furthermore the 
harassment they and their families received from state military personnel was not 
conducive to their peaceful integration into society.
However the Second Bureau and its agents weren’t the only ones involved in 
monitoring and harrying IRA suspects. The newly formed state police force the Garda 
Siochanna were also engaged in tracking Republican suspects. Consequently the 2nd
Bureau crossed paths with the new Armed Detective Branch of the Garda Siochanna on
numerous occasions. The relationship between the two bodies was far from amicable and 
as had happened in the Civil War competition for informants and information broke out 
between rival state intelligence bodies. The Gardai Detective Unit under David Nelligan
emerged from the Civil War CID organisation and the antagonistic relationship it had 
with the Military Intelligence Department was preserved.
From the outset of the Civil War, CID (then supposedly a supplemental 
intelligence agency to Military Intelligence GHQ) earned a reputation for brutality and 
maverick ways of operating.20 Consequently nominal control of CID was switched from 
the Department of Defence to the Department of Home Affairs in September 1922 and 
Minister Joseph McGrath was made a Director General of the organisation. This was an
19 Conor Brady, Guardians o f  the Peace (Dublin, 1974), pp 98-112.
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attempt to bring CID under direct government control and sever the Department of 
Defence and military attachment to the organisation. However, although CID no longer 
took any directives from military or GHQ commanders it still managed to operate 
independently outside the realm of direct government control. As the scale o f the Civil 
War reduced, O’Higgins the Minister responsible for CID decided to merge the 
organisation with all its sister bodies in an attempt to centralise crime work and make it 
more effective. The Protective Officer Corps and The Citizen’s Defence Force in 
February 1923 joined with CID and moved from Oriel House to Merrion Square. This 
extended McGrath’s powers but caused some friction with the other agency leaders.21 
Apart from Military Intelligence, the only body with intelligence functions to remain 
outside of CID was the old detective G wing of the DMP. However in October 1923 
O’Higgins despite protest from McGrath, absorbed CID into the Detective wing of the 
DMP organisation. This absorption meant a significant reduction in CID staff and 
reflected O’Higgins general plan of scaling down bodies designed for Civil War 
conditions. CID officers on merging with the DMP were reduced from 73 to 24. Many of 
the disbanded officers were given generous pension plans, none more so than McGrath.22
In November 1923 under O’Higgins directives, David Nelligan transferred from 
Military Intelligence to organise a new armed detective branch which was to take over 
the DMP G division. Nelligan’s detective branch absorbed many of the original Civil War 
CID officers which were left in G Division. However more importantly it also recruited 
31 of the disbanded CID officers dismissed a month previously. Naturally the Armed 
Detective Unit took on many of the characteristics of CID. According to Brady the 
methods of Nelligan’s detectives were not always orthodox. In March 1924 a number of
20 See Chapter 2.
21 Captain A S O’Muireadhaigh report 12th Oct 1923, (National Archives, Dublin, Dept of Home Affairs 
S3331.)
22 Proposed Disbandment of CID Oct 1923, (National Archives, Dublin, Dept of Home Affairs S3331.)
23 Conor Brady, Guardians o f the Peace(Dublin,1974), p. 128.
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them confronted known Republicans in Dublin. Gerry Boland, then in charge of the 
Dublin Brigade IRA, was informed if any member of the Detective Unit was shot he 
would be shot immediately.24
Nelligan’s detective branch came into close contact with Second Bureau 
operations, since both organisations were monitoring Republicans. Moves were made by 
the Department of Defence to facilitate co-operation between the two bodies. In 
November 1923, D/I Costello recommended that information requested by the Guards, 
should be supplied directly by the Second Bureau, rather than having to consult the 
Minister for Defence every time.25 In October 1923 a direct liaison between Civil and 
Military Intelligence was established. Three military intelligence officers were named by 
Costello in July 1924 to co-operate with the Guards. One of whom was Capt. Dan Bryan. 
Bryan during this time made suggestions on possible methods of collaboration. In August 
1925, following intelligence reports of Republican plans to shoot Civic Guards in Lucan 
and Celbridge, Bryan suggested that a platoon of soldiers could be appointed to reinforce 
each Garda Station.26
However despite these attempts at co-operation, the Civil and Military 
Intelligence agencies largely failed to communicate and share information with each 
other. Many of the Military Intelligence officers were highly critical of police methods. 
Although the military authorities had been involved with some of the worse atrocities of 
the Civil War and its aftermath, the Guards especially those from the old CED 
organisation were continuing to pursue illegal tactics. The Guards endeavours to control 
the IRA became more sinister as the years unfolded. The IRA’s shooting of a number of 
unarmed guards especially in Clare had fuelled the Guard IRA war.27 Bryan criticised 
many of the Armed Detective Units and Civic Guards actions towards the IRA, although
24 Ibid.
25 Intelligence Branch co-operation with Civic Guards (Military Archives, Intelligence Files 1925-30 Box 5).
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not strictly on a moral ground. Bryan believed that they were misusing the Treason Act to 
raid and prosecute Republican supporters for trivial offences. He stated in a report in 
August 1925 that :
This policy of extensive raiding and prosecution helps to create a general sense of 
insecurity and the imprisonment of large number o f individuals. It is doubtful if 
this will break the IRA, which itself has internal difficulties. The split in IRA is 
between Military and Political. If present raiding policy continues it will help the 
IRA to unify under the military wing.28
Although Bryan’s fears were realistic at the time, the split within the Republican
movement which Bryan referred to, was eventually formalised in 1926, when de Valera
formed the Fianna Fail party and led it back into the Dâil.
Both military and civil intelligence agencies entered 1925 competing for the same 
coups and information. The Second Bureau under the direction of Costello, with officers 
like Bryan, had the more efficient agency. The Bureau’s Central registry of files had built 
up to approximately 25,000. Their record section was far superior to that of the Armed 
Detective Unit, so much so that Guards on occasion made requests to see 2nd Bureau files. 
However despite the superior organisation and efficiency of the Second Bureau, measures 
were afoot to transfer much of its power to the Detective Unit. The decrease in armed 
troubles and the gradual spread of the Garda Siochanna throughout the country were
determining factors in allocating the intelligence duties of the Free State. The insistence 
on the supremacy of civil authorities over military ones was perceived as a necessary pre­
condition to progress to becoming a democratic state, as opposed to a military 
dictatorship. However the pursuit of these lofty ideals were also motivated to a degree by 
a desire for increased power. O’Higgins who had emerged from the Mutiny affair as the 
strong man in the government, realised the importance of controlling the state
26 Ibid.
27 Conor Brady, Guardians o f the Peace (Dublin, 1974), pp 142 - 160.
28 Intelligence Branch co-operation with Civic Guards (Military Archives, Intelligence Files 1925-30 Box 5).
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intelligence system. Although the Second Bureau had prevented a mutiny and later 
uncovered an assassination plan to kill O’Higgins, this did not exempt it from O’Higgins’ 
own reform.29
In late 1925 he issued a decree to transfer all responsibility for internal matters 
affecting the state over to the Detective Unit, leaving the Second Bureau to primarily 
concentrate on military intelligence and on internal army security. Political crime, 
subversion and the protection of politicians became the exclusive responsibility of the 
guards. The Second Bureau sections, such as Labour and Communism, and the IRA had 
to be shut down. To facilitate the changeover the Second Bureau was asked to transfer all 
its intelligence files and its outside agents to the Guards. The change over of power 
caused much dissent within Second Bureau circles and there was a reluctance on the part 
of many army staff to hand over their informers and dismantle the various intelligence 
sections. Bryan after handing over some of his informers monitoring “Communist 
organisations”, claimed they were being mishandled by the guards. In 1929 he sought the 
reemployment of “a source formerly found trustworthy by the Military Intelligence 
Section” who had approached him with information on Communist activities. This source 
maintained that the police did not take sufficient precautions to ensure his safety in 
dealings with them. The informer explained that when the police wanted information they 
would drive up to his house in broad daylight.30 Bryan reported this but his proposal was 
ignored. Attempts were made by other Second Bureau officers to maintain some files and 
keep some sections open. The life span of the North East Section was kept going on an 
indefinite basis, although due to financial pressures the scale of its operations was 
reduced. The 1927 Second Bureau report noted “Many files have been handed to the
29 Eunan O’Halpin, “Intelligence and Security in Ireland 1922-45” in Intelligence and National Security, vol. 
5 (London, 1990), p. 55.
30 Eunan O’Halpin, “Intelligence and Security in Ireland 1922-45” in Intelligence and National Security, vol.
5 (London, 1990), p. 55 reference. O’Halpin’s Interrview with Bryan July 1983.
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Gardai, but it is essential that touch with the North East comer should not be lost as the
economic and military situation in the North is of vital importance from our own point of 
view”.31 One division that the Second Bureau had to transfer, was that o f the Claims 
section. The investigation and processing of claims which the Second Bureau Claims 
division had to carry out was maintained within the Bureau for a while. The Bureau had 
used the Claims division to retain a considerable amount of records for purposes in 
connection with its work.32 However the division with its files were eventually transferred 
to the Guards in 1927.
This move freed up much of the Bureau’s staff, although this was counteracted 
with an alteration in the financial backing for Military Intelligence following the 
changeover. As late as 1925 the Bureau had been funded from two main sources, the 
Secret Service Vote and the Department of Defence Army Vote. An estimate of total 
expenditure by the Intelligence Department for 1925-26, came to almost £18,000, 
excluding military pay but including the generous sum of £8,580 for the “payments of 
Regular and Casual agents in Saorstat (Irish Free State) and Britain”.33 However
following the transfer of political and internal matters to the guards, the money made 
available to the Second Bureau significantly reduced. In 1925 the Army vote funded 
£2,050 and the Secret Service Vote funded £8,603. By 1926 the Army Vote figures had 
remained practically the same at £2,411, however the Secret Service Vote expenditure 
dropped to £807.34 Between 1926 and 1933 the Department of Defence’s annual spending 
from the Secret Service Vote never reached over £1,000.35 This lack of funding was a
31 2nd Bureau Annual Report 1926-27(Military Archives, Intelligence Files 1925-30 Box 5).
32 Memo on Functions and Organisation of 2nd Bureau 1926-28, (Military Archives, Intelligence Files 1925-
30 Box 5).
33 Estimate of Expenditure 1925-26, undated, (UCD Archives, Bryan Papers, P71/3).
34 Figures quoted in Co-operative Statement of Expenditure 1925 and 1926, 2nd Bureau Annual Report
1926-27, (Military Archives, Intelligence Files 1925-30 Box 5).
35 Eunan O’Halpin, “Intelligence and Security in Ireland 1922-45” in Intelligence and National Security, vol.
5 1990, p. 55 reference 21.
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major complaint of subsequent Intelligence Directors during this period. However their 
reduction in funding was justified by government officials, claiming that the Second 
Bureau no longer had the responsibility for surveillance of the IRA and other internal 
subversive organisations.
The Second Bureau’s intelligence network was also scaled down. The Battalion 
and Brigade intelligence system which had been shakily preserved since the Civil War, 
was phased out. When it became clear that the Guards were taking over, many I/O’s 
believed they were now surplus to requirements. It was noted in May 1926, that many of 
them had been approached by the Irish Air Force and had signed up on training courses. 
The Second Bureau reluctant to dismantle their intelligence network, sent a letter making 
sure that they understood they were not to abandon their functions as I/O’s. “The work on 
which they will be employed in the future is Military Intelligence and this will be largely 
the training of Scouts”.36 Despite these attempts by the Second Bureau to hold on to their 
battalion and brigade I/O’s, on 5 May 1926 they were ordered to return to the position to 
which they were posted before being attached to Intelligence.37 However it was decided 
by the Chief of Staff Peadar MacMahon, that Battalion I/O’s would be allowed “facility 
for any work ordered by 2nd Bureau”.38
By 1927 Military Intelligence became a backwater. The scale of its operations 
considerably reduced and confined to purely military matters. Some military minded 
officers interpreted this as a positive step. For the first time in its history, Military 
Intelligence could now direct all its energies at orthodox military intelligence duties as 
understood in other armies. Consequently in 1926 and 1927 the Second Bureau’s 
organisational structure was again altered. Based on a continental model, the Foreign
362nd Bureau Personnel, (Military Archives, Intelligence Files 1925-30 Box 5).
37 Letter from Athlone Barracks to Director 2nd Bureau, 5 May 1926,2nd Bureau Personnel, (Military 
Archives, Intelligence Files 1925-30 Box 5).
38 Letter D/I to Chief of Staff 10 March 1926, Intelligence Personnel (General), (Military Archives, 
Intelligence Files 1925-30 Box 5).
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Annies Section and the Scouting Topographical Section became two of the most 
important sections within the Bureau. The Foreign Armies Section, studied other armies 
use of training, equipment, organisation and administration. A series o f guideline 
bulletins for the Army Staff were then produced. This proved successful and as a result of 
the fact that several other sections o f Second Bureau “had outlived the military need 
which originally called them into existence”, it was decided to concentrate the efforts of 
the Second Bureau on the studying of foreign military methods. The foreign studies of 
military organisation tended to be very continental in focus and appeared to keep away 
from British military studies. Consequently in 1927, the Second Bureau demanded the 
services of six capable translators in French, German and Italian, who translated a whole 
series of foreign military studies.39
Dan Bryan by 1927 had attained a very senior position within the Second Bureau, 
while simultaneously holding the recently defunct position of Command Intelligence 
Officer for the entire Eastern Division. He was one of the longest serving intelligence 
officers within the Bureau although he was only twenty seven years old. It was this 
service since 1919 with the Intelligence Department that led to his promotion to 
Commandant in 1925.40 Bryan like many Second Bureau staff at the time, was troubled 
by the transfer of internal duties to the police. His misgivings appear to have stemmed 
from his lack of faith in the police rather than in the reduction of his own Department’s 
power. Bryan was a strong supporter of developing military structures and organisation, 
functions which he did believe had taken a back seat within the Second Bureau due to its 
internal subversive commitments. Bryan believed that it was not until the Civil War and 
the Army Mutiny were over that the Army could make any effort to think collectively 
about military organisation. According to Hugo MacNeill, attempts were made early on
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to expand the role of study of the army outside that of internal disorder. Six officers in 
1926 were despatched to the US to study American military strategy. Another mission to 
England followed shortly to study technical aspects of modem warfare.41 However, Bryan 
writing in An T-Oglac explains it was not until after the transfer of power to the Guards 
that we began to lose our “internal disorder complex”.42
This loss of the internal disorder complex brought about the formation of the 
Defence Plans Division within the army. It operated as a branch of the General Staff 
under the direct control o f the Chief of Staff.43 Its primary function was to develop an 
official defence policy for the state, since none in detail had been drawn up. In order to 
do this, expert personnel were selected from different areas of the army. Bryan had 
distinguished himself as a very forward thinking and progressive officer. He had co­
operated in organising mock manoeuvres in order to train command and battalion I/O’s in 
1925.44 It was his close affiliation with different training corps and his service in 
intelligence that led to him to be selected as the Chief Intelligence Officer to the Defence 
Plans Division. He officially transferred from the Intelligence Department in 1927 to take 
up his new position. Immediately the Defence Plans Division set about analysing possible 
defence policies and also different scenarios should the state be attacked.
The officers involved in developing the Defence Policy realised though that any 
decisions they made on Defence Policy would have to be ratified by the government. 
Before the Defence Plans Division was established, the General Army Staff had pleaded 
with their political counterparts for a definite outline of a Defence policy. However this 
had been slow in coming and had prevented any real development work the Army could
39 Memo on Functions and Organisation of 2nd Bureau Feb 1926-1928 (Military Archives, Intelligence Files 
1925-30 Box 5).
40 An T-Oglac section 2nd Bureau(Military Archives, Intelligence Files 1925-30 Box 1).
41 Hugo MacNeill, “The Defence Plans Division”, An T-Oglac vol. 1 no. 2 April - June 1928 p. 8.
42 Dan Bryan, “ Why we need a defence force?”, An T-Oglac vo. 1 no. 1 October 1927 pp 108 -1 15.
43 Hugo MacNeill, “The Defence Plans Division”, An T-Oglac vol. 1 no. 2 April - June 1928 p. 12.
44 Intelligence Department Army Manoeuvres, (Military Archives, Intelligence Files 1925-30 Box 1).
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do on it. Following a memo from the Chief o f Staff Peadar MacMahon on various types 
of policy, the Government approved their own Defence Policy in November 1925. The 
military authorities finally received the policy in May 1926. It provided for the holding of 
a small standing army capable of expansion in time of need. It also advocated the co­
operation between Irish and British forces in the event of a general attack on these 
Islands.45 The government suggested that the size of the standing army in normal times 
should never exceed 12,000, but conceded that in cases of internal disorder it would have 
to increase to 25,000, while under Foreign invasion 100,000. These concessions on the 
numerical value of the army were suggested by the Chief of Staff, but only granted by the 
government on the condition that the present army size be reduced to 10,000, and with 
the reservation that details as to number and cost were to be settled with Finance. The 
Defence Policy turned into a bargaining tool between government and army officials. 
However the army had managed to attain some sort of guidelines on Defence Policy 
despite the many faults they found with it.
In order to comply with the government’s policy many alterations had to be made. 
A very large reserve had to be established if the army was expected to double or even 
increase ten fold in times of emergency. Army staff suggested that conscription in Europe 
or the National Guard militia in the US, should be considered as possible reserve systems. 
The government’s policy also suggested that every man should be trained to NCO 
standard and every NCO to officer standard. However this provision was impractical, as 
Duggan points out at the time the Army and the country as a whole suffered from low 
standards of education, financial constraints and low rates of pay.46 Another part of the 
government’s policy put a heavy emphasis on co-operation with Britain. It suggested that 
it was considered practical to take steps to ensure Irish officers were capable of
45 Secret Special Memo 1 Preparation for War20lh June 1928, (Military Archives, Defence Plans Division (T) 
Chief of Staffs Office).
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commanding mixed Irish and British forces operating on Irish territory. It also 
acknowledged that defence by sea of both Great Britain and Ireland was undertaken by 
the British Navy.
Due to the government emphasis on a policy of co-operation, it was necessary to 
talk with the British about coastal defence. The discussions of Articles 6 and 7 of the 
treaty with the British in 1926 was selected as the place to bring up coastal defence talks. 
In order to facilitate this, Chief of Staff Peadar MacMahon and Staff officer Dan Bryan 
were selected to accompany members o f the government to the Imperial Conference in 
1926. However despite their best attempts, the British delegation refused to consider 
mutual coast defence at the conference. When Bryan and MacMahon returned from the 
Conference they continued to petition the government over the impracticality of a 
standing army of 10,000. Following a government statement in the Dail that the reserve
would only amount to 4,500, MacMahon angrily refused to accept responsibility for that 
statement: “If I, or any responsible military officer advised you that this country could be 
defended against anyone by an Army of 10,000 men plus 4,500 Reservists, we would 
immediately be deprived of our commissions”.47 The Defence Policy issue was turning 
into a three way squabble between the Army staff, the government and the Department of 
Finance. So much so that MacMahon further remarked: “The responsibility for advising 
you on matters of military policy is mine not the Army Finance Officer”.48
It was in this environment that the Defence Plans Division developed from its 
inception in 1927. Its base of study was established following the return of Hugo 
MacNeill, M.J, Costello and other officers from a training course in the US. However it 
was noted by MacNeill that some of their studies of US military tactics and strategy were 
far from practical or applicable to the Free State. One of the Divisions first notable results
46 See John P. Duggan, A History o f  the Irish Army, (Dublin, 1991), p. 149.
47 Ibid. p. 151.
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was the establishment of an Irish Military College, forming part of a progressive system 
of military education for Irish Army officers. This was followed in June 1928 by the 
submission of the Defence Plans Divisions Proposals on Defensive issues to the Minister 
for Defence. In July the Minister approved the proposals dealing with, preparation for 
war, a scheme for tactical war organisations, peace establishments embodying a militia 
system and proposals for military education. However despite the Minister’s agreement 
these plans were not implemented. The army strength continued to decrease. Furthermore 
the utterances of politicians complicated the issue. In 1927 the Minister for External 
Affairs, Desmond Fitzgerald, declared “it was practically inconceivable” that British and 
Irish soldiers would ever fight each other and must co-operate. He scoffed at the notion of 
neutrality on the grounds of geographical propinquity.49 Other Government and Cumann 
na nGaedhael members advocated an even more extreme policy. In the event of a war 
they suggested that measures should be taken to secure our neutrality by disarming 
completely except for the purpose of internal order.50 The government continued to 
refuse to commit itself on Defence Policy. The probable nature of aggression and the 
identity of the aggressors still remained unclear.
Despite these setbacks the Defence Plans Division drew up a Doctrine of War, 
which contained guidelines to implement the State’s Defence policy. Studies were carried 
out under four main categories:
1. Possible enemies of this country.
2. Possible actions of such enemies, under particular circumstances.
3. Possible theatre of operations, or scenes of such actions.
4. Our General Theory of Defence, based on these first three factors, and on the 
characteristics of our people and our State, our natural and other resources, and of course 
the facts of our geographical situation.51
Studies of other political party’s Defence policies were prompted by the trouble
they were having with the present administration.
48ibid.
49 Dan Bryan, “ Why we need a defence force?”, A n T-Oglac vo. 1 no. 1 October 1927 p. 111.
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While we are bound to carry out in the letter and spirit the Defence Policy of the 
government in power, we must at the same time take cognisance of the two other policies 
which are adopted by other important political parties.52
Consequently the Defence Plans Division looked at Fianna Fail’s and Labour’s 
defence policy. The Division findings concluded that Fianna Fail’s policy was unclear but
it was suspected to be aggressive towards England. The Labour Party’s Defence Policy 
was one of neutrality. The Division however points out that this is hard to achieve since 
the Treaty ports and North East Ulster are out of government control. Therefore the 
Labour policy of scrapping any amendments to the Treaty, is contradictory to their own 
defence policy.
Although Bryan was very much to the fore of the Defence Plans Division, he 
never lost contact with the Intelligence Department. He operated in the Division in his 
capacity as a senior Intelligence officer. On occasion he was asked to fill in for officers 
who were absent in the much depleted Second Bureau. In 1931 the Director o f the 
Second Bureau J.J O’Connell wrote in his half yearly report, “The Second Bureau 
laboured under considerable difficulty... A necessity for additional personnel to bring the 
Bureau in line with the Defence Plans Division proposals is required”.53 The officer 
personnel in the Bureau consisted of five, while the Defence Plans Division 
recommended eleven and the official establishment reports require a minimum of 
thirteen.54 This was the extent to which the Intelligence Department had been depleted. In 
April 1931 Bryan took over the Department temporarily while JJ O’Connell was absent 
on a staff course. While holding this position for a number of months he also involved
50 Ibid.
51 Hugo MacNeill, “The Defence Plans Division”, An T-Oglac vol. 1 no. 2 April - June 1928 p. 11.
52 Secret Special Memo 1 Preparation for War20th June 1928, (Military Archives, Defence Plans Division (T) 
Chief of Staffs Office).
53 Confidential half yearly report Oct 1931, Monthly and Weekly reports 1925-32(Military Archives, 
Intelligence Files 1925-30 Box 5).
54 Confidential half yearly report April 1930, Monthly and Weekly reports 1925-32(Military Archives, 
Intelligence Files 1925-30 Box 5).
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himself with the Army Disarmament Conference and drafted a document on the care of 
secret and confidential documents.55 Although Bryan was supposed to take a back seat 
within the Intelligence Department, according to O’Halpin, from the end of the Civil War 
he “was the secret service.” While he was officially operating outside the realm of the 
Department, “he maintained unofficial contact with some of his old contacts, and he kept 
an eye on affairs generally.”56
In the Summer of 1931 it became evident that there was a strong possibility that 
the Fianna Fail party might come to power. In an air of alarm and subversion within Free
State military and Cumann na nGaedhael circles, former army Commander, and the then 
Garda Commissioner Eoin O’Duffy, organised a coup d’etat against a Fianna Fail
political take over. According to Foley, O’Duffy approached a number of senior army 
officers who were sympathetic to his cause. Together they drew up a proclamation, 
calling on the public to stand behind a military government under O’Duffy’s leadership.57 
O’Duffy sought support for his scheme from Michael Brennan the Army Chief of Staff 
and David Nelligan the head of the Special Branch. However they both strongly opposed 
the plan and reported it to Cosgrave. According to Coogan, “Nelligan and my father 
would have nothing to do with the proposal. Their view was that they had upheld 
democracy against de Valera in 1922 and they were not going to threaten it in 1932 
because of him.”58 When Cosgrave was informed of the plan he shared Brennan’s and 
Nelligan’s opposition, although he took no disciplinary action against O’Duffy. 
According to Foley, Cosgrave and many other government ministers regarded O’Duffy as 
erratic and were resolved that he should be relieved of his post after the election. O’Duffy
55 Confidential half yearly report Oct 1931, Monthly and Weekly reports 1925-32 (Military Archives, 
Intelligence Files 1925-30 Box 5).
56 Eunan O’Halpin, “Intelligence and Security in Ireland 1922-45” in Intelligence and National Security, vol. 
5 1990, p. 55.
57 Conor Foley, Legion o f  the Rearguard (Dublin, 1974), p. 104.
58 Tim Pat Coogan, DeValera (London, 1993), p. 434.
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unaware how isolated he was, decided against the military takeover due to lack of 
support.59
However despite O’Duffy’s failure in the Summer of 1931, it appears that his 
moves managed to add fuel to a series of rumours of coup d ’etat on the part of the 
Guards, the Army and the Government. On 10 February 1932, at Wynn’s Hotel in Dublin, 
a decision was taken to organise ex-national army officers and men who had pre-truce 
service with the IRA. A convention was subsequently held on 17 March, a week after the 
Dáil had reconvened and the Army Comrades Association(ACA) was founded. During
the Fianna Fáil election campaign great publicity was given to the high level of gratuities
and pensions paid to ex-members of the Free State Army. According to Manning, this 
might easily have given the impression that such pensions would be terminated or 
reduced.60 Defence of these pensions was probably a leading factor in establishing the 
ACA. Those pensions Fianna Fáil publicly highlighted in the run up to the election were,
D. Hogan £3,300, E. Cronin £1,100, Austin Brennan £1,300, T.F. O’Higgins £3,034 and 
Seán Mac Eoin £3,300.61 Both T.F. O’Higgins and Austin Brennan were Presidents of the
ACA. Amidst the formation of the ACA and O’Duffy’s proposal a few months earlier, 
speculation and rumour took place concerning the possibility of a coup d’etat. The Press 
learned of the first meeting of the ACA which ironically was attended by Mulcahy, the 
major antagonist of ex-Army organisations. On the 26 February 1932, the Irish Press 
claimed “that two ministers, a well known member of the Cumann na nGaedhael Party, 
and some others are engaged in a movement to obstruct the transfer of Government to 
Fianna Fáil”.62 Lee claims that Ernest Blythe was one of the Ministers rumoured to want
59 Conor Foley, Legion o f  the Rearguard (Dublin, 1974), p. 104.
60 Maurice Manning, The Biueshirts (Dublin, 1987), p. 18.
61 Ibid. p. 17 reference 9.
62 Quoted in Dermot Keogh, Twentieth Century Ireland (Dublin, 1994), p. 62
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an army coup 63 Although these claims by the Irish Press which were subsequently raised 
in the Dail were denounced by Cosgrave as being “grotesquely untrue”, it was later
repeated in the Dail by a Fianna Fail T.D. Despite these claims of treason by the ACA, it
seems unlikely its leaders were prepared or even contemplated resisting the new 
government. Eight years before, Mulcahy had done everything in his power to ensure that 
the army recognised the state, so it would seem out o f character for him to support such 
an unconstitutional move. Similarly the ACA president Austin Brennan, was the brother 
of the chief of staff Michael Brennan, who had refuted O’Duffy’s original coup d’etat 
proposals and carried out the re-deployment of many potential mutinous officers. So it 
transpired that in the midst of all this rumour and speculation the Fianna Fail T.D.’s
entered the Dail peacefully and there was a smooth transition of power. Although
Manning claims that a number of Fianna Fail backbenchers fearing the worst entered the
Dail chamber “on that March afternoon with revolvers in their pockets”.64
However despite the smooth transition and the apparent false rumour that the 
ACA were set to halt the democratic process, it seems that there were a group of army 
officers who were militarily prepared to act should Fianna Fail gain power. The lack of
accounts and the conflict in a number of varying testimonies of what happened in military 
circles in the lead up to the change over of power to Fianna Fail is a contentious matter. It
is particularly difficult because of its underground nature to determine the importance or 
effect that O’Duffy’s failed planned military coup had on military personnel. However 
Dan Bryan was involved in monitoring officers affected by O’Duffy’s overtures. It must 
be stressed at this point that the unavailability of intelligence files for this period greatly
63 J.J Lee, Ireland 1912-1985 Politics and Society (Cambridge, 1989), p. 175.
64 Maurice Manning, The Blueshirts (Dublin, 1987), p. 18 reference.
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hampers any study of the event. Despite this, it appears that Bryan and the Second Bureau 
had kept their Ex-Army organisation and Internal Army Surveillance section open from 
the Army Mutiny days. Although staffing levels and resources must have been greatly 
reduced, it was recognised that these sections were vital in order to maintain army loyalty 
to the state. In the face of the Fianna Fdil take over, it seems a number of officers felt that
O’Duffy’s suggestions were appealing. Although O’Duffy’s plot itself was snuffed out in 
the summer of 1931, a number of officers took it upon themselves to organise as the 
elections came closer. They talked of refusing to take orders from a Fianna Fail
government if elected. According to Duggan, “To shoot or salute was the stark choice 
some senior officers saw facing them”.65 However Bryan through his intelligence network 
is accredited with defusing an incipient plot, and ensuring a peaceful transfer of power.66 
It seems Bryan was working closely with the Chief of Staff Michael Brennan at the time . 
According to Coogan, Brennan took steps to transfer disaffected officers who might have 
acted otherwise.67 Bryan’s hands on experience of the Army Mutiny of 1924 prepared 
him well for this plot.
In 1932 when Fianna Fail did come to power there were many nervous civil servants,
army and police officers who felt that they would now be dismissed or passed over for 
promotion due to their operations in the past. However de Valera in coming to power 
gave assurances that no victimisation of Treaty supporters would take place. With the 
exception of O’Duffy, and the movement of senior civil servants O’Hegarty from 
secretary to the government and Henry O’Friel from the Department of Justice, de Valera
65 John P. Duggan, A History o f  the Irish Army (Dublin, 1991), p. 157.
66 Eunan O’Halpin, “Intelligence and Security in Ireland 1922-45” in Intelligence and National Security, vol. 
5 1990, p. 55 reference 23, O’Halpin’s Interview with Bryan, Dec 1983.
67 Tim Pat Coogan, De Valera Long Fellow, Long Shadow (London, 1993), p. 435.
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appears to have kept his word.68 This came as a relief to Bryan who had been one of the 
greatest thoms in Republican side during the Civil War, when his agents had managed to 
capture hundreds o f IRA men. Throughout the 1920’s his men had continued to harass 
and monitor Republicans and later Fianna Fail. Despite this de Valera realised that Bryan
had curbed any threat of insurrection on his entry into government. He was also informed 
of Bryan’s knowledge and usefulness in an effective Intelligence Department. In 1932 the 
Fianna Fail government ordered Bryan discretely back to the Intelligence Department to
“destroy certain old Intelligence Records” principally on Civil War informants69. Bryan 
along with another intelligence officer Niall Harrington did this, but had to operate while 
Director J.J. O’Connell was away. Bryan realised that O’Connell a strong Cumann na 
nGaedhael supporter would not have tolerated this. O’Connell did not find out and 
temporarily everything calmed down. It appeared that Bryan just as in the Civil War had 
managed to back the winning side and come out on top. Similarly as in the Army Mutiny 
of 1924, he had again managed to stop a plot threatening the government, bringing 
stability to a potentially explosive situation.
68 DeValera could not get rid of O’Duffy straight away as the Labour Party who they were in coalition with 
had given him their support. However once Fianna Fail were no longer dependent on Labour support, in 
1933, they got rid of him. For reference to civil servant transfers on Fianna Fail coming to power see J.J Lee, 
Ireland 1912-1985 Politics and Society (Cambridge, 1989), p. 176.
69 Note on Intelligence Records by Bryan, (UCD Archives, Bryan Papers, P71/81).
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CHAPTER 5
WAR AND FRIENDLY NEUTRALITY
The 1930’s was a turbulent decade in Irish history. 1932 saw the replacement of 
Cumann na nGaedhael by the de Valera dominated Fianna Fail government. 1933 brought
the extremist semi-fascist Blueshirt movement and 1934 saw a republican left wing 
alliance in the form of the Republican Congress. Despite these volatile movements and 
events, the 1930’s was a time of limbo for Military Intelligence. Their powers which had 
been stifled democratically since 1925, enjoyed slightly more financial freedom during 
the early years of the Fianna Fail administration. However Fianna Fail member’s wariness
of a military establishment which seven years previously was planning their arrest and 
interrogation was reason enough to discourage any move which would increase the 
Intelligence Department’s powers. In the absence of any state threatening event, political 
and financial considerations dictated no significant changes to the division’s powers. The 
Second World War came as a lifeline to the Intelligence Department. The Irish State 
under threat of invasion and espionage restored many of the intelligence functions o f the 
Department to that of the early 1920’s. It was now up to the Department to prove to new 
masters that it could operate as efficiently against threats to neutrality, as it had done 
against many of the government’s members in the past.
Fianna Fail’s rise to power was greeted with trepidation by the political, military
and civil machinery that had supported the Cumann na nGaedheal administration. 
Particular anxiety was felt by the Intelligence bodies, that operated so forcefully against 
their new controllers. Despite de Valera’s claims of no victimisation, the fears o f the 
Cumann na nGaedhael state machinery were strengthened when a series o f laws 
sympathetic to the IRA were passed. The IRA, Cumann na mBan, Fianna Eireann, Saor
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Eire, Irish Labour Defence League, Workers Revolutionary Party, Irish Working Farmers 
Committee, Work Defence Committee, Workers Research Bureau, Irish Tribute League, 
The Friends of Soviet Russia and Women Prisoners Defence League were declared 
unlawful by the Cosgrave government in 1931.1 de Valera lifted the ban in June 1932. He 
also considered calls by the IRA, highlighted in An Poblacht, for the reform of the Garda 
Intelligence Department, the introduction of uniforms for plain clothes officers2 and the 
retirement of the GardaFs most notorious intelligence officers. “Old gang servants Eoin
O’Duffy, Col. D. Nelligan and Major Joe Sweeney” were the most wanted on the IRA 
retirement list.3 de Valera realised in 1932 that he could not retire O’Duffy before the 
next election, since his position was guaranteed by the Labour Party and he needed their 
support to remain in government. However David Nelligan was expendable. In December 
1932 in the run up to the January 1933 elections, the Garda Intelligence chief was 
compulsorily retired, accepting instead a post at equal pay in the Land Commission.4 In 
February 1933 two Garda intelligence officers were arrested and charged under the 
Official Secrets Act. E. M. O’Connell the deputy Special Branch chief and another senior 
officer Col. M Hogan, the brother of Dan Hogan former Cumann na nGaedhael minister, 
were tried and found not guilty. During their trial false rumours of plots against the 
government and leaking of secret information were spread. In the climate o f controversy 
surrounding the Gardai, de Valera took the opportunity to compulsorily retire Garda
Commisioner O’Duffy and replace him with Col. Eamon Broy.
Broy like Nelligan was another of Collin’s former intelligence agents who 
worked in Dublin Castle during the War of Independence. Broy accompanied Collins to 
the Treaty talks in London and supported the pro-treaty side on his return. However
1 Uinseann Mac Eoin, The IRA in the Twilight Years (Dublin, 1997), p. 208.
2 ibid.
3 ibid. p. 217.
4 Ibid. p. 230.
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according to Brady, Fianna Fail were now promoting him over the heads of four Deputy
or Assistant Commissioners; Coogan, Murphy, Walsh and Cullen. The Special Branch 
also underwent change following an incident in Killrush when Republicans T.J Ryan and 
George Gilmore were severely beaten and wounded by Special Branch officers. An 
inquiry followed and An Poblacht called for the sacking of a number of Special Branch 
officers.5 In 1934 one of the named officers, Michael Gill, along with five other Special 
Branch detective sergeants were returned to uniform, demoted and transferred to obscure 
rural stations or innocuous desk jobs where their political knowledge was neutralised.6
Under Fianna Fail, military intelligence underwent a similar clear out and
readjustment program but its limited powers meant it was not on the same scale as the 
Gardai and Special Branch. De Valera appointed Frank Aitken as Minister for Defence
and he in turn made alterations within the army. J.J O’Connell the staunch pro treaty and 
Cumann na nGaedhael supporter was replaced by Liam Archer as Director of 
Intelligence. Dan Bryan survived the political take over but initially was kept out of the 
Intelligence Department. The Chief o f Staff Michael Brennan also managed to survive. 
Brennan like Bryan had been involved in stopping an anti Fianna Fail plot which enabled
the new administration to look favourably on both men. Brennan a Civil War hero of the 
Free State Army was kept on until 1940, much longer than many expected. According to 
Lee, Brennan appointed under Cosgrave was probably the most conciliatory Fianna Fail
appointment.7 He co-operated loyally with Frank Aitken and relations between the two 
men ran smoothly. Lee also claims that “Aitken was probably more acceptable to Free 
State officers than any other appointment.”8 According to MacEoin, although Aitken was
5 Ibid. p. 223.
6 Conor Brady, Guardians o f  the Peace (Dublin, 1974), p. 181.
7 J.J Lee, Ireland 1912-1985 Politics and Society (Cambridge, 1989), p. 175
8 Ibid. p. 176.
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a former IRA Chief o f Staff, of all the Fianna Fail ministers, he was the one most opposed 
to the IRA.9
Fianna F£il alterations to the Garda Special Branch and upper echelons o f the
Army was a reaction to pressure or support from the IRA. The Fianna Fail’s pro ERA
stance contributed to the increase in support and growth of the ERA during the early 
1930’s. According to MacEoin, “By 1933-35 the IRA had reached a peak of 
membership”.10 However despite these outward republican sentiments, de Valera was 
using the IRA for his own political objectives. Following the 1933 elections de Valera 
realised he no longer needed IRA support. Government pensions and appointments were 
offered to IRA activists to get them to join Fianna Fail. Army pensions for anti-treaty ERA
men proved effective in a time of mass unemployment and grinding poverty. Soon the 
intelligence duties of the Gardai reverted to what they had been under the Cosgrave
government. The Detective Branch under Broy tracked and harassed the ERA although as 
Brady points out, the arrest and interrogation of IRA suspects didn’t fully take off until 
1936, when Fianna Fail officially severed all ties with the organisation.11 The Branch’s
reputation for brutality gained from the Civil War continued under the Fianna Fail
administration.
Bryan was also effected by the 1932 change in government. Following his brief 
return to the Intelligence Department to destroy certain records, he served in the office of 
Chief of Staff. He developed a sound partnership with the new Chief of Staff Michael 
Brennan and carried out many duties for his office. He worked on the development of a 
regular civil aviation service between Dublin, London and Belfast. This three way service
9Uinseann Mac Eoin, The IRA in the Twilight Years (Dublin, 1997), p. 235.
10 Ibid. p. 233.
11 Conor Brady, Guardians o f  the Peace, (Dublin, 1974), p. 202.
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was outside the preserve of the army, but it was felt at the time they would be the most 
skilled in taking on the task. Bryan also worked on intelligence training programs and 
lectured frequently at the new military officers college set up under the provisions of the 
Defence Plans Division. Although now officially outside the Defence Plans Division he 
was asked from time to time to give advice. His role in getting British co-operation for a 
mutual coast watching service was severely setback by the failure of the 1926 Imperial 
Conference. He gained support for the venture in a subsequent conference in 1930 
although the service never materialised since Anglo-Irish relations deteriorated with the 
outbreak of the Economic War.
As in his position in the Defence Plans Division, Bryan while in the office of 
Chief of Staff, was never far away from intelligence. Following 1932, the Intelligence 
Department had been amalgamated to form part of the overall military machinery of the 
state. Due to this move, the Department was no longer referred to as the French styled 2nd 
Bureau. It now became known as G2 in line with the American form of military 
organisation. Despite its new name, little changed within the Department. Although it had 
a new Director, its low staffing levels and limited fields of operation ensured that it 
remained on the periphery. Its work was principally concerned with the study of foreign 
armies. According to O’Halpin “in addition to what was gleaned from published material, 
the army show jumping team was always carefully debriefed by intelligence following 
trips abroad.”12
Military Intelligence experienced a slight resurgence when funding for the 
Department was increased significantly probably as a result of the rise of the Blueshirt 
movement.13 This right wing organisation with its roots in the ACA and other Ex-Army
12 Eunan O’Halpin, “Intelligence and Security in Ireland 1922-45” in Intelligence and National Security, vol.
5 1990, p. 55.
13 In 1933 -34 the Dept, of Defence’s annual spending from the Secret Service vote went from £307 to 
£2,009 . This was followed by a rise to £4,174 and £4, 820 in successive years. See Eunan O’Halpin, 
“Intelligence and Security in Ireland 1922-45” in Intelligence and National Security, vol. 5 1990, p. 55.
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organisations gave G2 unexpected latitude as technically G2 had some jurisdiction since 
it was a military related matter. Bryan’s old Ex-Army section from 1924 which had not 
become totally redundant although it operated on a much reduced level, was now revived 
to monitor the Blueshirts. It was important that G2 carried out surveillance of the 
Blueshirt organisation, since under O’Duffy’s influence, many of the Guards were 
supporters of the right wing organisation. The Blueshirt movement inside the Guards 
played a similar role to the IRAO within the army. The Blueshirt movement was crushed 
by both state and IRA supporters and by 1936 its threat (except briefly in Spain) had 
fizzled out. However, de Valera did not fully trust army intelligence and realising the 
strength of the old Commissioner O’Duffy’s support amongst the guards turned to his 
own force to harry and snuff out the Blueshirts. He introduced a series of Republican 
gunmen under Ned Broy (reminiscent of his former boss Collins) to track down the 
Blueshirts. Initially organised by Oscar Traynor they became known as the Broy Harriers 
and were introduced as a separate unit within the Garda Detective Branch. This was the 
only significant change de Valera made to the intelligence system in his early years of 
government. Even this measure had to be curtailed when many of the Broy Harriers were 
found operating as double agents for the IRA.14
After three years service in the Chief of Staffs office and following the slight 
upsurge in activity within G2, in 1935 Bryan was allowed to return to intelligence. He 
was named as Deputy Director, and together with Liam Archer he commanded the 
Intelligence Department. From studying press and political intelligence reports it became 
evident to Archer as early as 1936 that there was a major European conflict brewing. 
Archer and Bryan were aware of the intelligence role in protecting the state from foreign 
invasion, particularly as G2 had become an integral part of the state’s defence against
14 Ibid. p. 57.
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outside attack. Archer in February in a strongly worded memo to the Chief o f Staff 
warned that the “international situation gives cause for great unease. I fear this unease is 
not felt outside this Department”.15 Archer argued for rearmament in line with other 
European states and that a committee of national defence be established.16 Brennan the 
Chief of Staff sent Archer’s memo accompanied with his own to the government, 
warning of the looming conflict. Its response was the establishment in the Autumn, of a 
cabinet committee on “national defence”, chaired by de Valera. Following this the Chief 
of Staff sent the Minister for Defence a “programme which would complete the existing 
units of the defence forces in the shortest period possible”.17 A document on Irish defence 
which was 90% Bryan’s work and the rest Archer’s was included. This document on 
“Fundamental Factors affecting Irish Defence Policy” took into consideration British 
occupation of North East Ulster and the Treaty ports. The strategic implications of the 
country’s position in relation to Britain and her trade routes dominated the framework 
and findings of the document and advised accordingly. According to the report, due to 
British control of the Treaty ports at the time of writing in 1936, Ireland would not be 
considered neutral in any conflict involving Britain. Furthermore Bryan and Archer 
argued, if Britain was threatened by another power, she would take control of whatever 
facilities she might require in Ireland. The report estimated that although the defence 
forces would at that time be unable to engage in organised resistance, if they took over 
port facilities by force, a campaign of guerrilla warfare would require a huge British 
garrison in Ireland to defend their gains. This observation was recognised by British
15 Copy of Archer to Brennan, 2 Feb, 1936, with Brennan to minister for defence, 22 Sept. 1936(UCD 
Archives, MacEntee papers, P67/191(3)).
16 Peter Young, “Defence and the new Irish State 1919-39”, in The Irish Sword, The Emergency 1939-45 p 
7.
17 Eunan O’Halpin, Aspects of Intelligence, in The Irish Sword, The Emergency 1939-45 p. 60.
18 “Fundamental Factors” G2 documents G2/0075, May 1936 (Military Archives).
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military planners some time later.19 Apart from advocating a neutral defence policy that 
was appeasing to Britain, both Archer and Bryan pointed out the importance of 
strengthening the army. They believed that there was a greater chance of preserving 
neutrality if a significant increase was made in military armoury and personnel and 
backed their claims with numerous references to studies of neutral countries in the past. 
However, their advice was ignored by government officials who were not prepared to 
make a large financial commitment, Despite this initial rejection of their suggestions and 
the hand over of the ports in 1938 rendering much of the report obsolete, according to 
Commandant Peter Young “its basic defensive premises were to remain the cornerstone 
of Irish military strategy up to and including the emergency.”20 It was not until 1938 that 
the government were willing to concede the seriousness of the situation and agreed to 
make some provisions to organise the country defensively.
G2 by 1938 had carried out studies and anticipated many of the security problems 
to face them in the next seven years, even though political, financial, staff and policy 
restraints prevented any immediate action on them. According to O’Halpin, “G2’s 
emergency performance was not the result of a priori im provisa tionThe fact that two of 
its “most senior officers had extensive intelligence experience from the war of 
independence and civil war, reasonably placed it to handle various jobs given to it 
between 1939 and 1945.” 21 By 1938 it was merely a matter of persuading the political 
authorities that they were up to the task. In 1938, following further warnings of a global 
conflict, G2 were given a mandate by the government to initially cover counterespionage 
and security. Despite this a special garda aliens unit was established under Sergeant 
Michael Wymes to seek out potential foreign spies and although the IRA had embarked 
on a mainland bombing campaign of Britain, G2 were warned not to poach on a police
19 Peter Young, “Defence and the new Irish State 1919-39”, in The Irish Sword, The Emergency 1939-45 p.
6 .
127
preserve by renewing surveillance of the republican movement. G2’s new brief only 
materialised after Archer held a series of meetings with his British counterparts.
According to MI5 intelligence files, following the agreement signed between 
Britain and Ireland in April 1938, de Valera sent military officers to discuss defence 
measures in London. During these discussions Mr. Joe Walshe, the Secretary of the 
Department of External Affairs, asked the British Dominions Office to put him in touch 
with the British counterespionage department, “as he had reason to think that there was a 
good deal going on in Eire which needed attention”.22 On the 31 August 1938 a meeting 
took place between an MI5 officer, Joe Walshe and Mr. John Dulanty, the “Eire High 
Commisioner in London”.23 At this meeting, according to MI5, Mr. Walshe expressed 
concern about German activities in Ireland and their desire to set up a department similar 
to the British Security Service. The MI5 officer expressed his readiness to assist and it 
was agreed that an exchange of information be made between MI5 and G2 on the 
activities of Germans in Ireland. Following this agreement, Archer in October 1938 met 
MI5 officials in London and was briefed on the workings of the British counterespionage 
department. It was MI5’s belief that de Valera made this offer of intelligence co­
operation as a gesture of goodwill following the British termination of the Economic War 
and the hand over of the Treaty Ports.24 However, soon it was to prove much more 
significant than just an Irish thank you present.
As a result of this meeting an official was sent from the Irish Post Office 
Investigation Branch, to be briefed in London on the various postal methods of assisting 
counterespionage. He was also trained in telephone supervision and consequently on his 
return a Postal Interception Unit was established within the Post Office’s Investigation
20 Ibid. p. 7.
21 Eunan O’Halpin, Aspects of Intelligence, in The Irish Sword, The Emergency 1939-45 p. 59.
22 Liason with Dept, of Defence, Dublin, Part 1 , p. 5. MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, London KV4/9).
23 Ibid. p. 6.
24 The 1938 Agreement, Part 1, p. 12. MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, London KV4/9).
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Branch. This was important in the evolution of Irish military intelligence, since this new 
postal unit reported not to the civil authorities but directly to G2. This brought the army 
back into internal security work, since one of the principal aims of the unit was to look 
for communication between the republican movement and foreign powers.25 However not 
all of the early suggestions of MI5 were accepted by G2. MI5’s request to place a G2 
agent in the Gardai which indicated MI5’s desire to have access to the entire Irish
Intelligence network was rejected by Bryan since it would lead to friction with the Gardai
and the Dept, of Justice.26 According to MI5’s Irish section B1H, MI5 were quick to test 
the limitations of their new found intelligence network, however “it was not considered 
advisable to make enquiries about Eire nationals or to disclose to the Irish information 
about them which might be in our possession.”27
This collaboration between MI5 and G2 developed into an effective operational 
unit before war broke out. Regular correspondence took place between the organisations 
through John Dulanty the British High Commissioner for Eire’s postal bag. As the war 
progressed IRA intelligence were suspicious of co-operation and attempted to intercept 
the mail, but were foiled by two Irish detectives accompanying it.28 Although MI5-G2 
correspondence was confined to German activity in Ireland,29 the passing of information 
quickly bore fruit. Following an MI5 tip off, a German visitor was shadowed but left 
suddenly and it later transpired that he was a member of the Abwehr, German 
intelligence, sent to make contact with the IRA. A German woman in Dublin, to whose 
address a French naval officer was sending information was put under surveillance, but 
again left abruptly. Surveillance tasks had been given to the police although the
25 Eunan O’Halpin, “Intelligence and Security in Ireland 1922-45” in Intelligence and National Security, vol. 
5 1990, p. 65. O’Halpin’s Information referenced as Bryan Tapes p. 5. Interview Dec 1983.
26 Eunan O’Halpin, “Intelligence and Security in Ireland 1922-45” in Intelligence and National Security, vol. 
5 1990, p. 65.
27 Liason with Dept, of Defence, Dublin, Part 1, p. 6. MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, London KV4/9)
28 Terence De Vere White, “Lord Rugby Remembers” in Irish Times, July 3 1962.
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information was sent to G2. Bryan felt that the police bungled operations by watching 
suspects too closely, although the zeal of the Irish authorities was important in developing 
British trust.30
British trust was paramount to de Valera in pursuit o f his policy of neutrality. He 
realised that due to geographic proximity, economic factors and the far superior military 
capabilities of Britain, his main worry was a British rather than a German breach of his 
policy. De Valera permitted his intelligence service to work alongside the British, not 
because of any secret deep rooted faith in the Allied cause. Rather he used the
intelligence link as a political bargaining counter to throw back at the British when they
pushed to reoccupy the Irish state. If this shrewd step was to work, he had to have the 
complete trust of his military intelligence officers, something which he had been wary 
about less than six years previously. Officers with a similar Civil war history to Bryan’s 
had managed to gain the trust of the upper ranks of Fianna Fail. This was facilitated by
Fianna Fail’s official split with the IRA, and the banning of the organisation.
Significantly, it was at this time that Bryan was officially transferred back to the
Intelligence Directorate.
By the start of the Second World War on 3 September 1939, the G2-MI5 link was 
fully operational. G2 continued to supply MI5 with information on the movement of 
suspected German spies. However the relationship between G2 and MI5 was often 
jeopardised by the rivalry between the various British intelligence agencies. This worked 
against British interests rather than for them. In 1939 British intelligence was far from a 
co-ordinated operation, and was undergoing complete re-organisation. MI5 referred to as 
the Security Service, were appointed to look after counter-espionage and had direct
29 Liason with Dept, o f Defence, Dublin, Part 1, p. 6. MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, London KV4/9)
30 Eunan O’Halpin, “Intelligence and Security in Ireland 1922-45” in Intelligence and National Security, vol. 
5 1990, p. 65.
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access to the Home Secretary. MI6 sometimes called the Secret Intelligence Service, 
were to take care of espionage and reported to the Foreign Office. According to Deacon, 
“although “MI” stands for military intelligence, this is an anachronism, since neither 
agency is concerned directly with military intelligence, and the military intelligence 
sections of the Defence Ministry are quite separate from either.”31 Standard military 
intelligence was responsible to the Defence Ministry, although the Naval Intelligence 
Division (N.I.D.) were responsible to the Admiralty. Responsibility for all the intelligence 
services lay directly with the Prime Minister who had access to the Joint Intelligence 
Committee, which comprised the heads of all the British intelligence services. However 
the Joint Intelligence Committee was not effective in co-ordinating the measures taken in 
Ireland. The various intelligence agencies had different aims in Ireland and varying 
opinions on how to carry them out. MI5’s mandate being counterespionage, they were 
only concerned with the existence of Axis spies in Ireland. Whereas MI6 were chiefly 
concerned with the possibility of a large scale Axis invasion of Ireland. Conflict and 
consultation on what intelligence policy to adopt towards Ireland can be traced back to 
before the War.
Britain had until 1932 mainly relied on the RUC and Cumann na nGaedhael as 
sources of information.32 With the arrival of Fianna Fáil, the British Government realised
it “would become increasingly difficult to obtain reliable information about happenings 
in Eire”.33 Both Sir Vemon Kell head of MI5 and MI6 were asked to establish a network. 
Despite this MI5 declined and only MI6 set up a restricted information service. The 
reports of MI6 informers and agents gave “a limited cross section of private opinion on
31 Richard Deacon, British Secret Service (Glasgow, 1991), p. 264.
32 Eunan O’Halpin, “Intelligence and Security in Ireland 1922-45” in Intelligence and National Security, vol. 
5 1990, p. 63.
33Special Sources of information available to the Irish Section p. 3, MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, London 
KV4/9)
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current events of political or public interest”.34 British Petroleum (BP) supplied MI6 with 
material on the Russian Oil Products company in Dublin, while estimates on Ireland’s 
arms manufacturing potential was obtained from a firm of Dublin consulting engineers.35 
According to Bryan an MI6 intelligence report written in 1932 deemed Fianna Fáil’s
prospect of continuity as poor.36 MI6 depended on the RUC to supply much of their 
information. As the RIC had been the eyes and the ears of British Intelligence during the 
War of Independence the RUC had a similar intelligence function. In 1931 MI6’s Irish 
section and the RUC established a direct information link. With the Second World War 
looming MI5 realised the strategic importance of good intelligence reports on Ireland, 
however by 1938 MI5 would have to get consent from MI6 to run agents since they had 
established Ireland as their own preserve. Despite this in 1938 MI5 managed to get the 
RUC information link redirected to their own Irish section. Through this link they gained 
access to informants within the Gardai, although this information tended to be primarily
focused on IRA activity rather than foreign espionage. MI5 noted that although they 
received some valuable information from the RUC, it was not trained or equipped for 
counterespionage. In order to overcome this MI5 wanted to send an officer to help, 
however this was advised against when it was found that “the RUC did not welcome the 
amateur interference of intelligence officers who lack local knowledge”.37 Much of MI5’s 
information came from RUC inspector general Charles Wickham whom they regarded as 
particularly well informed and astute.38 With the creation of the Dublin link, MI5 were no 
longer worried about establishing agents in Ireland. However with the outbreak of war, 
both the Naval Intelligence Division and MI6 were especially concerned and wanted to
34ibid.
35 Eunan O’Halpin, “Intelligence and Security in Ireland 1922-45” in Intelligence and National Security, vol. 
5 1990, p. 64.
36 Bryan’s book review carried inlrish Times 19 November 1983, (UCD Archives, Bryan Papers, P71/175).
37 Part 1 RUC Northern Ireland pp 8-10, MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, London KV4/9)
38Eunan O’Halpin, Aspects of Intelligence, in Irish Sword, The Emergency 1939-45 p. 64.
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step up their network. This was facilitated when on 20 December 1939, Lord Hankey, 
Minister without Portfolio who had been appointed to set up an intelligence organisation 
in Ireland had his proposals approved.39
The temporary organisation the Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.) established 
in 1938 by Col. Laurence Grand was a section within MI6, although it worked 
independently from the rest of the organisation. Known as Section D (for Destruction), it 
was intended, to be an aggressive unit for sabotage behind enemy lines. One of its plots 
was an assassination attempt on Adolf Hitler.40 The S.O.E. tried to establish a stay behind 
organisation in the south should Ireland be invaded. Operating from Northern Ireland they 
detailed British officers to enter Ireland in plain clothes masquerading as tourists to 
obtain military information about roads and bridges.41 According to Bryan the British 
wanted to set up a covert organisation for radio work to be operational in the event of a 
German invasion.42 In July 1940, Major E.Y. Byass, a British Army staff officer from 
Northern Ireland was arrested with his wife by the Gardai at Mullingar in Co. Meath,
while driving a car containing military plans and maps. An RUC informant sent to 
enquire about the arrest of Byass, was told by a Garda officer “that if he’d only go to the 
Army, as you came to me, he’d be told anything he wanted, but we can’t have them 
running round sketching the whole place”.43 Byass was handed over to John Maffey the 
British Representative in Dublin, and despatched hastily back to Belfast.44 Another 
British army major was named by the Gardai as travelling south of the border form
Northern Ireland each week. Following a warning from the Irish government that arrests
39 Joseph Carroll, Ireland during the Emergency 1939-45 (Dublin, 1975), p. 35.
40 The SOE files that were recently released were ominously missing all their files concerning their operations 
in Ireland, although an entry in the index to the files contains a reference to them.
41 Special Sources o f information available to the Irish Section p. 3, MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, London 
KV4/9)
42 Eunan O’Halpin, “Intelligence and Security in Ireland 1922-45” in Intelligence and National Security, vol. 
5 1990, p. 75.
43 Quote taken from Robert Fisk, In time o f War (London, 1983), p. 126.
133
would be made in future, MI5 who did not want to jeopardise their Dublin link, put 
pressure on MI6 to obtain a promise from the S.O.E. that this would stop. However they 
only agreed on condition that other MI6 sections were allowed provide the necessary 
information.45
In the autumn of 1939, MI6 now seen as the authority for running agents in 
Ireland, was requested by the British Admiralty to check numerous reports of German 
submarines refuelling and landing personnel on the West coast of Ireland. Winston 
Churchill, the head of the Admiralty, was pressurising the War Cabinet to retake the Irish 
treaty ports. Reports from Churchill’s NID officers documented the importance of these 
ports for anti-submarine warfare, giving destroyers and sea planes an extra 400 miles 
range. On 17 October the Royal Oak battleship was sunk by a German submarine at 
Scapa Flow. This convinced the War Cabinet of the need to control two of the treaty ports 
Lough Swilly in Donegal and Berehaven in Cork. However de Valera through Maffey 
managed to convince the War Cabinet that this was not an option.46
Despite the British failure to retake the Treaty Ports, MI6 were asked by the NID 
and the War Cabinet to monitor the movement of German vessels off the Irish coast. 
Although unable to provide a coast watching service, they increased their organisation to 
provide some checks on reports of German naval activity. Col. Valentine Vivian a deputy 
head of MI6 appointed Sir Charles Teagart a graduate from Trinity College and ex-Chief 
of the Bombay Police “to keep an eye on events in Eire”.47 His reports were alarming. 
According to Tegart “local Irishmen accept the visit of U-Boats as commonplace” and 
“up to 2,000 leaders have been landed in Eire from German U-Boats and by other
“ ibid.
45 Special Sources of information available to the Irish Section p. 3, MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, London 
KV4/9).
46 Joseph Carroll, Ireland during the Emergency 1939-45 (Dublin, 1975), p. 29.
47 Quote taken from Robert Fisk, In time o f  War (London, 1983), p. 121.
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methods since the outbreak of war”.48 Tegart’s reports and his insistence on a German 
plan to occupy Ireland caused grave concern. He backed his claim of a German invasion 
by stating that staff at the German legation in Dublin were busy buying coastal properties 
in preparation for German landing craft.49 His dramatic narrative had increased effect as 
it came at a crucial time during the French and British evacuation of Dunkirk in 1940. 
The Germans controlled France and the Channel Islands, so both Ireland and Britain were 
very much in striking distance. Coupled with this, Tegart during his former career on the 
Calcutta police force had impressed and gained the confidence of Churchill.50 So despite 
Tegart’s claims being totally untrue, Churchill on hearing them prepared a trawler to 
watch the Irish coast and sent submarines on occasion for the same purpose.51 This 
trawler, the Q-boat Tamura, commanded by Captain W. R. Fell, patrolled the west coast 
of Ireland between September 1939 and March 1940.52 Churchill was of the belief that 
there were U-boats lurking in the inlets and bays of Cork, Kerry and Galway. However 
Fell records in his memoirs that he never saw or heard of a U-boat in Irish bays.53 
According to Carroll a second trawler was commissioned “to poke around the western 
ports of Ireland to report enemy activity”. However the Captain went ashore in search of 
an alleged spy ring, only to be arrested by the Gardai and released through Maffey in
Dublin.54 ironically the British now wanted joint co-operation on coast watching, the 
issue they were unwilling to discuss with Bryan fourteen years earlier at the Imperial 
Conference.55
48ibid. p. 122.
49 Ibid.
50 ibid. p. 121.
5IEunan O’Halpin, “Intelligence and Security in Ireland 1922-45” in Intelligence and National Security, vol. 
5 1990, p. 75.
32 Joseph Carroll, Ireland daring the Emergency 1939-45 (Dublin, 1975), p. 32.
53 Ibid.
54 ibid. p, 35.
53 See Chapter 4.
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Despite the negative findings of the NID, Captain Richard Pim another Trinity 
College graduate and former member o f the RIC accompanied by a naval intelligence 
officer was sent to look into the claims by Tegart. Pim used an RUC officer who had a 
senior informant in the Gardai and a contact with Richard Mulcahy.56 It is quite likely
that G2 were aware of the British Intelligence - RUC link, since Bryan knew that the 
RUC and Gardai forged friendly relations and co-operated with each other in relation to
the ERA and counterespionage.57 Pirn’s findings contradicted most of Tegart’s earlier 
claims. There were only 318 Germans and 149 Italians in Ireland, not 2,000 as Tegart had 
suggested. There had only been one or two instances of U-boat landings and there was a 
significant improvement in the Irish coast watching service.58 However despite Pirn’s 
report, MI6 continued to run a network of agents in Ireland. According to the B1H section 
of MI5, MI6 ran agents in Ireland both as a source of information and as a check on 
reports received from other sources, “it will be noted that this organisation had to be kept 
secret from the enemy in Eire, but also from the Eire authorities”.59 This “checking of 
reports received” appears to have prompted the arrest of at least one British agent that G2 
picked up after the coast watching service in Wicklow noted he was asking them too 
many questions.60 G2 also brought another agent who like Teagart had been a former 
Indian police officer, into custody after he was found to be distributing radio transmission 
sets to sympathetic Irishmen who would give London advance warning of a German
56 Pirn’s intelligence report is very similar to that made by Mulcahy on “Germans with Hotels” submitted to 
Dept, of Justice
57 Eunan O’Halpin, “Intelligence and Security in Ireland 1922-45” in Intelligence and National Security, vol. 
5 1990, p. 68.
58 Robert Fisk, In time o f  War (London, 1983), p. 123.
59 Special Sources of information available to the Irish Section p. 4, MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, London 
KV4/9)
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invasion. This was followed by the arrest of Geoffrey Jules Marcus in August 1941 after 
he was found making a personal inspection of defences on the west coast.61
The British continued to run operatives in Ireland throughout the war period, 
despite having access to G2 information. When British agents were caught it strained 
relations between MI5 and G2, however for the most part they remained healthy. In 
September 1939, the link helped facilitate a hundred Germans, many with ties to the Nazi 
party, go from Ireland to Germany via Britain. MI5 realised they posed a greater 
counterespionage problem in Ireland than in Germany. However some Germans intent on 
spying stayed behind. One of these, Werner Unland, was found by MI5 to be writing to an 
address in Denmark. Co-operation between MI5 and G2 led to Unland’s surveillance and 
his arrest in April 1941 after his photograph was found in the possession of Gunther 
Schütz a captured German agent.62 Reports and rumours which came from or related to 
persons in Ireland were passed to Col. Archer by MI5. It tended to be MI6 misinformation 
which fuelled MI5’s enquiries. Almost without exception they were found to be without 
foundation and MI5 were generally satisfied at the steps G2 were taking. Despite this, the 
controllers of MI6 and the NID felt insecure and compelled to check the situation 
themselves. The lack of co-operation and co-ordination was a great problem within the 
British intelligence structure. According to Duggan, MI5 and SOE loathed MI6 and its 
controllers.63
Despite internal British intelligence problems leading to pressure being placed on 
the MI5-G2 link the link was preserved throughout the war. On the British side the man 
responsible for maintaining the good relations was Cecil Liddell (head of B1H Irish 
Section), whose brother Guy was head of MI5’s counterespionage section. Both Liddells 
were frequent visitors to Ireland and knew the country well. Both Archer and Bryan
61 Ibid. pp 126-127.
62 Part II German Activities p. 40, MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, London KV4/9) .
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developed a good relationship with these MI5 men. Relations between Bryan and Cecil 
Liddell were cemented by regular packages of Irish brisket, spiced beef and turkey. For 
some time after the war Bryan kept in contact with the Liddells and on hearing of Guy’s 
death he wrote to Cecil. Following the early meetings in 1938 and 1939 concerning postal 
interception and counterespionage which established the link, another meeting was 
organised in 1940.
The meeting in May 1940 came at a critical time during the war when tensions 
were high in the British and indeed the Irish camp. Germany had taken Norway and 
Denmark in April, displaying a complete disregard for neutrality. By May 1940, Hitler 
advanced his forces through France and took control of the Channel Islands. An assault 
on Ireland now appeared more realistic than at any stage during the war. It was with this 
background that Liam Archer and Joe Walshe met Cecil Liddell at Droitwich outside 
London on 24 May. The original agenda for the meeting had been to discuss 
arrangements to improve G2’s Illicit Wireless Interception. However Archer quickly 
focused on Irish demands.64 He assured Liddell that the IRA would be handled, but would 
not give an assurance that all enemy aliens would be interned. Archer suggested that if 
the Irish contracts for arms equipment placed with Britain were fulfilled they would be in 
a better position to repel invasion. Archer stressed the danger of a German airborne 
landing saying that little resistance could be offered.65 Archer’s push for arms coincided 
with a similar request by de Valera at a meeting with John Maffey. This type of two 
pronged military and political policy worked and although MI5 claimed “the cupboard 
was bare”, Maffey returned with a list o f material that could be supplied.66
63 J. P. Duggan, Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich (Dublin, 1989), p 229.
64 Part II Meeting with Archer May 1940 p. 44, MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, London KV4/9)
63 B1H Irish Section, MI5 p. 266 MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, London KV42)
66 Part II Meeting with Archer May 1940 p. 44, MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, London KV4/9)
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As a result of the meeting, firstly, a British Military Mission was sent to Dublin to 
form a joint defence plan between the Irish military and Northern Ireland troops should 
Germany invade. Known in British Intelligence circles as Mission 18,67 Cecil Liddell 
appointed Captain Caroe in March 1941 to act as a liaison between MI5 and the Northern
¿L O (
Ireland force which was to repel a German invasion. Secondly, in June 1940 a British 
Passport Control Officer was appointed to Dublin under the pretext of controlling the 
flow of people between Ireland and Britain.69 Attached to Maffey’s office he made 
confidential enquiries and ran a small network of agents in Dublin which was quickly 
penetrated by G2.70 With the appointment of the Passport Officer and the Censorship Unit 
o f Irish mail through Britain fully functional, the flow of information into MI5’s Irish 
section dramatically increased. This unprecedented amount of information and the wave 
of rumours and reports about Fifth Columnists which spread through the country after the 
invasion of Holland, led to an expansion in personnel at the MI5 Irish section B1H in 
May 1940.71 Despite this increase in staff B1H, suffered a large setback in March 1941 
when its offices in London were bombed. Part of the section moved to Oxford but this 
impaired its efficiency. BIH were dependent on direct access to MI6’s Irish section files 
and government departments based in London. The section eventually reverted back to 
London in October 1943.72 From the outbreak of war until 1940 MI5’s BIH section 
consisted of just one man, Cecil Liddell who had been brought into the organisation in 
the autumn of 1939 by his brother Guy. The sections numbers from that point increased 
but fluctuated and essentially act as a marker to measure British perceptions of the level
67 Joint Defence plans, Part II p. 49, MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, London KV4/9)
68 B1H Irish Section, MI5 p. 267 MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, London KV42)
69Part II Meeting with Archer May 1940 p. 44, MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, London KV4/9)
70 See Eunan O’Halpin, “Intelligence and Security in Ireland 1922-45” in Intelligence and National Security, 
vol. 5 1990, p. 76 Reference O’Halpin’s interview with Bryan Jan. 1983.
71 Part II Meeting with Archer May 1940 p. 44, MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, London KV4/9)
72 Irish Section move to Oxford, Part II, p. 49. MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, London KV4/9)
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of security threat posed by Ireland. There is a steady increase in B1H staff between May 
1940 and March 1943. For details o f the varying size of B1H see Appendix 3.
On Archer and Walshe’s return from Droitwich, they were accompanied by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Dudley Clarke, who had just returned from German occupied 
Norway. He was assigned to co-ordinate the Anglo-Irish defence measures. On Walshe 
and Archer’s insistence Clarke travelled in civilian clothing. Walshe took Clarke from the 
Shelboume Hotel and drove him around for some time before reaching their meeting 
place inside Government Buildings, which was less than three minutes away, to disguise 
the location and ensure they were not followed. Clarke met Archer, Bryan and the new 
Irish Chief of Staff General McKenna. Despite Clarke’s pleas, McKenna said British 
troops could not enter the country before a German invasion started and therefore a 
British counter invasion unit was stationed in the North. It was conceded that a British 
Military attaché would be stationed in Dublin but in a civilian guise.73 This attaché 
worked as a British intelligence officer, reporting on Ireland. Clarke was taken to the 
Phoenix Park to advise against German Paratroop landings and spent time with the 
Minister for Defensive Measures, Frank Aitken, who is reported to have spent much of 
the time explaining his ideas for mechanical improvement of the war!74
Despite the co-ordinated defence plan and the steady flow of information through 
G2 and to some extent through the Gardai, British intelligence and the War Cabinet were
still in disarray over Ireland and were the victim of their own misguided intelligence 
reporting. While B1H staff did not believe that intelligence reports from British agents in 
Ireland were reliable, the War Cabinet, Churchill and MI6 leaders did. MI5 had relayed 
Tegart’s reports back to G2, who checked them. Bryan described Tegart’s reports, to MI5
73 Joseph Carroll, Ireland during the Emergency 1939-45 (Dublin, 1975), p. 44.
74 According to Carroll, Aitken was a most enthuistic amateur inventor”. Ibid.
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as misleading and as “public house stories”. Neville Chamberlain also believed these 
false intelligence reports. On 28 May he told the War Cabinet, the IRA was strong 
enough to overrun the Irish Defence Forces. On 3 June the cabinet heard that a German 
invasion force was gathering in Cadiz for an invasion of Ireland and that de Valera had 
already been informed.75 This report may have emanated from German deception or from 
sloppy intelligence work76 but Chamberlain was now determined to have British troops in 
Ireland before a German invasion. Since Clarke had failed to do this, British Health 
Minister Malcom MacDonald was sent to talk to de Valera. MacDonald, a friend of de 
Valera, was briefed and told to:- 1) secure the entry of British troops, 2) insist on 
interning the ERA and 3) demand the internment of Germans. If de Valera raised 
partition, to offer him a council to be set up to discuss the issue. However despite 
MacDonald’s best efforts he failed. De Valera would not allow British troops since it 
would openly breach his policy of neutrality which had strong support within the country. 
He also rejected the British veiled promise of a united Ireland, realising that that’s all it 
was. De Valera said “if an agreement on a constitutional as well as agreement in principle 
was made for an United Ireland then the Irish government might agree to enter”.77 De 
Valera realised that the British War Cabinet had not secured any backing to overturn their 
Unionist supporters and knew that they couldn’t deliver on his constitutional demand. 
Even when MacDonald changed the conversation to the arrest of the IRA leadership he 
was treading on weak ground. Ten days earlier 390 IRA suspects had been arrested and 
interned.78 After reading MacDonald’s report, the War Cabinet discussed taking the treaty 
ports by force. However they decided the risk of U.S. alienation would be too dangerous 
at a time when they were desperate for American support.
75 ibid. pp 44-45.
76 See T. Ryle Dwyer, Guests o f  the State (Dingle, 1994), p. 23.
77 See Joseph Carroll, Ireland during the Emergency 1939-45 (Dublin, 1975), p. 50,
78 Ibid. pp 45-48.
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Due to de Valera’s sharp political manoeuvring, the US factor and the “friendly 
neutrality” policy G2 were adopting towards MI5, the state escaped invasion. However 
according to MI5 “From May 1940, the time of the fall o f France, until the German attack 
on Russia in June 1941, Eire was as much under threat of invasion as Britain.”79 As the 
allied forces began to take the upper hand, the threat of invasion by Germany and 
therefore Britain, declined. The G2-MI5 relationship also improved during this period. 
Certain problems did arise, but after the potential crisis of the summer of 1940, G2’s 
attitude towards the British became even more friendly. In May 1941 Bryan and Archer 
met with Liddell in Dublin. Archer was concerned about the British proposal to apply 
conscription to Northern Ireland.80 Bryan went to London and presented notes on the 
Dublin meeting to a member of the British cabinet Sir John Anderson. According to MI5,
Anderson referred to these notes during the cabinet discussion on the issue and the
81proposal was dropped. As well as conscription, the Dublin meeting also discussed the 
British fear of illicit wireless messages being released through a transmitter in the 
German legation. Archer told Liddell his main problems in preventing illicit wireless 
transmission was insufficient trained personnel to maintain a twenty four hour watch and 
a lack of equipment. Liddell asked that a British radio expert be assigned to examine and 
improve the Irish Signal Corps. Archer and Bryan both said that they would have to 
consult External Affairs before they could sanction a move like this. External Affairs had 
reservations as they wanted to deal with the problem with out outside help. However by 7 
October 1941 it was agreed and on 11 November, Bryan met with MI5 to discuss the 
arrangements for the radio officers visit. Colonel Stratton visited the G2 Signal Corp in 
December 1941 and arranged that G2 who were monitoring the German legation traffic 
would pass a report of the information picked up to him. In return Stratton agreed to send
79 Neutrality of Eire, Part I, p. 17. MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, London KV4/9)
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reports of any transmissions they received from Ireland which G2 were unable to 
receive.82 Following Stratton’s visit, a follow up MI5-G2 meeting was organised in 
Dublin in March 1942. The focus of the meeting was still the radio traffic from the 
German Embassy. The British had toyed with the idea of keeping the traffic open to break 
the code. But it was thought there was only a remote chance of breaking the cipher. It was 
suggested by British intelligence that Bryan should be asked to secretly copy the cipher 
books in the German Legation. However MI5 refused to ask him to do this.83 During the 
March meeting, Bryan suggested that G2 would jam the signal. MI5 had anticipated this 
suggestion and retorted, “while we do not think that jamming would be satisfactory we 
should be interested to know the results”.84 This wording was expressly adopted so as not 
to enable the Irish to say they would have jammed the transmissions, but the British were 
opposed to it.
In November 1943 Captain Liddell of MI5 visited Bryan in Dublin to again 
discuss security matters. While Liddell was visiting he dined with General McKenna the 
Irish chief of staff and stayed the night at Collins Barracks. Liddell unofficially disclosed 
to McKenna of the British plans to formally ask for the removal of the German legation 
transmitter. Liddell exclaimed “The fact that the set was being watched could not prevent 
the message being sent”.85 On learning of this formal approach, External Affairs through 
Walshe met the German ambassador Herr Hempel and duly confiscated the set. However 
even after G2 confiscated the transmission set from the German ambassador, the British 
were looking for his complete expulsion. They believed it was still a potential security 
risk and could jeopardise the plans for operation “OVERLORD” or D-Day as it was more
80 Meetings and development o f link with Irish Security service, Part II, p. 54. MI5 2nd World War Files 
(PRO, London KV4/9)
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84 Ibid. p. 59.
85 Liddell visit to Dublin November 1943, Part II, p. 75. MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, London KV4/9)
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popularly known. Despite this Capt. Liddell through the Joint Intelligence Committee 
prepared a note on the situation for the cabinet. It concluded that if the German legation 
whose communication we control was removed, it might be replaced at this most critical 
time by enemy agents and it might strain relations with Eire so much that assistance 
would be broken off.86 Consequently it was decided not to press for the Legations 
removal. However following the American note which is discussed in more detail below, 
the British felt compelled to support a claim for its removal. Despite this, de Valera 
remained steadfast and the German delegation were not removed. But in order to calm 
allied fears Walshe through an American agent organised a Security Conference in 
Dublin between British, American and Irish representatives. Bryan, Liddell and US agents 
Marlin and Will all attended. Held in May 1944 it acted as a type of Irish reassurance step 
to the Allied forces before D-Day eventually took place on the 6 June.87
Following D-Day British intelligence was no longer that worried about security 
matters or leakage of information from Ireland. Travelling restrictions enforced for D- 
Day preparations were lifted. Essentially British intelligence activity in Ireland began to 
scale down as the war came to a close. In September 1944 MI6 withdrew many of its 
agents only leaving a nucleus similar to those levels of pre 1940.88 In March 1945 MI6 
further reduced it’s agents in Ireland again only leaving a skeleton operation. Intelligence 
reports on Ireland were now only being generated from MI5 contact with G2 and the 
reports from Maffey’s office.89 However on 6 November 1945 a meeting was held to 
discuss British intelligence in Ireland. Sir John Stephenson represented the Dominion 
office who controlled Maffey’s organisation. Col. Vivian Valentine and Mrs. Archer 
represented MI6 while Captain Guy Liddell and Cecil Liddell represented the MI5 Irish 
section B1H. It was decided that because the existence of the MI5-G2 link was
86 Preparations for “OVERLORD”, Part II, p. 80. MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, London KV4/9).
87 Preparations for “OVERLORD”, Part II, p. 86. MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, London KV4/9).
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completely dependent on good relations existing between British and Irish governments it 
was not a good idea to become too dependent on this source for intelligence. Since MI6 
had been the main British intelligence operators in Ireland since 1932, they were again 
given the responsibility to furnish reports on Ireland in the future. Valentine and Mrs. 
Archer accepted this task but said it would take some time to rebuild their networks after 
abolishing most of them over a year ago.90
Although G2 initially refused to acede to the British demand to confiscate the 
transmitter and dismiss the German legation, co-operation between G2 and the British 
continued. Already G2 had released captured British spies, had turned a blind eye to the 
British invasion of Irish air and sea space and most importantly had not complained about 
the British censorship of Irish mail outside Ireland. The foolishness of the British 
censorship affair was highlighted at Foynes airport. All Irish mail travelling outside the 
country went through the British Censorship offices in Liverpool. Although G2 knew this, 
in order to satisfy Irish national sensitivities, the westbound Irish mail was delivered to 
the BOAC mail aircraft at Foynes. Before the mail boarded the aircraft it was sent to 
Liverpool, and then returned to Foynes for the USA, instead of being sent direct from 
Liverpool.91 G2 also facilitated the British by allowing British military personnel to 
inspect Irish defensive measures and by sending officers to train in Britain in the more 
technical aspects of censorship and signals. Furthermore they agreed a joint defensive 
strategy in case of German invasion and made joint preparation plans. Despite this the 
British were still worried about the possibility of a leakage of information.
In February 1941, MI5 learned that Foynes airport in Limerick was to become a 
port of call for the commercial air route between Lisbon and England. The British air 
company B.O.A.C. ran the flights, but MI5 felt that Lisbon, a centre for Axis espionage,
88 Intelligence operations following D-Day, Part II, p. 97. MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, London KV4/9)
89 Meeting to discuss Intelligence in Ireland, Part II, p. 100. MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, London KV4/9)
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could channel information back and forth through this source. MI5 in the summer of 1941 
without telling G2 appointed an undercover officer as a member of the B.O.A.C. staff at 
Foynes. MI5’s involvement in Foynes increased when in June 1942, the Irish government 
suggested if Irish priests on the continent were allowed to travel direct from Lisbon to 
Foynes, they would agree to having a British security representative who would co­
operate with a G2 officer and the immigration staff. MI5 wholeheartedly agreed and in 
July 1942, Mr. F. B. Carruthers was appointed to the position. He was given an annual 
salary of £500 a year plus £300 for entertainment. He regularly reported to London on 
passenger traffic and remained at Foynes well after the war had concluded.92
The improvement in relations between MI5 and G2, continued to be jeopardised 
by other sections of the British intelligence service. Whereas MI6 and the SOE had been 
the main culprit in the past, NID were now surpassing them. In May 1941 G2 uncovered a 
large NID spy network. The British changed tactics and were now using native Irish 
people with no British connection whom they hoped would not attract so much attention. 
James Flynn the son of a Cork hotel owner was arrested by G2 and interrogated by Bryan 
and the southern G2 commander Florence O’Donoghue.93 Flynn identified a man named 
Michael Fitgerald based in Galway who controlled operatives up and down the West and 
South coast. G2 recognised Fitzgerald as an NID officer who had formerly served in the 
Palestine police force.94 Flynn’s job was to monitor a stretch of coast in Cork and Kerry 
for which he was provided with a car. He then had to report to Fitzgerald any sighting of 
German submarines or other suspicious vessels. Flynn was operating since January 1940.
However shortly after Fitzgerald approached him, a man named Lywood also met 
him. Lywood, the air attache appointed to Maffey’s office, wanted Flynn to keep an eye
90 ibid.
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on a number of people suspected of being German spies. Lywood also asked Flynn to 
report any German aircraft crashes or landings. G2 quickly placed all the suspected 
operatives under surveillance. Another coast watcher Stuart Pearson was caught and 
found to be in correspondence with a Col. Craig, who was the Assistant Director of 
British Naval Intelligence. NID were also found to be in correspondence with a number 
of ex British Army soldiers based in Ireland, requiring information on “coastal and inland 
areas including ports and anchorages, railways, roads, bridges, communications, water 
supply, industrial plants, power and mineral resources”.95 The level of NID operations 
was scaled down, mainly due to G2 pressure although it was noted that Lywood’s 
movements could not be restricted due to diplomatic immunity.96 MafFey’s office became 
a haven for British intelligence operations in Ireland. Lywood and other British attachés
operated intelligence networks from there. Before the war there was no official British 
representative in Eire, but in October 1939, Maffey was appointed with a staff which 
included a dominion office official, a private secretary, a navel attaché, a military attaché,
an air attaché and a press attaché. MI6 normally use their foreign diplomats and staffs all
over the world as a basis for intelligence networks, however they were not the only ones 
using Maffey’s office. NID were sending reports from their agents through his office, as 
of course were MI5 and G2. However as was characteristic of British intelligence 
operations in Ireland, Maffey and his dominion office staff were not always kept 
informed of which agents were responsible to whom. It was noted that working in the air 
attaché, Mr. Lywood’s residence in Castleknock, there were two radio experts posing as
his personal secretary and butler. However it came as a shock to Maffey’s office and
95 Notes on activities of British agents in Ireland, British Activities in Eire Part II to 31/12/42 (Military 
Archives, G2/X/0266)
96 Report 15 May 1941, British Activities in Eire (Military Archives, G2/X/0266)
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Lywood when it was found that these radio experts were reporting to the passport control 
office, a subset o f MI6 and to discover that the radio they had did not work.97
Despite G2’s unveiling of the NID network British intelligence continued to 
persevere. In September 1942, Bryan and G2 uncovered an escape organisation which 
had been set up in conjunction with MI9 to help Allied internees to escape to Northern 
Ireland. MI9 were established to carry out rescue missions throughout Europe, but were 
working in Ireland without the knowledge of MI5 and other British intelligence sections. 
The organisation recruited in Ireland was mainly made up of Irishmen who had served in 
the First War. Two members of MI9, a Dublin doctor Thomas Wilson and his friend 
Rutledge were arrested when caught trying to help a New Zealand pilot Bruce 
Girdlestone escape from the Curragh. The Curragh housed a considerable number of 
British and German air and naval crews who had made forced landings. Although British 
spies apprehended were repatriated, the Irish government baulked at releasing all 
uniformed soldiers as this would openly undermine it’s policy of neutrality. The prison 
conditions for allied and axis internees was lax (with the exception of some of the 
captured German spies) and they were often allowed out of prison on passes. Along with 
Girdlestone a number of British air men had escaped although it is unclear if they were 
all aided by MI9. MI9’s intervention greatly irritated the Irish government and was likely 
to jeopardise Irish co-operation with the Allies. G2 discovered from telephone taps where
n o
some of the escapees were hiding, but instructions were given to take no action. Maffey 
embarrassed by the whole affair pleaded with de Valera not to intern the two MI9 men. 
However before agreeing de Valera consulted Bryan. De Valera wished to know if  the 
military would resent it if Wilson was not jailed. However Bryan raised no objections and
97Eunan O’Halpin, Aspects of Intelligence, in The Irish Sword, The Emergency 1939-45 p. 64.
98 Eunan O’Halpin, “Intelligence and Security in Ireland 1922-45” in Intelligence and National Security, vol. 
5 1990, p. 76 reference 97.
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Wilson was fined and released. This air of friendliness which colours Irish neutrality 
throughout the war, was not the direct reason for the lenient action taken against the MI9 
operatives on this occasion. According to Wilson’s G2 file it was due to the fear that the 
British would cancel Irish orders for bombers.100 No further attempts at escape were 
made during the war because of the possible impact on Anglo-Irish relations. The MI9 
“escape club” as it was known, was closed down following Girdlestone’s arrest.101 
However according to T. Ryle. Dwyer, MI9 was acting in a far greater capacity than just 
the running of an escape club. Dwyer claims that it had organised in Ireland “a kind of 501 
column ready to help British forces” and consequently “Maffey was afraid of the 
implications if it became public”.102 Despite the fact that Dwyer does not source his 
information and the fact that MI6 had been reprimanded for trying to run a similar 
venture, it is not incredibled that MI9 ran a 5th column, especially when one considers the 
total lack of co-ordination between the different British intelligence bodies.
Throughout the war MI5 and MI6 had little knowledge of what plans MI9 were 
making in relation to Ireland. MI5 through the censorship of prisoner of war (POW) mail, 
learnt that attempts were being made by the Germans to recruit an Irish brigade from their 
own POW’s of Irish origin. This brigade was to accompany a German force invading 
Ireland and to co-operate with the IRA. Although MI5 had gathered this information in 
the Autumn of 1940, it was not until the Spring of 1941 that both MI5 and MI6’s Irish 
sections learnt that M39 had considerable information on the subject. Consequently a 
meeting was held between MI9, MI5 and MI6 where it was decided that all information 
pertaining to Ireland would be passed onto MI6’s Irish section.103
99 T. Ryle Dwyer, DeValera -the man and the myths (Dublin, 1991), p. 265.
100 Dr. T. Wilson File (Military Archives, G2/4184).
101 T. Ryle Dwyer, Guests o f  the State (Dingle, 1994), p. 152.
102T. Ryle Dwyer, Guests o f  the State (Dingle, 1994), p. 152.
l03Irish Brigade, Part II, p. 48, MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, London KV4/9).
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The lack of co-ordination between the British intelligence agencies in Ireland 
made covert operations counterproductive. Reports were ineffective and incorrect, 
inevitably attracting attention and increasing the flood of rumours reaching London about 
unusual activity in Ireland. The fact that many operatives were caught or were under 
surveillance by G2 strengthened Irish suspicions about British intentions. According to a 
British intelligence chief Godfrey, "that having only recently emerged from a state of civil 
war the Irish police were particularly good at detecting underground activities and the 
unmasking of covert British organisations”.104 Although MI5 and the British 
Representative in Ireland conceded, “in this underground of intelligence and intrigue a 
British authority in Ireland could never achieve what was achieved by a native 
authority”105, the rest of the British intelligence and war leaders took much longer to 
convince.
In 1941 the United States entered the war on the allied side. Relations between 
Ireland and the US were now different. Whereas before, the threat of American 
abstention from the war had come to de Valera’s rescue and saved him from a Churchill 
backed invasion in 1940, now the US would be looking for Ireland’s aid in supporting the 
allied cause. Moves were afoot to get American President Roosevelt to openly ask de 
Valera for access to Irish bases to protect the North Atlantic shipping route which the 
Germans had targeted. Gray along with Maffey and the Canadian high commissioner 
John Keamey suggested asking Roosevelt to make de Valera a formal request thus 
forcing the Taoiseach’s hand in the open. Gray believed that in the light of recent Allied 
success and with the “orientation of Irish opinion toward the bandwagon it would be 
almost impossible for de Valera to order his troops to fire on naval forces occupying the
104 See Eunan O’Halpin, “Intelligence and Security in Ireland 1922-45” in Intelligence and National 
Security, vol. 5 1990, p. 76.
105ibid. p. 77.
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area in question”.106 How reliable Gray’s estimations of Irish public opinion was is 
debatable, however it is almost certain that G2 who had all embassies and foreign 
diplomats under close surveillance knew of this plan. De Valera realised that the 
Americans just like the British had to be humoured if his neutrality policy was to succeed. 
On 4 January 1943 Joseph Walshe approached the American Ambassador in Dublin, 
David Gray along with an American Intelligence officer Spike Marlin with an offer to co­
operate with America’s European intelligence network. The Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS) a forerunner to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), were very keen on the idea 
while the American Ambassador Gray was not. According to T. Ryle Dwyer, Gray was of 
the opinion that de Valera and his policy of neutrality should be discredited in the eyes of 
the American people for not having helped during the war. He therefore (quite correctly) 
saw this offer as a kind of trap.107 Despite this the OSS saw this as too good an 
opportunity to miss and sent David Bruce, head of the organisation’s European 
operations, to meet Irish officials. At this first meeting on 15 March 1943, Bruce met the 
Garda commissioner Paddy O’Carroll, Walshe and Bryan. It was decided that Bryan 
would supply Spike Marlin with reports on
such matters as IRA strength, radio interceptions, daily, weekly and monthly 
reports on aeroplane and submarine sightings, the names and addresses of people in 
America to whom German nationals living in Ireland or pro-German Irish people were 
writing; and files on German spies already captured.108
In the face of heightened US pressure to openly compromise his neutrality policy, 
de Valera decided to offer G2’s files to the Americans. G2 sent copies of over 4,000 
subject files to the Irish desk at OSS headquarters over the course of the war. 109
106 T. Ryle. Dwyer, Strained Relations, Ireland at peace and the USA at war 1941-45 (Dublin, 1988), p. 
101.
107 Ibid. p. 90.
108 Ibid.
109 ibid. p. 91.
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Following the preliminary meetings Bryan and the American officials had in 
March, Spike Marlin the US Irish liaison officer moved back and forth from London to 
Dublin collecting reports and discussing various issues with G2. G2 reports to the OSS 
Irish desk were sent via Marlin in London, rather than through Gray in Dublin. This was 
indicative of the distrust the Irish authorities had for Gray. R. Carter Nicholas, the head of 
the OSS Irish desk in Washington decided in May 1943 to assign a new agent to Ireland. 
Following some recruiting mishaps, Martin Quigley an Irish-American took up the post. 
Quigley soon reported the strong allied bias which existed within Irish neutrality. To him 
Gray’s attitude and desire to discredit de Valera was a puzzle. The US intelligence link 
was further enhanced when in July 1943, Marlin approached Walshe for Irish help in 
communicating with Switzerland or any other part of Europe, where the Irish had 
diplomatic missions.110 Walshe provisionally agreed if the documents carried through the 
Irish diplomatic pouch were untraceable. This agreement opened up the possibility of the 
OSS using Irish diplomats as American spies. Consequently, Nicholas and Marlin met 
Walshe in Dublin on 25 September 1943. The Americans extended Irish intelligence co­
operation even further at this meeting when Walshe agreed not just to send information 
through Irish diplomatic pouches, but also to get specific information from Irish 
diplomats which the OSS required. The next day Nicholas and Marlin met Bryan to ask 
for access to potential double agents. With preparations for D-Day the Allies were frantic 
to supply false information to the Germans. Nicholas on reading the G2 files on German 
nationals forwarded to his desk, believed that Joseph Andrews was a possibility. This ex 
ERA man had made a number of attempts to contact the Abwehr but had failed. However 
Bryan told Nicholas that Andrews’ prime motivation for contacting the Abwehr was to 
extort money and that he was unreliable and possibly distrusted by the Germans. Despite 
this Bryan informed the OSS delegation that he would “look out for a suitable candidate,
but he was not too hopeful.”111 Throughout 1943, the OSS were furnished with Irish 
diplomatic political intelligence reports on conditions, morale support for and against the 
allied and axis causes. Although files are not readily available, Irish diplomatic channels 
almost certainly passed information to US agents throughout Europe. An account in T. 
Ryle Dwyer’s book, although uncorroborated, claims Monsignor Giovanni Battista 
Montini (later Pope Paul VI), offered to arrange the transfer to the Americans of 
information from a source in Japan on strategic bombing sites in that country. Michael 
MacWhite the Irish envoy in Rome forwarded the information to Dublin where it was 
passed to the OSS.112 The truth of this recollection of a former CIA agent is open to 
debate, but it is undeniable that Irish diplomats were used as American spies in the latter 
half of the war.
Following the successful invasion of Normandy the SI branch of the OSS lost
interest in Ireland. Marlin and Quigley were recalled but X2, the counterespionage
division of the OSS, sent their own agent to Dublin. Edward Lawler came with the full
co-operation of the Irish authorities to act as a liaison. He like Quigley and Marlin,
reported a hundred per cent co-operation from the Irish authorities. Lawler located
himself in London and was in direct communication with MI5. According to MI5 reports
Lawler deliberately located in London because he did not want to get too close to the
Irish. According to MI5 writing on Lawler’s position,
it was most important to avoid, as far as possible, political contacts in Eire and to 
restrict his contacts to Col. Bryan of Dept, of Defence and his activities to security 
matters only, leaving any political questions to American ministers.113
This view of the danger of over friendliness with the Irish probably resulted from 
Liddell’s disclosure to McKenna during the German transmitter incident. It also came
111 Ibid. p. 95.
112 Ibid. p. 97.
113 OSS intelligence set up in Eire, Part II, p. 89. MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, London KV4/9).
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from the MI5 perception that Marlin’s friendly attitude with Irish personnel angered Gray 
and led to his dismissal. Even though Lawler distanced himself he managed to forge an 
effective intelligence regime. Gray would report any rumours or security queries he had. 
Lawler would in turn check them with MI5. If this did not suffice he would then confer 
with Bryan before reporting back to Gray.114
Despite this Gray was still unhappy about the Irish situation and was determined 
to force the issue of neutrality with de Valera. Gray believed if he could formally 
discredit the Taoiseach in American eyes, there was little chance of his being able to 
cause problems later for the Anglo-American alliance by stirring up trouble in the US 
over the partition question. Gray after consulting with Maffey and with American 
officials sent the “American note” personally to de Valera on 21 February 1944. The note 
asked for the removal of all Axis representatives in Ireland. This was followed by a 
“British note” from Maffey later that afternoon supporting the American request for the 
Axis Legation dismissal. De Valera managed to obtain assurances that his rejection of 
these notes would not result in an Allied invasion although a strong anti neutral press 
campaign against Ireland was launched in the US when the story of the notes broke. 
Churchill in a speech at the time talked of isolating Ireland and there were Irish fears that 
Britain was going to re-introduce economic sanctions but this did not happen. The threat 
of ending the MI5-G2 link helped keep Anglo-Irish relations friendly. According to an 
MI5 official writing after the war, “The Dublin link was not always favourable to British 
policy. Its existence provided de Valera with an answer to British complaints”.115 In order 
to keep the Americans happy they were offered to instate their own agents in Ireland. 
However the OSS decided against this since it would exonerate the Irish authorities if 
Axis representatives in Dublin did manage to betray plans for an Allied invasion. Despite
114 Ibid.
115 Part I, The Dublin Link p. 7, MIS 2nd World War Files (PRO, London KV4/9).
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this the OSS agents in Britain reported complete satisfaction with the steps the Irish 
security forces were taking. By April 1944 word reached the Irish government that the 
Americans were preparing a second note to let de Valera reconsider his refusal. Marlin 
was informed that if a second note was delivered, any further intelligence co-operation 
would be terminated.116 Both the American and the British decided against the issuing of 
a second note, and subsequently on 2 May 1944 a security conference in Dublin between 
the Irish, British and the Americans was called. Among the things discussed were 
intensification of radio security, details of co-operation between the Irish army Signal 
Corps and the British, and the existing co-operation between the Irish coast watching 
service and the RAF in Northern Ireland to prevent agents being dropped by aircraft. G2 
monitoring of Axis sympathisers and the German legation was also discussed. Again both 
the American and British security and intelligence representatives left the conference 
feeling assured at the steps G2 and the Irish authorities were taking
116 T. Ryle. Dwyer, Strained Relations, Ireland at peace and the USA at war 1941-45 (Dublin, 1988), p, 
150.
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CHAPTER 6 
BRYAN’S LEADERSHIP 
AND AN INTELLIGENCE RENAISSANCE
As the war progressed, G2’s dormant sections revived and many new sections 
were formed. Sections were established to deal with, Combat Intelligence, 
Counterespionage, Code and Signals, Air and Marine Intelligence, Coastwatching, 
Communications, Censorship and other Defensive measures. The Signals and Combat 
Intelligence Sections existed in a former life under the Second Bureau, but now had 
increased funding and staffing levels under Emergency conditions. G2’s Censorship and 
Signals Sections practised what their commanders had been preaching during their 
Defence Plans Division days. The G2 Foreign Armies section was split between the 
growing Combat Intelligence Section and the newly emerging Counterespionage Section. 
With the re-emergence of military involvement in tracking IRA and republican 
organisation the Internal Subversive Section was also reawakened.
Although Emergency conditions and efforts to preserve the policy of neutrality 
acted as catalysts for military intelligence’s rebirth, the driving force behind the 
Department’s reorganisation was Col. Dan Bryan. During the early war period Bryan 
played an influential role guiding, training and advising new G2 operatives. His role in 
running the Department became official when in July 1941 he was appointed Director of 
Intelligence. No person within the Department had such a long service record in 
intelligence and no one was more interested or dedicated to intelligence than Bryan. 
However it still remained to be seen how he and his Department would cope with the 
global shifts in power which threatened to erupt and spill over into Ireland.
Archer and Bryan’s main concern at the beginning of the conflict was the staffing 
of the Department. They realised that for G2 to operate effectively it had to increase staff
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levels to deal with the security threat the war posed. As was the case for many of G2’s 
early ventures, contingency plans had been prepared. A 1928 Defence Plans’ document 
recommended a centralised intelligence corps, where personnel with special talents such 
as interpreting, interrogation, censorship, internal security, etc. should be gathered 
together to pool resources. It was anticipated that the intelligence corps would not exist in 
peacetime but would be mobilised in time of war and be used to relieve full time 
intelligence staff from their routine duties to allow them to concentrate on more pressing 
and important affairs.1 It is unclear if this was formally introduced but many skilled civil 
servants and people known to have talents in special areas were drafted in. Dr. Richard 
Hayes, a mathematician and Director o f the National Library was brought in to aid the 
Code and Signals Section. The Emergency army recruiting drive targeted Ex-Civil war 
IRA men, although their numbers were small. Tom Barry was drafted into the army as 
was “neutral IRA” leader Florence O ’Donoghue. O’Donoghue served as a senior G2 
officer in the south and was influential in recruiting “neutral” and ex IRA men into the 
national army.
O’Donoghue proved a vital asset to G2’s Combat Intelligence department and it 
was due to his leadership that the Supplementary Intelligence Service (SIS) was 
established. The British SOE and possibly MI9’s idea of setting up a “stay behind” force 
in Ireland in case of a German invasion was not lost on G2. Although the origins of the 
idea are unclear, in January 1942, G2 held a conference to discuss the formation of such a 
body.2 The SIS was an exception to most of G2’s developments as it had not been 
planned in the pre-war studies, rather it was a sudden improvisation which displayed 
Bryan and G2’s commitment to total war if need be. Its principal functions were combat
1 Defence Plans, Special Memorandum No.2. 1928, Tactical Organisation of the Defence Forces, p. 66. 
(Military Archives, Dublin).
2 Letter from Commandant MacKay to Bryan 7 January 1942, Supplementary Intelligence Service, G2/X363 
(Military Archives, Dublin).
157
intelligence, counter espionage and behind lines reporting.3 This behind the lines 
organisation was to relay reports on the movement and the strength of the enemy and 
facilitate the cutting of roads and bridges etc. to restrict the enemy’s advance. SIS 
members were under a standing order to remain in their areas if overrun “unless ordered 
to leave” by their army controller.4 SIS agents were required to furnish 5th columnist lists 
i.e. lists of people in their assigned area they thought likely to help a potential invader.5 
The SIS was kept totally secret and although theoretically they were attached to the Local 
Defence Force (LDF) they were to have no connection with the Gardai or the reserve
army units of the Local Defence Force. SIS members were sworn to secrecy and were 
assigned code numbers for communication purposes. They received no pay or 
allowances, though their postal and telephone costs were reimbursed each month.6 The 
SIS command areas corresponded with the old pre 1921 IRA battalion areas. 
O’Donoghue used the nostalgia for the War of Independence to attract republican and ex­
republican recruits who were the most skilled in the form of guerrilla warfare the SIS 
would need to adopt. These republican and IRA recruits provided intelligence on the IRA 
and alerted O’Donoghue to attempts by a renegade Special Branch officer Jim Crofton, to 
get a seaworthy boat for the escape of a German spy. O ’Donoghue’s group also 
uncovered the NID coast watching ring along the south coast.7 Within a month an SIS 
group formed in Waterford and was followed by others in South Leinster and Munster. 
The internal secrecy surrounding the organisation was not only generated by the necessity 
to keep the SIS undercover in case of invasion but also the political ramifications that
3 Quoted in Eunan O’Halpin, Aspects o f Intelligence, in Irish Sword, The Emergency 1939-45 p. 62 Ref. 
Document marked “Secret. Supplementary intelligence service”, 10 Mar. 1941 (Military Archives, Dublin).
4 Ibid.
5 Letter from SIS to Bryan, 10 March 1941, Supplementary Intelligence Service, G2/X363 (Military 
Archives, Dublin).
6 Quoted in Eunan O’Halpin, Aspects of Intelligence, in Irish Sword, The Emergency 1939-45 p. 62.
7 See Chapter 5.
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might occur if the government or the opposition found out about the recruitment o f IRA 
personnel and republicans into its ranks.
Bryan never extended the SIS organisation outside of the south o f the country 
which suggests that he only anticipated a southern attack and did not prepare for invasion 
from the north. If this is the case Bryan was probably only worrying about a German 
attack since they were the most likely to launch a southerly invasion. Although by early 
1942, the threat of British invasion was not as great as it had been in the Summer of 
1941, it would have been foolhardy of Biyan not to prepare for a British invasion as he 
had done for a German. Perhaps the close links with Liddell convinced him not to, or he 
simply did not have the quality of personnel like O’Donoghue who could forge secretive 
contacts in the North to enter on such an expedition. O’Halpin suggests that the SIS could 
cause friction between the army and the gardai who had the primary responsibility for
local security.8 However it is possible that he feared a northern organisation with a strong 
IRA or republican membership organised to fight a British invasion could pose a future 
potential internal threat if it was not controlled tightly.
Although the SIS was never tested it proved to be one of the more practical and 
visionary steps made during the period. So much so that after the war the Department of 
Defence said that the secrecy surrounding the SIS should be maintained “as assistance 
from its members might possibly be sought again”.9
The SIS would be vital in supplying information in case of invasion, however it 
was hoped that they would not be the only Section to provide data on the enemy. The 
Combat Intelligence Section also focused on preparing measures in the event of a 
German or British invasion. It issued intelligence notes to officers10 covering subjects
8 Eunan O’Halpin, Aspects of Intelligence, in The Irish Sword, The Emergency 1939-45 p. 62.
9 Eunan O’Halpin, Aspects of Intelligence, in The Irish Sword, The Emergency 1939-45 p. 62.
10 This form of reporting seems to have really taken off in the Irish Army during the Defence Plans Divisions 
of the late 1920’s.
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such as “British Army organisation, German Army organisation, Anti-Aircraft tactics, 
obstruction of aerodromes and airborne and parachute troops”.11 Further intelligence 
notes were issued to higher officers giving up-to-date situation reports on Irish defence 
topics such as the possibility and nature o f an invasion. Much of the intelligence gleaned 
by G2 on a German invasion came from reports published by British and US military 
officers. The G2-MI5 link which prompted the joint contingency plan for co-operation in 
the case of a German invasion (Mission 18) helped provide the Combat Intelligence 
Section with information on the German army. In addition, the Foreign Armies Section 
founded in the early 1920’s and the Defence Plans Division founded in 1927 carried out 
many studies of military tactics. Bryan who was an authority on general and Irish military 
history believed strongly in this approach and these studies were now called on.12
The Combat Intelligence Section paid particular attention to inferior forces 
defeating superior ones. Of special interest were home made anti tank measures, since 
although orders had been placed with the British, the state had no anti tank weaponry. 
Studies of the Finnish Army’s effective halting of a Russian tank invasion showed that 
strategically placed felled trees could hold up advancing tanks for days, although it was 
noted unlike the Finnish, the Irish did not have dense forestry or severe winters to 
capitalise on such a move. Other home made Finnish anti tank measures were 
camouflaged pits and the use of stone obstacles.13 G2 also supported the use of molotov 
cocktails which were used as an effective anti tank measure in both the Russo-Finnish 
war and by both sides in the Spanish Civil war. They were cheap and easy to make, a
11 Military information and General Section 1939-45 (UCD Archives, Bryan Papers, P71/28).
12 In an article he wrote in his retirement he noted how a conquering army in Ireland always controlled 
Dublin. He made references to the Vikings, the Normans and the War of Independence. He noted the 
primary reason why the 1916 rising failed and the War of Independence succeeded was because the IRA 
made Dublin uncontrollable for the British and forced the introduction of British “no go areas” which 
isolated them.
See Dan Bryan, “Guerrilla Warfare in Dublin” In An Cosantoir, (July 1964) pp 397-401.
13 Intelligence Note No. 21, Notes on Anti-Tank Measures, Russo-Finnish War, 2 August 1940 (UCD 
Archives, Bryan Papers, P71/38).
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glass bottle is filled with petrol and tar and a lit paraffin soaked rag is used as a fuse. 
When the bottle breaks against an object the liquid sticks to the target and is ignited.14 
100,000 molotov cocktails were commissioned and stored in the Phoenix Park. 50,000 
grenades were also purchased for the same purpose. Following a study of reports from 
German tank crews during the invasion of Poland the use of metal rail barriers and the 
use of manmade ditches were also considered.15 Despite the references to home made 
anti tank measures, G2 did not dismiss the use of traditional anti-tank weapons. The army 
corps manufactured 5,100 anti-tank mines which were distributed to all commands.16 
Anti-tank obstacles and home made weapons permitted the sparing use of mines which 
would be vital considering the lack of equipment available to the army.
Combat Intelligence Section issued reports on the organisation of potential 
invaders. On 18 November, 1940, Intelligence Note no. 48 was a synopsis study of the 
German invasion of France.17 It covered the organisation of the higher German command, 
the use of propaganda and news services by the Germans. It also describes the actions of 
army corps engineers, artillery, infantry, etc. In Section 5 entitled: “Irregular methods of 
warfare”, some examples of “dirty tricks” used by the Germans are cited, one being, 
“Concealing anti-tank guns in farm carts driven by civilians or troops in civilian clothes”. 
Another states “Bombing and machine-gunning columns of refugees to cause blocking of 
roads in rear of the enemy”.18 The German application of Blitzkrieg tactics i.e. advancing 
from newly captured territory without attempting to consolidate, but using speed and 
surprise to neutralise enemy counter measures was also examined,
14 Philip Warner, Firepower, From Slings to Star Wars (London, 1989), p. 146.
15 Intelligence Note No. 23, Notes on Anti-Tank Measures In the Polish Campaign 25 July 1940, (UCD 
Archives, Bryan Papers, P71/40).
16 John P. Duggan, A History o f  the Irish Army (Dublin, 1991), p. 208.
17 Intelligence Note No. 48, Lessons to be learned from the success of the German Army in France, 18 
November 1940, (UCD Archives, Bryan Papers, P71/40).
18 Intelligence Note No. 48, Lessons to be learned from the success of the German Army in France, 18 
November 1940, (UCD Archives, Bryan Papers, P71/40).
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Irish Combat intelligence took on a new significance when G2 discovered German 
invasion plans. For a while it was unclear whether G2 had knowledge of these plans 
during the Emergency, however all evidence suggests that they did. The invasion plan 
entitled “Military Geographical Data on Ireland” was discovered in a store house in 
Brussels shortly after the war. In 1946 the Irish authorities received a copy from an Irish- 
American soldier who said he had found them in Bavaria. However Colm Cox claims that 
G2 received a copy of these plans as early as 1942, while Douglas Gageby a G2 officer 
recalls seeing them during the Emergency.19 The German plans were drawn up in 
September 1940 and detail the geographical, social, cultural and political background to 
Ireland from the point of view of a German tourist from which much of the plans 
information was gleaned. Much of the physical and geographical information was out of 
date, for example, railway stations long closed were thought to be operational. The plan 
outlined landing sites particularly targeting the Wexford-Waterford coasts. It is claimed 
that a large scale Irish army exercise held in this area in 1942 was a direct result of this 
plan and proof of Irish knowledge of it.20 It is thought that the plan was only realistically 
considered by the Germans after the fall of France in 1940, as a diversion or “back door” 
for the invasion of England. This operation was known as Operation Gruen and although 
the invasion plan for Britain Operation Sealion was postponed, training for operation 
Gruen continued through September and October 1940.21 According to Bryan, when 
Operation Sealion was abandoned, Ireland was discussed at the Führer’s Naval 
conferences. Hitler declared that there was insufficient information for an Irish invasion 
but that this information should be prepared.22 However the strength of the British navy
19 Colm Cox, “Militär Geographische Angaben Uber Irland” In An Cosantoir, (March 1975) p. 83. For 
Gaegby’s testimony see Brian D. Martin, The Role of G2 during The Emergency 1939-45, M.A. Maynooth 
1994, p. 20, Reference to transcript of an interview with Douglas Gaegby p. 8.
20 Brian D. Martin, The Role of G2 during The Emergency 1939-45, M.A. Maynooth 1994, p. 32.
21 Ibid. p. 33.
22 Dan Bryan, “The Days of the Emergency” in Irish Times, 3 September, 1979.
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and the problem of supplying troops in Ireland led German commanders to conclude that 
even a diversionary invasion of Ireland was too costly.
A British invasion appeared as likely as a German one. Although plans had been 
agreed for dual defensive measures should Germany invade, British commanders might 
be unwilling to wait for an Irish invitation. British Troops Northern Ireland (B.T.N.I.), 
commanded by Sir Hubert Huddleston had a mobile column waiting for the code signal to 
advance south and documents containing details of his military instructions for this move 
are still withheld.23 Fisk maintains that the British counter invasion plan known as Plan 
W, was to operate with or without Irish consent. He supports this with W plan orders to 
send a large force of British troops to Lough Swilly in Donegal. As there were over two 
hundred Irish troops stationed there and the main German invasion was anticipated over 
two hundred miles away off the Irish southern coast, this precaution was a bit extreme 
unless the British intention was to occupy the country without consent.24 The number of 
Irish files pertaining to studies directly related to a British or Allied invasion, although 
they exist are not as numerous as those of a German invasion. There are many possible 
reasons for this. G2 did not entertain the threat of a British invasion as likely as a German 
one due to good intelligence relations they enjoyed with MI5. Secondly the British, who 
had between 1938 and the outbreak of war left tables of British military organisation 
open to the Irish, had now sealed them. Finally the fact that plans to deal with a British 
invasion would be sensitive for both countries may have led to their destruction or 
withholding.
Although like the SIS, the Combat Intelligence measures were never needed, it 
demonstrated the foresight of Bryan and other G2 commanders and their willingness to 
contemplate all-out war.
23 Robert Fisk, In time o f War (London, 1983), p. 202.
24 Ibid.
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As well as carrying out studies o f foreign wars, journals, handbooks and reports, 
G2 obtained intelligence information themselves. G2 were dependent on censored news 
or British reports on how the war was progressing and its likely outcome. With the 
exception of some of the Foreign envoys, the Irish state did not send spies into the field, 
they did operate agents close to foreign sources on home soil. Foynes was one of one of 
these foreign sources. Throughout the course of the Emergency over 1,650 serving 
members of the US Armed forces passed through Foynes.25 Practically all o f these were 
commissioned officers. This figure does not include the foreign diplomats, British 
military staff and other civilians who had first hand information on the war. In order to 
obtain useful information from military and civilian passengers, G2 appointed a team 
with a senior officer Lieutenant Niall Hewett to work at the airport. Initially Hewett was 
stationed permanently in Foynes and an assistant officer was rotated every six to nine 
months.25 As activity at Foynes increased so did G2 and Garda surveillance of the airport. 
Hewett and his staff kept an inventory of passengers coming through Shannon and 
accompanied passengers on flights and around the airport to gather information. Hewett 
compiled intelligence reports covering aspects of the war and conditions on the continent 
of particular interest to the Combat Intelligence Section. Informal conversations with Mr. 
Lowenstein, a passenger who worked for an arms firm, gave information on US aircraft 
production. Information obtained by G2 officer Lieutenant Summerling, from Sir Arthur 
Street of the British Air Ministry revealed flaws in the design of the new German Focke- 
Wulf fighter. G2 anticipated a large Allied offensive (D-Day), when the Foynes team 
intercepted mail to American employees in Shannon, making reference to the large 
amount of American military personnel who had left the US for Europe.“ The G2 team at
25 Analysis Military Naval & RAF traffic for month of June 1942, 29 July 1942 (Military Archives, 
G2/X/0379).
26 Brian D. Martin, The Role of G2 during The Emergency 1939-45, M. A. Maynooth 1994, p. 20, Reference 
to transcript of an interview with Douglas Gaegby p. 4.
27 Shannon Airport Foynes, 22 January to 12 February 1944 (Military Archives, G2/X/757).
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Shannon were the most useful collectors of combat intelligence during the war. They not 
only collected combat information for the army on equipment, campaigns, defensive 
measures etc, they also supplied political information useful to the government on 
conditions in and opinions of foreign countries.
The G2 presence at Foynes was also used to prevent the leakage of information 
from Ireland, maintaining the Irish policy of neutrality and more importantly disapating 
the wrath of Britain. MI5’s undercover agent at Foynes operating as a B.O.A.C. employee 
was quickly discovered by Hewett. The G2 team had tapped all the B.O.A.C. staff 
phones.28 No steps were taken by G2 to remove him and to allay British fears, G2 even 
granted the formal establishment of a British Security Officer at Foynes in June 1942.29 
Many other facilities were afforded to the Allies at Foynes. Towards the end of the war 
British and US military personnel in uniform and war stores for Allied forces were 
allowed through the airport. Hewett reported that boxes with dust filters for US military 
aircraft passed through at one stage.30 Although G2 was aware of British screening of 
Irish Diplomatic mail at Foynes, Bryan took no action. The consequences of these 
concessions was two-fold. Firstly, it calmed British concerns but secondly it afforded G2 
a source of information from British security correspondence, which was monitored.
Another G2 Section which played a large role during the Emergency was the 
Censorship Department. Through the War of Independence and then the Civil War, the 
army had found postal and telephone interception a useful source of information. Bryan’s 
tapping of the Crown Alley phone exchange had heralded the foiling of the 1924 Mutiny 
plot. Irish Military Intelligence continued to run a Censorship department under the 
Second Bureau administration during the 1920’s. In 1925 the Director of Intelligence 
Michael J. Costello said “the fundamental flaw in our censorship and propaganda
28 Foynes, reporting on B.O. A.C, (Military Archives, G2/X/0379).
29 See Chapter 5 p. 131.
arrangements...is our flagrant dishonesty and consequently all our pronouncements are 
regarded with suspicion even by our friends”.31 The Second Bureau propaganda and 
censorship section were not as skilled at mixing truth with falsehood as the War of 
Independence Publicity Department. The failures within the section were examined and 
reviewed in 1925. It was acknowledged that by 1925 the role of censorship had changed 
from a measure to protect military secrets to a system designed to cover the whole life of 
the nation against the leakage of information. Problems regarding censorship if a conflict 
were to break out were examined. The study focused on control of the press, postal 
censorship, letter interception, telephone censorship, eavesdropping and cable censorship. 
Amongst its recommendations it concluded that “the government should appoint in time 
of peace a person who will act as director of censorship and publicity in time of war or 
when otherwise required.” “This person would be a military officer who would liaise, as
• • • 3"?
required with civilian departments.” " None of the recommendations were acted upon, 
the Government probably believing them to be misplaced in the context of 1925. Bryan 
noted in his and Archer’s Fundamental Factors document a decade later that the British 
had mentioned the possibility of censorship co-operation at the Imperial conference in 
1926, but it did not develop past this stage.33 An interdepartmental committee on 
censorship was established in 1931 and reconstituted in 1935 but nothing was done until 
the threat of War became obvious.
So like many other G2 sections, the Censorship sections aims and objectives had 
been studied and laid out over a decade previously. More importantly, both Liam Archer 
and Dan Bryan had been involved in the 1925-6 analysis of wartime censorship problems, 
Archer as director of signals and Bryan as a Second Bureau officer.34 Following the early
30 Hewitt report on US war stores, (Military Archives, G2/X/0379).
31 Eunan O’Halpin, Aspects of Intelligence, in The Irish Sword, The Emergency 1939-45 p. 58
32 Ibid.
33 Eunan O’Halpin, Aspects of Intelligence, in The Irish Sword, The Emergency 1939-45 p. 58
34 Ibid. p. 59.
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secretive talks with MI5 in 1938 both Bryan and Archer set about reviving the redundant 
Censorship section and began applying their own organisation plan which drew on 
studies from the 1920’s. The Censorship section in G2 was among the first sections to 
mobilise in preparation for war. The Postal Interception unit with the aid of British 
training was established within the GPO. This was an important development for G2, 
since observing illicit Axis mail to and from the IRA returned unofficially many of G2’s 
internal surveillance powers. The Post Office Investigation branch reporting to G2 came 
into full operation in May 1939. The Minister for Justice issued warrants for postal 
supervision on G2’s request, (previously only issued on the written request of the Garda 
Commissioner.35) Although G2 monitored the mail and telephone calls, most state 
censorship was carried out by organisations independent of army control. However 
civilian organisations co-operated closely with the army and looked to G2 for a lead on 
even the most innocuous points with any military or security bearing. G2 commanders 
advised and helped establish the Civil censorship department, since the G2 covert one 
had been in active operation since 1938. Proposals on the state’s censorship structures 
were sent by the Dept, of Defence to the Dept, of Finance in April 1939.36 Owing to G2’s 
supervisory role and the fact that he had a phone and Archer did not, Bryan claimed he 
was plagued with night time calls from the press censors during the “phoney war” 
period.37 However Bryan had developed odd working hours, operating very early in the 
morning and very late at night. A G2 officer commenting on his odd working hours said 
he would not have been amused to be told that he kept Kremlin time.
During the day the G2 Censorship Department’s link with its civil counterpart was 
between Liam Archer and Thomas J. Coyne. As the Emergency progressed G2 officer
33 Donal O’Drisceoil, Censorship in Ireland 1939-1945, Neutrality, Politics and Society (Cork, 1996), p.
12.
36 Ibid. p. 11.
37 Eunan O’Halpin, Aspects of Intelligence, in The Irish Sword, The Emergency 1939-45 p. 59. Reference to 
Bryan tapes p. 27.
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Captain McCall was assigned to act as the liaison officer. However relations between the 
civil censorship body and G2 were not always amicable. Following the publication of an 
item on a crashed belligerent plane in June 1942, McCall told Censorship to inform him 
about such matters in future but he was told that it was their responsibility to decide not 
G2’s.
The G2 officer Major Joe Guilfoyle accompanied the “March of Time” team 
while they filmed in Ireland in December 1943. He viewed all the shots taken and only 
objected to one scene showing waiters carrying bottles of champagne to guests at the 
Gresham Hotel. This scene of decadence was duly deleted.39 It was G2’s intention to 
enforce censorship of press, radio, telephone and letters to such an extent that “national 
interests” would never be compromised. Material was censored under three headings:- 
defensive, political and economic. Defensively, G2 wished to prevent the disclosure of 
information relating to the defence of the state. This included all references to defence 
policy, army movements, numbers, equipment, fortifications etc. All indiscreet letters, 
including those complaining about conditions, from army personnel were sent to the 
adjutant general. Defensive censorship included any weather reports which might aid a 
belligerent side. Political censorship covered statements which prejudiced or adversely 
affect national policy or prestige or relations with other states. Particular attention was 
paid to comments on neutrality, especially by influential persons or in newspapers 
published outside the state. Political censorship also controlled propaganda which might 
encourage violence or disaffection against the government. This was especially included 
to obstruct IRA and republican correspondence and literature. G2 and the Department of 
External Affairs administered this type of political censorship. The task of economic
38 Douglas Gaegby, “Colonel Dan Bryan” in Irish Times 8 June, 1985.
39 Donal O’Drisceoil, Censorship in Ireland 1939-1945, Neutrality, Politics and Society (Cork, 1996), p. 
44.
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censorship was to prevent the circulation of matter prejudicial to national commercial 
interests and to seek out tax evasion and financial irregularities.
The potential scope of censorship was beyond the resources of G2. Although a 
staff of 200 were employed in the civil Postal Censorship division housed in a converted 
warehouse in Exchequer Street in Dublin, this staff level was small when compared with 
the 10,000 people who were employed by the British, and therefor only partial censorship 
was carried out. Despite this the Postal Censorship unit was effective. Workers in the 
Postal Censorship unit were screened by G2, due to the sensitive nature of their work. 
They were lectured by Liam Archer on breaches of the Official Secrets Act and warned 
about taking correspondence outside of work,.40 Despite these warnings, although the 
effectiveness of the unit did not suffer, there were many problems of this nature. The 
sorters opened the letters, examined them and set aside those addressed to persons on a 
“Black List”, “White List” and a “Watching List”. The White List contained those whose 
correspondence was exempted from censorship. The Watching List consisted of 
correspondence which was temporarily observed to determine whether they were safe. 
The Black List contained those under suspicion whose correspondence was required by 
G2. This mail was passed to G2’s Censorship Unit who examined these letters and 
material from their own Postal Interception Unit which was attached to the Postal 
Investigation Branch. This with the aid of British training had been running since May 
1939 on postal warrants issued to G2 from the Dept, of Justice.41 Among this unit’s early 
surveillance were a select list of post from Northern Ireland. G2 learned as early as 1925 
that the Northern authorities had been running a similar system on outgoing mail to the 
south.42
40 Ibid. p 63
41Ibid. p 12
42 Ibid. p 67
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In 1943 G2’s postal interception concentrated on the high level o f desertion from 
the Irish to the British Army. In order to counteract this they censored all post for Irish 
soldiers coming from outside the state, in order to frustrate the British Recruiting Centre 
in Belfast which was writing to them. G2 were successful and there was a marked 
decrease in desertion rates.43
G2’s Censorship Section not only examined post but also scrutinised press and 
published media. A letter printed in the Irish Press in June 1942, written by Fianna Fail
T.D. Dan Breen, slated the paper’s pro British line. This letter was withdrawn after 
censorship, Bryan believed that Breen’s information was being fed by Thomsen from the 
German legation who had strong feelings against the Irish Press believing it to have a pro- 
British sub editor. However G2 put all the journalists and senior staff of the paper under 
surveillance and found them to have pro-Axis sympathies if any.44
G2’s Postal Unit often investigated post on the White List, i.e. those with 
censorship exemptions. Theoretically diplomatic bags and foreign missions should 
receive diplomatic immunity from censorship. However G2 kept all such correspondence 
under close surveillance, on the basis that “the immunity enjoyed by letters of this kind is 
a matter of courtesy, not of right”.45 On many occasions diplomatic mail was even kept 
back from its destination. Dan Bryan, in consulting Joseph Walshe from External Affairs 
about forwarding a letter containing indiscreet references to current events, reminded him 
that Thomsen, the German Legation’s second in command’s last letter had been “lost” .46 
According to Bryan, postal censorship was upgraded with new British equipment and
43 Ibid. p. 68.
44 Ibid. p. 170.
43Ibid. p. 70.
46 Ibid. p. 71.
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from that point on the work done “was of the highest quality” in terms both o f security 
and intelligence.47
G2’s Censorship Section also covered telephone tapping and telegraph 
supervision. Irish military intelligence had been practising telephone interception since 
the war of independence, but large scale monitoring did not begin until the outbreak of 
the Second World war. Like the postal interception unit, it’s founding members were sent 
on courses to London organised by MI5. Telephone-tapping began on a large scale early 
in 1940. The chief press censor declared that this fell within his brief and ironically said 
he wished to begin with the telephone of the British representative. Bryan argued strongly 
that it was a counterespionage function. He also thought that the German Legation should 
be first on the list, although he kept his opinions to himself. Boldly acting on his own 
authority he told his Post Office contacts, just returned from British training, to initiate 
tapping and report directly to him. This they did and up until 1945 the telephones of all 
foreign diplomats and legations were supervised and relevant transcripts passed to the 
Department of External Affairs and elsewhere. Irish people thought sympathetic to 
Germany were also watched this way. This included a former government minister and 
the founder of the 1930’s Blueshirt movement.48 In May 1945, after he had been 
informed it was to shut down, Bryan argued vigorously for the retention of telephone 
surveillance. Bryan writing to Aitken as Minister for Defence argued on a legal basis, 
stating that he “never regarded this service as a section of Censorship...I can only 
reiterate that I regard telephone supervision as essential to a security machine...it has 
proved itself the most valuable portion of supervision which has been exercised by the
—  J . Q
Post Office for a number of years”.
47 Eunan O’Halpin, “Intelligence and Security in Ireland 1922-45” in Intelligence and National Security, vol.
5 1990, p. 66.
48 Ibid.
49 Department Foreign Affairs A11 “Security Intelligence” Bryan to Aitken, 25 May 1945 (National 
Archives, Dublin).
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Apart from post, press and telephone, illicit wireless transmissions were 
monitored by G2. Due to its technical aspects and the fact that many messages were in 
code, a separate section known as Code and Signals was responsible for its surveillance. 
Again this section had its roots in the 1920’s Second Bureau’s Signals section of which 
Liam Archer had been a prominent member. However it like most of G2’s sections got a 
lease of life with the outbreak of war in Europe. It was initially used to track down an 
IRA broadcasting operation and later to trace transmissions from a secret radio in the 
German Legation. The existence of this transmitter caused many problems with the 
British but it led to a British radio expert being sent in December 1941 to help improve 
the Code & Signals Section and in return for co-operation Britain fed the section with 
transmissions picked up to and from Ireland.50 The British probably had more precise 
knowledge of the nature of the activities of the German Legation than they were prepared 
to tell Irish intelligence.51 The problem was initially raised by the British, who said that a 
radio was transmitting signals in a German diplomatic code from a point about twenty 
five miles north of Dublin. Bryan accompanied by an Irish signals officer went to the area 
on a preliminary investigation which Bryan declared in hindsight “was a waste o f time”. 
Following an improvement within the G2 Signals Section the transmissions were traced 
directly to the German Legation in Dublin. A small code breaking unit was established to 
tackle the wireless traffic under the Director of the National Library Dr. Richard Hayes, a 
mathematician who had previously worked for military intelligence. Although unable to 
recruit the two or three operatives with university qualifications in maths and science he 
requested, the son of the Minister for Justice and a member of the government’s Defence 
Council were recruited. The unit was unable to break the German diplomatic cipher from 
their base in an Army barracks just behind the legation.
50 See Chapter 5 p. 128.
172
This presented the government with a problem as they did not want to provoke 
the Germans, then in the ascendant, by asking them to shut down the legation radio 
without good cause. The precise source of the transmissions was concealed from the 
British while the government considered the problem. The decision to conceal this 
information caused great strain between G2 and MI5 and for a time in 1941 all dealings 
ceased. However Bryan’s meeting with Liddell in London at MI5’s invitation put 
relations back on track. He told MI5 that the transmitter had been located, was being 
constantly monitored and was told to inform MI5 that it would cease operating. However 
to Bryan’s embarrassment the legation radio continued to transmit. Finally the break out 
of German battleships from channel ports wrongly thought to have been aided by weather 
reporting sent from the legation transmitter, gave the Department of External Affairs the 
confidence to approach the German Minister about the transmissions. The transmitter 
ceased to transmit although the Ambassador was frequently asked to reply to messages 
sent from Germany. Following further pressure from the Allies in the build up to D-Day, 
the Irish government was persuaded to force the legation to hand over the transmitter 
altogether. They did this in December 1943.
Despite Dr. Hayes code breaking unit’s failure to break the Legation traffic, his 
team did manage to intercept ciphers and codes used by German agents in Ireland 
between 1940 and 1943. In this respect he enjoyed considerable success. The Code and 
Signals section according to Hayes only really developed towards the end of the war.
“We had so very little material to work on during the first two or three years that 
our experience had nothing on which to crystallise and it was only towards the end of the 
war that it was possible to face up to the problems with confidence and without 
unnecessary wasted effort”.32
51 Eunan O’Halpin, “Intelligence and Security in Ireland 1922-45” in Intelligence and National Security, vol. 
5 1990, p. 69.
52 Ibid. p. 72.
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The success that Hayes and his team enjoyed towards the end of the war prompted 
British interest. According to Hayes, early in 1943 British cipher experts Denys Page, 
philosopher Gilbert Ryle and the head of the British Codes and Ciphers Department met 
with Hayes in Dublin to discuss Abwehr messages being sent from Dublin to Lisbon by 
ship.53 Following the visit the British cipher experts managed to break the cipher. 
Consequently Hayes was given a document from Cecil Liddell detailing technical 
information on German ciphers already known to the British.
Hayes and his team’s most important work was the breaking of Abwehr agent 
Herman Goertz’s code. Following Goertz’s capture and imprisonment in October 1941, 
he continued to send messages by hand from prison, through a bribed Irish sentry. G2 
intercepted these messages and led Goertz to believe he was in contact with Herr Hempel 
from the German Legation and that he agreed to pass his messages on to Germany. Hayes 
received 18 messages from Goertz which detailed his mission in Ireland including his 
efforts to make contact with some Irish Army officers. This was a particularly valuable 
and sensitive coup for G2. Hayes said that the cipher Goertz was using was the best that 
the Irish had come in contact with and according to British experts was amongst the best 
three or four used in the war.54 Hayes had managed to break most of the Goertz code, but 
after G2 decided to pass the broken cipher to the British, they managed to completely 
break it.55 The passing of German codes to the British caused some friction inside G2. 
Although Bryan as D/I was to be updated constantly on any developments within the 
Code and Signals section, he was not informed that Goertz’s code had been cracked until 
a year after the event. When he remonstrated with Hayes he was told that the new Deputy 
Director, Eamonn de Buitlear had prevented this information reaching him, believing
(rightly) that Bryan would run hot-foot to the British with it. De Buitlear was an ardent
53 Ibid.
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Irish speaker who went to Berlin before the war to perfect his German. Although 
according to Duggan he was a loyal officer he was regarded by Bryan as strongly anti- 
British. Bryan regarded “dyed-in-the-wood Gaelic Leaguers like Butler as being anti- 
British to the point o f irrationality”.56 However Bryan acknowledged that being anti- 
British was not the same as being pro-German. This was not the only clash between 
Bryan and Butler, they also come to loggerheads on methodology. Bryan gave Butler 
confidential work and his way of tackling tasks was not to Bryan’s liking. He felt his 
subordinate was unable to keep more than one ball in the air at a time. However 
according to Duggan, “these internal squabbles within G2 were characteristic o f the 
organisation. Clashes arose from time to time as officers vied to excel each other in 
professionalism and patriotism. There was also an element of dog-eat-dog for 
promotion”.57
Despite internal friction the Code and Signals section operated effectively. 
Another German code was gleaned from an interned Irishman who agreed to relay 
messages for the Germans. John Francis O’Reilly while imprisoned in Arbour Hill was 
interrogated by G2. Bryan tricked O’Reilly into disclosing the ciphering system he had 
been taught. O’Reilly claimed the code was unbreakable and rashly accepted a challenge 
to test his captors. However G2 agents cheated by going to his cell when he was on 
exercise and taking the ashes from the fireplace where he had burned the papers on which 
he had “done his homework”. The ashes were brought to the Garda technical office in 
Kilmainham where they were pieced back together. Within two weeks of O’Reilly’s 
arrest, G2 passed details of his interrogation to MI5. Even before Hayes had managed to 
break O’Reilley’s code, Guy Liddell wrote to Bryan on 3 January 1944 saying he “would 
be delighted to come over when you think a suitable state of interrogation has been
54 Ibid.
55 John P. Duggan, Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich (Dublin, 1985), p. 229.
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reached” and that Bryan’s preliminary report to MI5 indicates “it might be o f a type not 
hitherto known here.” 58 By 21 January, Col. Bryan was able to cable MI5 that O ’Reilly’s 
code had been broken. The success of Bryan and Hayes in capturing and breaking 
Abwehr codes quickly spread in Allied diplomatic circles. Despite the factual inaccuracy 
of some of the stories, they served a useful purpose in impressing Allied diplomats. In 
1944 Maffey told Gray that the Irish had a very skilled cryptographer who had broken his 
code messages from London.59
A subsection of the G2 Code and Signals department monitored German radio 
transmissions targeted at Ireland. Many of these German propaganda broadcasts were in 
Irish. The G2 centre for monitoring these transmissions was in McKee Barracks and 
began it’s monitoring in December 1939. The army monitors reported on the content of 
the transmissions as well as the accent or dialect of Irish was being used. Although coded 
messages wrapped up in radio plays were missed by the monitors,60 G2 got a better 
picture of the German propaganda set up when one of the Irish broadcasters John 
O’Reilly was captured by G2 on a spying mission.61 As Allied forces closed in around 
Germany at the end of the war the broadcasts were disrupted as broadcasting 
headquarters had to be moved.
Of late the most publicised section within G2 during the Emergency was the 
Counterespionage Section. Its exploits in tracking German agents is mentioned in several 
Emergency studies.62 Despite its coverage in the past, this thesis will deal with the topic 
and focus on Dan Bryan and his important role in organising and running the Section.
56 Ibid. p. 230.
57 Ibid. pp 229-230.
58 David O’Donoghue, Hitler's Irish Voices (Dublin, 1998), p. 215.
59 Eunan O’Halpin, “Intelligence and Security in Ireland 1922-45” in Intelligence and National Security, vol. 
5 1990, p. 73.
60 David O’Donoghue, H itler’s Irish Voices (Dublin, 1998), p. 108.
61 Ibid. p. 92.
62 See John P. Duggan, Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich (Dublin, 1985) and Enno Stephan, Spies in 
Ireland (London, 1963).
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The Counterespionage Section was one of the first G2 sections to be reborn as a 
consequence of the looming conflict. Although the tenets of the Counterespionage 
Section were set out in a 1928 Department of Defence Memorandum, its renaissance 
followed the preliminary meetings Archer held with MI5 counterespionage officials in 
London in 1938.63 The reorganisation of the Counterespionage Section was to act as a 
forerunner to the other G2 sections. Its need to monitor telephone and postal 
correspondence brought other G2 sections into play and the licence the Counterespionage 
section was given to investigate IRA-German co-operation, brought military intelligence 
back into the domestic monitoring of Republican activity. The early effectiveness and 
success of the Counterespionage Section coupled with the fact that it developed a good 
working relationship with it’s British counterpart made G2’s position unassailable as war 
conditions escalated. Although a Garda body known as the Aliens Unit had been 
established with a similar brief, G2 was given the task of counterespionage since it was 
supposed that most other nations gave this task to their military.64 G2’s Counterespionage 
Section was primarily concerned with belligerent forces using Ireland as a spying base. 
Although much of the Section’s time was taken up with tracking British agents from rival 
intelligence agencies, it is most famous for its success in capturing and interrogating 
German agents.
Before the war, there was a small but influential German population of 
approximately four hundred residing in Ireland,.65 Many of them were well educated and 
had been requested to come to Ireland to aid technical developments. In 1926 the contract 
for the Shannon Hydro-Electric Scheme was given to the German firm Siemens, a 
number of whose engineers and technicians settled in Ireland along with others from
63 Defence Plans, Special Memorandum No.3. 1928, Territorial Organisation of the Defence Forces, pp 87- 
90, (Military Archives).
64 Department Foreigh Affairs A8/1, Defence Security Intelligence, 25 June 1945 (National Archives,
Dublin).
65 David O’Donoghue, Hitler's Irish Voices (Dublin, 1998), p. 7.
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German managed industrial developments. In addition to industrial technicians and 
managers, there were a number of Germans engaged in the study of Celtic and Irish 
culture, including Dr. Adolf Mahr a leading archaeologist and Celtic scholar who was 
appointed curator of the National Museum in Dublin.
In 1934, following the Nazi rise to power, a fresh impetus was given to German 
activities in Ireland, when foreign “Ausland” divisions of the party were formed. Dr. 
Mahr a party member was made leader of the Irish group which was a subsidiary of the 
British division. The membership of the Irish section of the Nazi party was never more 
than twenty, but many held influential positions in Irish society. As well as a small Nazi 
party, the German foreign propaganda agency known as the “Fichte Bund”, established 
contacts in Dublin. Mahr, together with a large number of Germans, returned home to 
attend the Nuremburg rallies. G2 intercepted one of his letters which suggested he was 
copying maps and supplying other military information on Ireland for the Germans. G2 
suspected that this information would form the basis of a German invasion plan for 
Ireland, “Operation Gruen”. Consequently when Mahr wished to return as Museum 
director, Bryan advised against his return and he was excluded.56
Towards the end of 1939 Liam D. Walsh an ex-Irish Army officer and former 
Second Bureau operative was found to be in correspondence with Oscar Pfaus of the 
Fichte Bund. Walsh submitted proposals to Pfaus to run a bureau and a paper in Ireland 
and was seeking funds. MI5 informed G2 of this, and G2 replied they had Walsh and 
other correspondence with the Fichte Bund under observation for some time. MI5 
reported further developments to G2, when they received a report that an undercover 
agent talked to Pfaus in New York pretending to be a pro-Nazi wanting to set up in
66 Ibid. p. 25.
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Ireland. Pfaus had given him Walsh’s name as a contact.67 It was particularly ironic that 
Walsh was under surveillance using the censorship proposals he himself had laid out 
during his time as an intelligence officer.68 G2 kept Walsh under close surveillance and 
found he was now working for the Italian legation while acting as adjutant or second in 
command to Blueshirt leader Eoin O’Duffy.69 Walsh was a member o f an Irish fascist 
group called the People’s National Party and later co-founded an organisation called the 
Irish Friends of Germany. G2 kept Walsh and his correspondence under observation 
which led them to two German agents, Walter Simon and Gunther Schütz who came to 
Ireland and were given Walsh’s name as a contact. Walsh tried to merge his Irish Friends 
of Germany organisation with the IRA, before he was finally interned in the Curragh for 
subversive activities.70 Following his arrest, in September 1940 his wife telegraphed the 
German Legation in Dublin demanding regular payments now that Walsh was interned. 
Although German Ambassador Hempel did not approve of the Fichte Bund and believed 
its propaganda was jeopardising his position it appears that the Abwehr thought Walsh 
could be useful.71
While G2 put all those they suspected of pro-Axis sympathies or those with even 
distant German connections under surveillance, anyone thought to be in contact with the 
IRA were immediately picked up. This vigilance against a German-IRA alliance stemmed 
not only from G2’s own priorities but also a desire to keep the British at bay. The 
Counterespionage Section had initially been established with help from MI5 with this in 
mind. Although split from Fianna Fail, by the mid 1930’s the IRA had gained some
support. Despite spending much of its time during this decade opposing the Blueshirt
67 Germans in Ireland before the War, Part I, p. 31. B1H Irish Section , MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, 
London KV4/9)
68 See Eunan O’Halpin, Aspects of Intelligence, in The Irish Sword, The Emergency 1939-45 p. 58 reference 
Censorship in time of war, 9 March 1925 (Military Archives, P/21560).
69 Donal O’Drisceoil, Censorship in Ireland 1939-1945, Neutrality, Politics and Society (Cork, 1996), p.
76.
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organisation, when the Second World War broke out, the IRA saw this as a case of 
“England’s difficulty is Ireland’s opportunity”. It was decided to carry out the S-PIan, a 
mainland bombing campaign of Britain. However the IRA at this point had a shortage of 
arms and in December 1939 they took the Army completely by surprise and raided the 
Magazine Fort in the Phoenix Park capturing a large quantity of arms and ammunition. 
This incident which Bryan described as “our Pearl Harbour” was highly embarrassing for 
the government, especially after Irish assurances to the British that the IRA threat was 
minimal. Searches and raids on Republicans and IRA headquarters were escalated which 
resulted in more ammunition being recovered than was actually taken. However this was 
just a foretaste of what was to follow. The Fianna Fail government introduced the
Offences Against the State Act in the summer of 1939 and in June 1940 the Emergency 
Powers Amendment Act. This Emergency legislation returned to the State draconian 
powers of internment, military tribunals and legal prosecution and sentencing without 
trial, powers similar to those used in the Civil War. Although theoretically this legislation 
was aimed at both belligerent agents and subversive organisations, the IRA suffered most 
from this legislation. Its members and supporters met harsh state treatment and its 
numbers dropped considerably. However, the IRA contributed to its own down fall. 
Following an internal IRA dispute, in June 1940 the IRA Chief of Staff Stephen Hayes 
turned himself in and was placed in police custody where he recorded a series of 
confessions. During the war, G2 infiltrated and tracked the IRA. Evidence suggests that 
G2 used the Department of External Affairs to gather information on IRA suspects 
abroad, especially in the US.72 Douglas Gageby a junior officer in G2 confirmed a 
separate section operated to deal with anti-IRA work.73 At times Bryan had to discourage 
G2 officers from pursuing republican contacts in order to appease the Gardai, though
71 John P. Duggan, Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich (Dublin, 1985), p. 150
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Bryan kept in touch with IRA informants. In fact Dan Bryan recalled receiving a good 
deal of information during the Emergency from “old foes”. Information on the MI5 
intelligence network established by the British passport control officer in Maffey’s office, 
was supplied to Bryan by an IRA member.74
Despite the weakness of the IRA, the British were convinced by the Magazine 
Fort episode that they were a large force and the German Abwehr saw them as a realistic 
ally for a German invasion or a fifth column. This and the fact that Germany would 
succeed in using Ireland as a base for espionage against Britain was G2’s main worry at 
the start of the war. Bryan paid attention to the foreign diplomats in Dublin and he knew 
the leanings of most of them. The German legation came in for particular scrutiny. Bryan 
had everyone who entered the German Embassy put under surveillance including T.D.’s 
like Dan Breen who was a frequent visitor.75 Although the Counterespionage Section had 
many IRA and German sympathisers under surveillance, the IRA’s pre-war talks with the 
Abwehr went undetected. The IRA’s S-Plan had aroused Abwehr interest and the ban on 
IRA contact was lifted. A German student studying in Dublin who was a member of the 
Foreign Nazi party offered to make contact with the IRA in 1938. Abwehr II as it was 
known turned him down on the grounds that it was forbidden to make IRA contact.76 
However following the escalation of the IRA S-Plan, Oscar Pfaus was sent by the Abwehr 
to make IRA contact in February 1939. Due to poor information which characterised 
most German agents missions to Ireland, he approached Eoin O’Dufty, sworn enemy of 
the IRA to put him in touch with the republican movement. However O’Duffy’s adjutant, 
Liam Walsh helped Pfaus to make contact. Bryan identified Pfaus and Walsh’s initial 
IRA go between as Joy Payne whom Bryan described as “a flapper”, However it is not
72 IRA Activities, Department of Foreign Affairs (National Archives, Dublin, A12).
73 Brian D. Martin, The Role of G2 during The Emergency 1939-45, M.A. Maynooth 1994, p. 40.
74 See Eunan O’Halpin, Aspects of Intelligence, in The Irish Sword, The Emergency 1939-45 p. 63
75 Dermot Keogh, Ireland and Europe 19¡9-1942 (Dublin, 1988), p. 179.
76 John P. Duggan, Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich (Dublin, 1985), p. 62.
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clear after this how much more G2 knew of these early meetings.77 Pfaus met Sedn
Russel, Chief of Staff of the IRA at the time and it was arranged that Jim O’Donavan an 
IRA man would be sent to Germany to instigate plans. O’Donavan a school teacher who 
masterminded the S-Plan with Stephen Hayes visited Germany in February, April and 
August 1939 before the war broke out. On his last trip to Germany however O’Donavan’s 
wife was stripped searched by an over zealous custom’s officer.78 At these meetings the 
S-Plan was discussed and arrangements made for sending agents to Ireland and supplying 
equipment.79 Shortly after O’Donavan’s meetings, the IRA sought to make contact with 
the Abwehr again as the radio they had been given had been confiscated in a police raid 
and they required a new one. Francis Stuart, a writer who had been offered a position in 
Berlin University’s English Department starting in January 1940, was contacted by the 
IRA who persuaded him to convey their message. Following Stuart’s departure, Sean
Russell the IRA Chief of Staff, also went to Germany via America. Although his 
movements in the US were picked up by G2 and MI5 he managed to make his way to 
Berlin, where he leamt German sabotage methods.
While in Germany, Stuart met Helmut Clissmann who introduced him to Kurt 
Haller. Haller approached Stuart to convey a message to the IRA concerning the return of 
Sean Russell. Russell was to return by U-Boat organised by both Haller and the German
Foreign Office’s coup d’etat specialist Edmund Vessenmeyer. Stuart was to travel to 
Ireland shortly before the U-Boats arrival to give the IRA notice of Russell’s arrival. 
However Stuart never had to make this trip as Russell died en-route. It is believed that 
Russell’s mission was to target British military installations in Northern Ireland. He was 
accompanied on the voyage by former IRA commander Frank Ryan. Ryan had been
77 Ibid. p. 60.
78 Ibid. pp 60-61.
79 Brian D. Martin, The Role of G2 during The Emergency 1939-45, M.A. Maynooth 1994, p. 39.
182
released from a Spanish prison where he had been interned by the Germans following the 
Spanish civil war. They had hoped to use him with Russell to further their sabotage plan. 
Although Ryan agreed he and Russell represented complete opposite strands of the 
Republican movement. Ryan had been a prominent member of the Republican left and 
the Republican Congress, this is probably why the Germans entrusted the details of the 
mission to Russell rather than Ryan. Ryan’s ignorance of the mission meant that 
following Russell’s death just off the Irish coast the U-Boat had to turn back.
Although Bryan was oblivious to these plans, Ryan’s dramatic departure from 
Spain caused him some consternation. Ryan while in the Spanish prison had been in 
correspondence with the Irish Envoy in Madrid, Leopold Keamey. Keamey handled some 
of Ryan’s mail from Ireland and had conducted appeals for his release. Following Ryan’s 
absence from prison in July 1940, External Affairs asked Keamey to get an official 
statement on the matter from the Spanish government. It replied in November 1940 that 
Ryan had officially escaped. Kearney’s diplomatic mail carrying correspondence to Ryan 
and also a visit from Helmut Clissmann’s wife aroused suspicions in both G2 and MI5 
circles. Archer in March 1941 informed External Affairs that they believed that Keamey 
was passing mail to Helmut Clissmann who was fighting with the German army in 
Belgium. Bryan also reported from censorship of Kearney’s mail it appeared that he had 
made contact with Ryan that had not been reported to External Affairs. Kearney’s mail 
which passed through the British censor was causing some concern with MI5. Bryan was 
under pressure to convince them that Kearney’s actions were under control. Further 
consternation in the MI5 camp was aroused when Keamey between November 1941 and 
May 1942, met with Helmut Clissman, Kurt Haller and Edmund Vessenmeyer. Keamey 
reported the Vessenmeyer meeting to Dublin and reported that “some information of 
value could be obtained by me” and that he left them without any doubt of Ireland’s
position of neutrality. Kearney’s meeting was immediately picked up by MI5 and
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consequently put great strain on the G2-MI5 link. However Bryan negotiated and assured 
MI5 that the appropriate steps would be taken to direct Kearney’s actions in the future. 
Keamey was recalled to Dublin in 1943, where he returned with details of the German 
meetings and a Spanish plan to form a neutral Catholic bloc which was also causing 
British concern. On his arrival in Dublin he was debriefed by Bryan, de Valera, Walshe 
and Frederick Boland. He was told in no uncertain terms not to go near the Germans or to 
entertain any involvement in a Catholic Bloc before he returned to Madrid.
Between 1939 and 1943 German agents were sent to Ireland to collect intelligence 
on the British and make contact with the Republican movement. Most agents were badly 
trained and equipped with hazy and sometimes false information. At the time a stranger 
appearing in a small coastal village would attract considerable attention. These factors 
together with security precautions such as supervision of mail and telephone 
communication aided G2’s counterespionage unit and ensured its efficiency.
Following Pfaus’s pre war contact with the IRA, the ensuing O’Donavan meetings
in Berlin and Stuart’s request for a transmitter, the Abwehr in February 1940 despatched
Ernest Weber Drohl to strengthen intelligence relations with the IRA. Unlike many
German agents, Weber Drohl had been to Ireland before. He had been given a transmitter
and money for the IRA, however on coming ashore from a submarine off the Sligo coast
he lost the transmitter. He managed to get to Dublin, contact Jim O’Donavan and gave
the IRA an invitation to send an agent to contact Germany for equipment and a shipment
of arms. In return he requested the IRA to target the British military rather than civilians.
Weber Drohl remained at large until 24 April, 1940 when he was arrested under the
Aliens Act. He was fined and then G2 had him released so that he could be watched and
followed. Three days after his release G2 picked him up and he was interned for a year.
He was released in 1941, worked in Ireland as a strongman under the name “Atlas the
Strong” and was re-intemed in August 1942. The fact that Hempel had knowledge of
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Weber Drohl and referred to him in his reports back to Germany as W. D. was of
80particular interest to G2.
The German espionage problem escalated by the Summer of 1940. Following the 
capture of Weber Drohl in April, on 5 May 1940 a German Abwehr agent Hermann 
Goertz parachuted into Meath. He was the only agent to remain at large for any length of 
time. Goertz was imprisoned in Britain in 1935 after he was caught sketching an RAF 
station in Kent. He was deported back to Germany in February 193981 and was asked by 
the German Supreme Command to go on a mission to Ireland. The purpose of this 
mission was to contact the IRA and organise an uprising in Northern Ireland.82 This plan 
was inspired by a Dublin man, Liam Gaynor in which he proposed an IRA attack on 
Northern Ireland supported by German paratroopers. An IRA supporter Stephen Held 
brought “Plan Kathleen” to Germany in April 1940. Despite the efficiency with which the 
S-Plan was being carried out, the IRA invasion plan was far from well thought through. 
Bryan who had access to agents who had infiltrated the IRA ensured that an outline of 
this plan reached his desk. He noted that “they were planning to bring German warships 
where you couldn’t bring a row boat”.
Goertz like Weber-Drohl lost his radio transmitter on his arrival in Ireland. He 
was given the contact address of Francis Stuart’s wife Iseult Stuart. He headed for her 
house in County Wicklow walking 120km to Laragh but on his way he left clues to his 
arrival. On 13 May G2 picked up their first evidence when Christopher O’Reilly a 
resident in Ballivor County Meath claimed he met a German parachutist who asked for 
directions to Wicklow. On 16 May Commadant RC Daly confirmed to G2 that an aircraft 
flew over Ballivor and the search was on for a parachutist.84 Once Goertz reached the
80 John P. Duggan, Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich (Dublin, 1985), p. 155.
81Brian D. Martin, The Role of G2 during The Emergency 1939-45, M.A. Maynooth 1994, p. 43.
82 Herman Goertz, Goertz Document 1944 (Military Archives, G2/1722).
83 John P. Duggan, Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich (Dublin, 1985), p. 230.
84 Herman Goertz, Goertz Document 1944 (Military Archives, G2/1722).
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Stuart’s house he was taken in and Jim O’Donavan was contacted. He collected Goertz 
and brought him to Stephen Held’s house in Templeogue. While staying at Held’s house 
he met Stephen Hayes, the ERA Chief of Staff following Russell’s departure. G2, 
probably through their IRA network, learned of Goertz’s arrival and on 22 May Held’s 
house was raided and some of Goertz’s possessions were found. Held was arrested but 
Goertz escaped to Laragh. He did not stay there long as Iseult Stuart was arrested on 25 
May. The Fall of France took place in May 1940 and a German invasion was now a 
possibility. This heightened MI5 tensions and placed a strain on their link with G2. The 
elusiveness of Goertz was one of their primary concerns.
Goertz remained at large during the Spring of 1941 but by this stage G2 had 
picked up his coded orders. According to Eamon de Buitlear, Goertz’s “orders were
relayed in a cypher which nobody could understand and I spent two years working on it 
while I was with the President, I succeeded in working out the system but I could not 
figure out its meaning”.83 The British had also been alerted to Goertz’s messages since 
some of them emanated from the German Legation which they were monitoring. 
Although Goertz’s code was intercepted, Goertz was beginning to move more freely. He 
made contact with General Hugo MacNeill who commanded the Second Division of the 
Irish Army during the Emergency. MacNeill who probably had sympathies for the Axis 
cause was a significant figure in the Irish army. He had led troops into Devlins during the 
Army Mutiny Affair and had been actively involved in the Defence Plans Division with 
Bryan. During the Economic War with Britain (1933-38) he talked to the Minister for 
Defence Frank Aitken about the possibility of fighting the British with small mobile 
columns. Bryan on his Command and Staff course in 1935 wrote a thesis demolishing this 
contention. According to Duggan “Conceptually these two were on a collision course that
85De Buitlear was aide de camp to Douglas Hyde between 1938-41. See Brian D. Martin, The Role of G2 
during The Emergency 1939-45, M.A. Maynooth 1994, p. 47.
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climaxed during the Emergency when MacNeill tried to bypass and belittle Bryan in 
intelligence work.”86 Bryan stressed, that while he distrusted MacNeill he had no 
concrete evidence linking him to Goertz.87. However without government knowledge 
MacNeill made contact with the German Legation and Goertz. MacNeill believed that 
Goertz could be used to reach an understanding between Ireland and Germany in the case 
of an Allied invasion. Bryan said that MacNeill had no authority to act as he did while G2 
continued searching for the agent88.
Florence O’Donoghue the SIS commander through his IRA contacts discovered 
that the ERA had planned Goetz’s escape in a boat from Kerry.89 O’Donoghue rounded up 
Goertz’s collaborators in Kerry. According to General Michael Costello, Goertz was 
captured but placed under the protection of a uniformed Garda, an IRA plant named Jim
Crofton, (controlled by Stephen Hayes) who allowed Goertz escape through the backdoor 
of the house in which he was held.90
Hempel the German Ambassador reported that Goertz was still at large and had 
met MacNeill and the head of Irish Military Intelligence. Bryan on seeing this report was 
outraged, and vehemently refuted any suggestion that official Irish intelligence had any 
contact with Goertz.91 By the autumn of 1941 Goertz was finding his mission very 
troublesome as co-operation from the IRA was not forthcoming. Although he collected 
information on British forces in Northern Ireland, his informants had no idea of military 
organisation and produced a lot of meaningless reports which were intercepted in transit 
by both G2 and the British. Following Stephen Hayes confessions, Hempel tried to 
distance himself from Goertz since if he was implicated it would give the Allies an
86 John P. Duggan, Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich (Dublin, 1985), p. 181.
87 ibid.
88 ibid. p. 192.
89 See Eunan O’Halpin, Aspects o f Intelligence, in The Irish Sword, The Emergency 1939-45 p. 62.
90 John P. Duggan, Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich (Dublin, 1985), p. 188.
91 A point which Duggan suggested he protested too much and that for an intelligence officer all sources 
must be protected at all costs, ibid. p. 267.
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excuse to remove the legation. Hempel recommended that the German High command 
repatriate the agent, to which they had no objection since they believed that both Irish and 
British Intelligence had him under surveillance. Goertz was eventually captured in Dublin 
in October 1941, after eluding the authorities for a year and a half. He was questioned 
and sent to Athlone where Butler and Hayes tricked Goertz into revealing the cipher to 
his code. Bryan passed this information to MI5 who gratefully accepted it.
With the exception of Goertz, G2 generally picked up German agents within days. 
Walter Simon alias Karl Anderson who had a previous conviction was picked up at once. 
Willy Preetz alias Paddy Mitchell who like Anderson had been inserted by U-Boat 
survived three weeks before he was found with a transmitter in the loft of a shop in 
Westland Row. Three German agents landed from a French yacht off the south coast in 
July 1940 were quickly picked up when one of them asked a bus conductor a question in 
Irish! By 1941 the Germans were enlisting native Irish recruits for spying missions since 
almost all their previous attempts failed to blend in. One man Joseph Lenihan a relation 
of the prominent Fianna Fail family, was recruited by the Germans while a farm labourer
on the Channel Islands. He volunteered to spy for the Germans and was dropped in the 
Dublin-Meath area on 18 July 1941. Lenihan decided to make his way to the North and 
turned himself in to the British. He was questioned and gave information on German 
intelligence activities in Holland and Paris.92 MI5 who codenamed him “Basket” sought 
to use him as a double agent to feed the Abwehr false information. The Abwehr planned 
that Lenihan would set up a weather station in Sligo. In an effort to persuade the Irish to 
collaborate with British intelligence, they sent Lenihan’s surrendered transmission set to 
Bryan and flew Lenihan to England. They released him with the stipulation that he keep 
in touch. However, Lenihan vanished and Joe Walshe from External Affairs would not 
entertain using the radio in a British double cross operation. G2 thought that Lenihan
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might be involved with the criminal underworld of wartime Europe. However another 
theory suggests that he was siphoned back over the border and integrated into the double- 
cross system93.
G2’s security and counterespionage success during the war was, as O ’Halpin has 
pointed out, largely due to the men who successively ran the organisation, Liam Archer 
and Dan Bryan. Running on a tight budget with inexperienced staff they managed to 
safeguard the State policy of neutrality albeit “Friendly Neutrality”. The 
Counterespionage, Censorship, Code and Signals, Coastwatching and the other Sections 
established G2 as the premiere security organisation in the state.
92 Part II, Joseph Lenihan, p. 53, MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, London KV4/9).
93 John P. Duggan, Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich (Dublin, 1985), p. 156.
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CONCLUSION
Dan Bryan’s career coincides with a series of important turning points in Irish 
history which saw the birth and development of the Irish state. His career spanned a war 
of independence, a civil war, a world war and many potential revolutions in between. The 
high’s and lows of a military career dedicated to intelligence, reflects the early 
development of the Irish military intelligence organisation. He saw Irish intelligence 
develop from the famously effective but ad-hoc organisation under Collins, to the highly 
structured and organised machine it became under his guidance during the Emergency.
Although always appearing in the background, Bryan played a major role in 
upholding the security of the state. The most characteristic element of Bryan’s career is 
that at a time when today’s security staff were continually becoming tomorrow’s 
subversives, Bryan remained the one constant star. Despite political fluctuations and a 
series of new mangers and controllers of the state intelligence system, Bryan remained to 
the fore. He had a useful knack of backing the winning side.
Between 1922-1945, Irish military intelligence was involved in many of the state 
threatening incidents in Irish history. Bryan plays a part in most of these incidents, and 
due to his influence over the Department, its presence usually exerted a stabilising effect 
returning power to the status quo, ensuring that the security of the elected power was 
guaranteed. Although Bryan was a military officer, he was first and foremost a democrat. 
He continually protects and secures the elected political authorities, despite his own 
personal feelings or reservations about them. This professionalism which characterised 
Bryan’s career was alien to many sections o f the Army, including the Intelligence 
Department. However his presence had a major effect in ensuring the Department and the 
Army remained loyal to the political authorities of the day.
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Bryan took the pro-Treaty side during the Civil War. From a democratic stance 
this was the elected choice. However, Bryan’s inclination was as much due to his own 
family political background which became ardent Cumann na nGaedhael supporters and 
the influence of GHQ officers such as Mulcahy and Collins as his own democratic 
principals.1 His work during the Civil War period saw him establish a network of 
informants and agents around Dublin, which helped the Free State army capture and 
puncture Republican resistance within the capital. Although this work by Free State 
military intelligence proved highly successful in safeguarding the political majority of the 
day, Bryan arrested and interrogated former friends and colleagues from the Dublin 
Brigade.
Bryan’s resolve at maintaining democratic state security did not stop there. When 
an internal espionage war broke out from within the Intelligence Department and the 
Army, loyalty to the state was in doubt. Bryan and his Second Bureau’s Ex-Army section 
were responsible for unmasking and tracking down the mutineers long before and after 
the coup was supposed to have finished.
The Mutiny was followed by a politically motivated purge of the Army Council 
and despite Bryan’s close affiliation with some of its members he managed to survive.
At another key moment in 1932, when Fianna Fail were about to take power, in
the midst of rumour o f victimisation and army pension cuts, Bryan and Chief of Staff 
Michael Brennan uncovered and prevented another coup by a strong Cumann na 
nGaedhael section of the Army, this time aimed at overthrowing the new Fianna Fail
government. Just as Bryan had compromised friendly relations with former comrades in
1 Bryan’s father canvassed as a local Cumann na nGaedhael councillor in Kilkenny in the 1920’s. Bartley 
Bryan, Interview with author 20-09-98, Dunbell Co. Kilkenny.
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pursuing Republicans, he would not turn a blind eye to this new threat to democracy by 
his fellow officers.
Bryan and the Intelligence Department were now under the control o f Fianna Fail,
members of which he had personally tracked, harried, arrested and interned. However as 
is characteristic of his career, his democratic principals and respect for the Army’s 
position within the State maintained a smooth working relationship. He worked for the 
Irish government whatever party was in power, under orders his allegiance lay nowhere 
else and his professionalism influenced the rest of the Intelligence Department.
Bryan and military intelligence moved into a new period of active operations 
during the Emergency. G2’s work was paramount in protecting and safeguarding the 
state. It is unequivocal that it was largely G2’s actions that saved the State from invasion 
or incursion.
Bryan’s career illustrates the continuous conflict between the military and 
political elites. During the War of Independence while Bryan served in the Dublin 
Brigade there was feint regard by the volunteer military organisation for the political 
authority and orders of the Dail. GHQ, the soldiers on the ground in the Brigades and the
Flying Columns resented political control of the IRA. Despite attempts during the truce of 
July to December 1921 to impose Dail authority, IRA GHQ continued to resist. When
Biyan officially enlisted in the Provisional Army in July 1922, political forces had made 
some progress at securing loyalty. The IRA was split and new recruits without the War of 
Independence mindset were being taken into the Provisional Government Army. Despite 
this many officers were kept in check by the dual Dail and GHQ membership of leaders
such as Mulcahy and Collins. Following the Civil War, political forces (then Cumann na 
nGaedhael) made an effort to take control and Minister for Defence Mulcahy scaled
down and re-organised the Army to make it suitable for a peacetime existence. This
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caused animosity within the ranks and culminated in the Army Mutiny of 1924. The 
outcome of the Mutiny ended any doubt over army loyalty and ensured political 
dominance.
Although there was the popular support for a democratic state, the success of 
democracy was due more to the political skill of its proponents than it was to idealism. 
The army officers involved in the 1924 Mutiny were completely out of their depth when 
pitted with O’Higgins, Cosgrave, Mulcahy or even McGrath. Unknowingly they were 
used as pawns in an internal political squabble. As the military bowed to the 
democratically elected government in 1924, the Intelligence Department did likewise in 
1926. Bryan complained about the loss of Intelligence Department power over internal 
affairs, but not on a political level. He upheld the right of political authority over the 
army and his complaint was professional, targeted at the tactics and poor intelligence 
work of Nelligan’s Special Branch. The 1932 plot to overthrow Fiaiina Fail, the last
attempt at military supremacy over political authority failed miserably.
During the Emergency, after Bryan regained political confidence and was running 
G2, much of his reporting and work was directly ordered by and given to Mr. de Valera, 
Joseph Walshe and Frederick Boland within the Department of External Affairs. This 
ordering, reporting and co-operation between the political controllers and military 
intelligence did not exist in previous years.
Another feature of Bryan’s career mentioned by other commentators is his alleged 
pro-British stance. With increasing analysis of Irish neutrality policy during the 
Emergency, the popular view held after the war that Ireland was sympathetic to the Axis 
cause or even impartial has been dismissed. The policy which has been called “friendly 
neutrality” best describes the co-operation which the Irish authorities gave the Allied 
forces. However as this policy has been uncovered, Bryan and his personal convictions
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have been described as strongly pro-British by many commentators. It has to be stated 
that this is a fair assumption. His relationship with his British counterparts in MI5 
reached such a level that he kept in contact with many of it’s operatives informally long 
after the war had ended. His relations with Cecil and Guy Liddell were extremely good. 
Bryan’s friendly relationship was most pleasing to MI5 and as one MI5 commentator 
exclaimed:
Colonel Archer though at all times friendly and absolutely fair in his dealings, was 
a strong Irish nationalist and inclined to limit his co-operation rather strictly. He was a 
conscientious, but not enthusiastic Intelligence officer. Colonel Bryan while just as 
mindful of his duty to his country, was wrapped up in intelligence work for its own sake.2
As is evident the professionalism which Bryan brought to the intelligence 
department impressed the British, however it did not impress some Irish officers. An 
example of which was Bryan’s conflict with de Buitlear his second in command during
the Emergency over releasing codes to the British. According to Duggan, Bryan viewed 
de Buitlear as “a dyed in the wood Gaelic Leaguer”.3 Bryan’s stance also came into
conflict with fellow officer Hugo MacNeill over his proposed plan to attack Britain 
during the Economic War. Bryan poured scorn on MacNeill’s plan while MacNeill had 
been highly critical of Bryan’s intelligence work during the Emergency.
There is no doubt that during the Emergency Bryan strongly favoured the British 
and Allied side. However being pro-British is not the same as being anti-Irish or 
unpatriotic. In his defence, Bryan realised that good relations with Britain were essential 
to any Defence policy for Ireland. The British superior naval and military capabilities, 
control of the North East and geographical proximity meant that it would be unrealistic to 
ignore them when drafting defence plans. Bryan’s friendly relations with MI5 played a
2 Part II, The Development of the Security Service Link with Dublin, p. 54, MI5 2nd World War Files (PRO, 
London KV4/9).
3 John P. Duggan, Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich (Dublin, 1985), p. 230.
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major role in both impressing Irish desires and in allaying British fears. It prevented 
conscription in Northern Ireland, defused misunderstanding over Kearney’s talks with the 
Germans in Spain, allayed British fears about the German Legation transmitter, Hermann 
Goertz and advance warning and co-operation in the event of an Axis invasion. Without 
Bryan’s “Friendly Neutrality” the outcome of the Emergency may have been significantly 
different.
Although Bryan’s co-operation and personal support for the allied side was 
evident, that is not to say that he was unwilling to contemplate war against a British 
invasion. He had fought the British before and despite compromising his own powers, his 
loyalty to the state had been displayed on numerous occasions in his career. Writing after 
the Emergency he said:
In October 1939 the British government asked Ireland for the ports but the request 
was refused by the Taoiseach, Mr. de Valera. The existence of this problem and the fear 
that it might lead to a major crisis in Anglo-Irish relations led to one situation which the 
defence forces had to visualise and be prepared to cope with.4
Although he was willing to contemplate all out war against the British, Bryan 
could be criticised for the lack of precautions he took to prepare for it. Although G2 plans 
especially work of the SIS and mention of co-operation with B.T.N.I. against a German 
invasion have been uncovered, similar measures for a British invasion appear absent. 
Although their absence could be due to G2’s incompetence, it could also be due to the 
sensitive nature of the files which may still be restricted or even destroyed. Despite Bryan 
being pursued by a number of researchers, he never detailed contingency plans for a 
British invasion. However Bryan was aware of its sensitivity and the Official Secrets Act.
Bryan and the Military Intelligence Department were a testament to a new state 
bom in turbulent times. Much of the rocky negotiation of the state in it’s infancy and well 
into it’s later childhood was negotiated and steered by Bryan, though very much from the
4 Dan Bryan, “The Days of Emergency” in Irish Times 3 September, 1979.
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background. His professionalism and dedication to intelligence and state security matters 
played a major role in shaping the development of the Intelligence Department. He with 
others such as Liam Archer, Michael Costello and even the early foundations which 
Mulcahy and General Sean MacMahon applied, transformed it from the Dublin focused
non-specific operation under Collins, to the national and specialised organisation it 
became in the early 1920’s and during the G2 period of the Emergency. Bryan’s influence 
throughout the Department in Parkgate Street was felt long after he left. Many younger 
officers such as Douglas Gageby who came under his influence in wartime showed a 
particular regard for his expertise.5
Bryan completed much work for the Military History society and contributed to 
other various historical journals after the Emergency. He continued in Parkgate Street 
until 1952. Following the war he played a substantial role in preparing the department for 
a peace time existence. During the Cold war he organised studies into preparing for a 
nuclear and Global conflict. Although Bryan never complained he felt a little aggrieved at 
being passed over for promotion. Ironically he believed this to have been a political 
decision, made by the very institution which he had for so long secured.6 although it has 
been suggested it was due to his specialisation in intelligence.7
Bryan’s intriguing career and life mirrors the success and plight of a new state 
emerging in uncertain times. It is hoped that this study has helped to enlighten the 
situation somewhat and has given the reader a fuller grasp of Irish military intelligence in 
the period.
5 Douglas Gaegby, “Colonel Dan Bryan, An Appreciation” in Irish Times 18 June, 1985.
6 Suggestion that it was given to “A Fianna Fail” supporter. Bartley Bryan, Interview with author 20-09-98, 
Dunbell Co. Kilkenny.
1. Confidential Source.
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Appendix 1
Directors of Military Intelligence
NAME DATE
Duggan Mar 1918 - Feb 1919
Collins Feb 1919 - June 1922
McGrath July 1922 - Oct 1922
Tobin Oct 1922 - Dec 1922
O’Hegarty Dec 1922 - Apr 1923
Hogan Apr 1923 - Sept 1923
Nelligan Sept 1923 - Oct 1923
Costello Oct 1923 - Mar 1926
O’Carroll Mar 1926 - July 1927
Henry July 1927 - Mar 1928
Morkan Mar 1928 - May 1928
Cotter May 1928 - May 1929
O’ Connell May 1929 - Mar 1932
Archer Mar 1932 - June 1941
Bryan June 1941 - Mar 1952
Source: Director Roil Board, Military Archives.
Dates for Duggan’s appointment are based on Sean Kavanagh, one of Collins’ agents, “About the time 
Collins became Adjutant General an intelligence Department was set up”. Collins became Adjutant General 
in March 1918. Sean Kavanagh, “The Irish Volunteers’ Intelligence Organisation” in Capuchin Annual 
1969, p. 354.
Date for Collins’ appointment estimated as early in 1919, referred to in Richard Mulcahy, “Chief of Staff 
1919” in Capuchin Annual 1969, pp 343-344.
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Appendix 2 
List of those killed by Dublin murder gang.
John Stephens, found in Inchicore, 2 September 1922
Michael Neville, found in Killester, 24 September 1922
Edwin Hughes,
Brendan Holohan and
Joseph Rogers found in Clondalkin, 10 October 1922.
Francis Lawlor, found in Milltown, 28 December 1922
Thomas O’Leary, found in Rathmines, 23 March 1923
Robert Blondfield, found in Clondalkin, 30 March 1923
Charles Breslin and Joseph Keaman, found separately in Cabra 3 April 1923
Martin Hogan, found in Milltown, 23 April 1923
Source: Based on John P. Hanley, Truce, Treaty and Civil war in Dublin city 1921-23, M.A. 
Maynooth 1995, p. 130.
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Appendix 3
Staff Levels at B1H, MIS’s Irish Section during World W ar II.
Staff. Officers. Secretaries.
September 1939-May 1940 1 1
May 1940-November 1940 2 2
November 1940-February 1941 3 3
February 1941 -March 1941 4 4
March 1941-July 1941 5 6
July 1941-March 1943 6 8
March 1943-November 1943 4 4
November 1943-November 1944 3 3
November 1944-Decembeer 1945 2 2
Source: Table taken from MI5 Second World War Files, B1H Irish Sectional report, PRO,
London KV4/9
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